TWO:
Chapter 2 outlines typical problems in current public service outsourcing. Complex public contracts are inevitably incomplete, leaving gaps and ambiguities, and allowing discretion in their delivery, which contracting parties may exploit for their benefit. Exploitation becomes particularly problematic where the state relies repeatedly on private partners, creating risks of incumbency and lock-in effects that can give rise to dependencies, transferring capacity from the public to the private sector, sometimes permanently (in the form of institutional knowledge, for example). Where private suppliers operate a highly financialized governance model, incentives to exploit both incomplete contracting and incumbency situations are further reinforced.
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