Managerial Discretion, Incentives and Governance Rules for Non–Profit Organizations

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Maria Alessandra AntonelliIstituto di Economia e Finanza, Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Piazzale A. Moro 5, 00185, Rome - Italy

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This paper analyzes the effects of managerial discretion and some possible solutions in non-profit sector. It is shown how the traditional incentives’ mechanisms are modified in a non-profit setting. In particular, market, reputational and ideological incentives are considered. The analysis highlights that new governance rules are necessary. In this context a new financial model is analyzed where the competition between for-profit and non-profit firms is extended from the products level to that of private financing.

Maria Alessandra AntonelliIstituto di Economia e Finanza, Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Piazzale A. Moro 5, 00185, Rome - Italy

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* E-mail: alessandra.antonelli@uniromal.it; fax: +390649910648; tel: +390649910392

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