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Since its founding, Convict Criminology (CC) has evolved into an international approach, group, organisation, and network with a relatively coherent set of objectives. Although little thought was put into CC’s development beyond the US, the original intent of CC was primarily to develop a network of individuals who were united around its core ideas. Due to both the constraints of international travel for ex-convicts and the financial burden for people to travel, originally it made best sense for people interested in the CC perspective to meet at the local level. Over time, because of advances in telecommunication platforms like Facetime, Skype, and Zoom, members of the CC network realised that meeting face-to-face on a regular basis was not necessary. Thus, the importance of local or even national approaches to CC were not necessary. This paper briefly examines the international components of CC and the authors’ views that, while individual country groups of CC members may have been advantageous in the early stages of CC, it is no longer necessary, if not counterproductive.
This chapter argues that the realities of civil–military relations in Vietnam defy the Western models that dominate the literature. The control architecture underlying this relationship is based on the mutual embeddedness of the military and the Communist Party. While the Party exerts political control over the military, the military’s participation and influence in elite politics and policymaking are not only legitimate but also an integral part of the architecture. The chapter explicates the architecture of Vietnam’s civil–military relations and charts the military’s influence in politics since the Third Indochina War. It shows that, paradoxically, military conflict is not the only and not even the main reason for a surge in the military’s influence in Vietnamese politics and foreign policy after the Cold War. The military gained more influence because it assumed a major political role. While the military’s influence has been on the wane recently, the Party’s control continues to prevail over the trends of commercialization and professionalization.
This book explores civil-military relations in Asia. With chapters on individual countries in the region, it provides a comprehensive account of the range of contemporary Asian practices under conditions of abridged democracy, soft authoritarianism or complete totalitarianism.
Through its analysis, the book argues that civil-military relations in Asia ought to be examined under the concept of ‘Asian military evolutions.’ It demonstrates that while Asian militaries have tried to incorporate standard, western-derived frameworks of civil-military relations, it has been necessary to adapt such frameworks to suit local circumstances. The book reveals how this has in turn led to creative fusions and novel changes in making civil-military relations an asset to furthering national security objectives.
The eras that preceded the Jokowi years and the fossilization of the views and values therein, is one factor that has contributed to the TNI’s evolution into its present form. This path dependency can be summarized as follows: because civilians are to be mistrusted and only the military knows what is best for the nation, TNI entrenchment in economic, political and social life is both natural and necessary. An additional factor is Jokowi’s need for legitimacy, which has compelled him to accommodate figures associated with the New Order. Accordingly, this chapter goes into greater depth than existing scholarship in analysing the ideology and actions of military hardliners who have surrounded the president. Leaning on and delegating authority to such figures has shifted civil–military relations in favour of the TNI, particularly when it comes to MOOTW, in numerous ways. This chapter considers several of them: Army counterterrorism manoeuvring, proxy war threat inflation, old guard anti-communism and the TNI’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. All represent military entrenchment couched in a serious distrust of civilian leadership.
This concluding chapter reviews the key analytical threads and arguments of the book, returning to the concept of ‘double activation’ and tracing the interconnections (conceptually and at the level of street-level practice) between the quasi-market governance of employment services and workfarist activation. It reviews the key dynamics by which quasi-marketisation intensifies a street-level orientation towards enacting a more demanding, workfare-oriented activation model: through how it reconfigures the profile of organisations and people working at the frontline of service delivery (politics of professionalism), and through applying more intensive performance management accountability regimes that discipline street-level workers’ exercises of administrative discretion. Finally, the book concludes by assessing the evidence-base for a demanding, workfarist model of activation and the reasons why governments continue to favour ‘work-first’ strategies despite limited evidence of their effectiveness.
This closing chapter attempts to plumb an Asian contribution to civil–military relations by revisiting the research questions set out in Chapter 1. Chiefly, the idea of melding civilian progress and material well-being in a defence statement is an Asian formulation that echoes across the 13 country studies in this book. Three big themes emerge: the enduring impact of colonialism by foreign powers and other legacies of the past, civil–military fusion and its links to development and political guardianship of the nascent modern Asian state and lastly, civil–military relations and its connection with defence diplomacy and MOOTW. Asian military evolutions are revealing of cumulative and synthetic slow-motion phenomena unfolding across the region’s politico-security landscape, but it will prove rewarding to study them if one does not always associate the Asian military in stark formations like authoritarianism versus democracy.
South Korea is not completely distinct in its practice of civil–military relations from the rest of Asia. As we argue in this chapter, the tussle over democracy in civil–military relations is more a symptom than a primary explanatory framework for South Korea. This is in view of the heavy social, psychological and ideological burdens imposed by the legacies of Japanese colonialism, as well as the panicked improvisation of the South Korean economic growth strategies that started under General Park Chung-hee’s direction between 1961 and 1979. Today, the failure to fully civilianize, or better yet, to fully liberalize, remains endemic to the South Korean political system. The threat from North Korea serves as a political prop for authoritarian elites. In short, South Korea’s current political stability was attained at a cost and its economic powerhouse status achieved through compromises arbitered by military rule and justified against a geopolitical environment of exaggerated insecurity.
For Bangladesh, defence diplomacy has evolved as a cornerstone of its military since the restoration of democracy in 1991. This chapter highlights the evolving roles and activities of the Bangladesh Armed Forces in this context as well as an extension of traditional diplomacy of the country. The military’s training and education facilities foster international cooperation and regularly host members of foreign armed forces. Bangladesh’s involvement in United Nations peacekeeping in particular has been instrumental in strengthening the defence diplomacy sector and has become an inseparable part of the military’s identity. It is argued that Bangladesh succeeded in promoting itself as a keeper of international peace and security through its participation in peacekeeping. Consequently, the chapter concludes that despite its peripheral position Bangladesh has been able to carve out its own space in international politics by virtue of promoting soft power through defence diplomacy, notwithstanding the fact that these activities are often circumscribed by manifold challenges.
This chapter examines the state of civil–military relations in India against the backdrop of the country being a major military power in the Indo-Pacific. The chapter also profiles the evolution of India’s civil–military relations by examining the changing relationship between the different members of its defence leadership and its resulting impact on the nation’s military effectiveness. The chapter engages with contemporary debates in India’s defence management concerning national security policy, jointness among forces, bureaucratic efficiency, force modernization and development, and politico-military diplomacy to discern the parameters of civilian control over the Indian military organization. It is concluded that India’s institutional framework of higher defence management is unsuitable for its current security obligations and requires critical policy adjustments.
Since 2010, Ireland has followed a well-trodden path of extending the project of welfare reform beyond the activation of claimants to the ‘double’ activation of the organisations and frontline workers responsible for implementing active labour market policies on the ground. This chapter takes a closer look at ‘double activation’ as an analytical lens, and why the concept holds significance beyond describing the conjunction between the two tracks of welfare reform. What is it about the parallel unfolding of governance reforms of delivery organisations that is of wider interest to the shape of activation reform? The chapter also introduces the Governing Activation in Ireland study underpinning this book: the research design and how the study differed from previous studies of the impacts of marketisation on the frontline delivery of employment services. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the underlying conceptual linkages between workfare and marketisation, drawing attention to the theories of motivation they share and the ways in which they each involve a normative commitment to the commodification of claimants.