An Analogy: Symmetric Tragedies and Calculus of Consent
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Any thoughtful reader would recognize the similarity between the anticommons [BUCHANAN - YOON, 2000] and the decision making costs in The Calculus of Consent [BUCHANAN - TULLOCK, 1962]. In both cases, the veto power of participants generates inefficient or costly outcomes. This analogy may suggest that there is an internal logic between the two literatures. The analogy, however, stops here and the internal logic cannot be generalized. The Calculus of Consent is concerned with a selection of a collective decision making rule from behind a veil of uncertainty in a constitutional convention, while anticommons considers individual decision making over alternatives under already defined existing rules. Yet, it can be instructive to clarify the differences. External costs and decision making costs in calculus are compared to commons and anticommons problems by introducing different property regimes.
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