Hayek, Arrow, and the Problems of Democratic Decision–Making

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Peter J. Boettke James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax - USA

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Peter T. Leeson James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax - USA

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Both Hayek and Arrow provide arguments about the inability of the vote process to yield a coherent social choice. Hayek demonstrated that planning is incompatible with democracy; its coherence requires dictatorship. Arrow demonstrated that voting fails to produce rational social choices; social rationality can be assured only when there is a single will. In both, the substitution of a single will for the many wills is ruled as incompatible with a free society. Because market socialism relies upon either the existence of a meaningful, stable social welfare function or democratic decision-making to allocate resources, the complementary arguments of Hayek and Arrow imply that market socialism requires dictatorship to achieve coherence.

Peter J. Boettke James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax - USA

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Peter T. Leeson James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax - USA

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* E-mail: pboettke@gmu.edu; fax: +703.9357535; tel: +703.9931149

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