A model of tax evasion and taxpayers’ perception about public goods provision

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  • 1 University of Messina, , Italy
  • | 2 University of Calabria, , Italy
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We analyse the impact of public spending on tax evasion using a two-period model in which the government and taxpayers make their decisions in terms of level and quality of expenditures to set and taxes to pay. Results predict that tax evasion increases with government inefficiency.

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