Cover Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice
Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice

The Differential Calculus of Consent

Authors:
Francesco Parisi School of Law, George Mason University, 3401 North Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA, 22201-4498, USA

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Jonathan Klick School of Law, George Mason University, 3401 North Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA, 22201-4498, USA

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Article Category:
Research Article
Copyright:
© AESP 2002
Online Publication Date:
Oct 2002
Pages:
115–123
Publisher:
Bristol University Press
Volume/Issue:
Volume 20: Issue 2-3
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1332/251569202X15665366114888
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Existing treatments of the choice of an optimal voting rule ignore the effects of the rule on political bargaining. Specifically, more stringent majority requirements reduce intra-coalitional free riding in political compromise, leading to greater gains from political trade. Once this benefit of increasing the vote share necessary to enact a proposal is recognized, we suggest that the optimal voting rule in the presence of transactions costs will actually be closer to unanimity than the optimal majority derived by Buchanan - Tullock [1962].

Francesco Parisi School of Law, George Mason University, 3401 North Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA, 22201-4498, USA

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and
Jonathan Klick School of Law, George Mason University, 3401 North Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA, 22201-4498, USA

Search for other papers by Jonathan Klick in
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* E-mail: parisi@gmu.edu; fax: 703-993-8088; tel: 703-993-8036

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