Old and New Theories of Fiscal Federalism, Organizational Design Problems, and Tiebout

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Giampaolo Garzarelli Dipartimento di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi, Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Rome - Italy

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This work intends to contribute to the Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism that studies fiscal federalism through contemporary economic and industrial organization theory. First, it establishes context by introducing the two classic motivations in support of federalism, namely, incentives and knowledge. Second, it succinctly discusses the incentive-based organizational approach of the SGT. Third, it shows that the Tiebout model already embeds an organizational approach, which instead rests on a knowledge motivation.

Giampaolo Garzarelli Dipartimento di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi, Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Rome - Italy

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E-mail: ggarzarelli@tiscali.it; fax +39064453870; tel. +390649910627

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