Discretion as blame avoidance: passing the buck to local authorities in ‘welfare reform’

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Jed Meers University of York, UK

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This paper argues that central governments can avoid blame for cuts to social security by giving local authorities discretionary powers. When making reductions to entitlements, conferring discretion avoids delineating who is affected, allowing for conflicts in policy formation to be deliberately fudged, decisions to be shielded from the gaze of the public and the courts, and responsibility for the impact of budget reductions to be externalised. Using three ‘welfare reforms’ in the UK as examples – the Council Tax Reduction Scheme, Discretionary Housing Payments, and local welfare assistance schemes – four ‘blame avoidance’ functions of conferring discretion are proposed.

Jed Meers University of York, UK

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