Research
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A calm desire of the good, benevolence belongs to constantia and not to pertubatio, according to the typology of passions elaborated by Cicero. The first one is a peaceful and natural tendency in order to understand our human condition. The second one corresponds to a reactive, brief, and lively disorder without control of reason. Globalization, as a product of modernity, flirts much more with the disruptive side of uncontrolled passions than with the channelling side of affections animated by constancy, patience, and consequence. At least until now. The question here is not of opposing globalization head on, but of seeing how, when it appears in the light of an untimely and unrestrained movement, it produces deleterious effects. Such a perspective does not erase the presence and the expression of a sensitivity to calm that benevolence feeds on as a moral disposition, and that diplomats incorporate in their ways of considering the relationship with otherness. On the one hand, this sensitivity offers a counterpoint to the exacerbated drifts of globalization. On the other hand, it directs the gaze towards a more balanced and probably more enlightened globalization. Benevolence is based here on another feeling in terms of rhythm: slowing down. It also implies another perception in terms of acoustics: to resonate.
Realist conceptions of the milieu ignore the fundamental idea that the global environment is similar to a living organism necessary for the existence of its inhabitants. The anchoring in the global environment presents here a double aspect as an integration of human beings in the natural environment and in society. This sensitivity to the good as an expression of inclusion finds in diplomatic activity a manifest field of development since it is essential to maintain the link with the other. This sensitivity is embedded in norms. They are not only natural law or subtle obligations considered imperfect because they are not a source of sanctions. They can be transformed into rules of positive law, thus revealing their character as pillars within international relations.
Ordinary individuals in international relations not only embody violence, suffering, and indifference; they also seem totally subordinated to the impotence produced by the burden of responsibility for the fate of all vulnerable human beings across the world. These ordinary individuals also engage in benevolent actions. They adopt practices aimed at the good of others and even of nature, but in proximity. It is indeed at this local scale that benevolence finds its primary and probably most intense dynamic. As Hutcheson pointed out, benevolence, like gravitation, is stronger the closer bodies get ‘and come to touch’. But this scale is by no means disconnected from the rest of international relations, since it remains linked to issues that cross borders, such as environmental protection, the preservation of solidarity links, or, of course, migrations. Such behaviours echo the ‘supererogatory morality’ evoked by Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Fuelled by ‘an acute sensitivity to the feelings and desires of others’, it goes beyond the requirements of justice and ‘is not suitable for ordinary beings’. However, certain moral conducts testify to a movement beyond the ordinary. They tend towards the centre of the benevolence continuum and activate its positive component (to help and improve the conditions of the vulnerable as well as of fellow human beings).
Some states are cultivating an exit strategy, ostensibly turning their backs on the ‘multilateral way of life’, as with Brexit or the populist choices in the Trump era. A crisis of functionality such as a weakening of the ‘functional triangle’ that links legitimacy (acting in the name of the interests of all), representativeness (composing a fair whole), and effectiveness (acting to produce the desired effects) of intergovernmental organizations. The stalled reform of the United Nations, particularly that of the Security Council, and the exhaustion of peace operations are striking illustrations of this. A crisis of normativity. This is due to the salient divisions between Western countries and emerging countries, and, more broadly, among countries of the South, as to the conceptions of human rights and the values that make it possible to achieve universality. How can we put an end to this awkwardness in multilateralism? By reviving solidarism. Multilateralism would find its true matrix in the awareness of the chains that link us all, individuals and nations, past, present, and future generations. But nothing can be done without education. Benevolence as a project as extensive as possible and within the limits of our finitude supposes awareness. It is already at work. We just have to take care of and enrich it.
In this first English-language edition of a sole-authored book from Frédéric Ramel, benevolence is defined as a moral principle which promotes temperance and attention to vulnerability. Ramel unpacks this concept, analyses its received meanings in different contexts and spells out its practical and ethical implications in detail.
In preparing this work for an English-speaking readership, the author undertook extensive revisions and included two additional chapters. It also includes a foreword from Chris Brown, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The French edition was published as La Bienveillance Dans Les Relations Internationales.
Traditionally, benevolence appears in international relations with the features of two state figures: the ‘benevolent neutral’ state that places itself outside of an armed conflict, and the ‘benevolent hegemonic’ state whose leadership makes it possible to institute an order that is beneficial to all members of the interstate society. This definition provides a restrictive reading of benevolence by focusing on the interest of a third or powerful state. Indeed, to think of benevolence as international practice, that is, material goodness, is to identify state actions guided by a moral sense beyond neutrality and leadership. It is essentially through the prism of moderation in diplomatic and strategic relations between states that it can be observed. It is deployed through no-harm or negative benevolence as well as temperance or positive benevolence. Both have a complementary virtue, that of vigilance in order to avoid the worst or to reasonably promote the good. This movement from negative benevolence to positive benevolence reveals a sequential approach. Apart from the state malice (examined in a short prelude), the experience of the former gradually allows us to envisage the latter, which is what historical observation as well as certain philosophical positions suggest.
Analysing benevolence and being inspired by it these days demands lucidity. It does reconnect with the Enlightenment but as less dazzling, less presumptuous. The international context requires this since everything that comes from the West, and in particular the thinking that is seminal to it, is open to severe criticism. The goal of this conclusion is to inscribe benevolence in the Enlightenment with all the necessary clairvoyance and modesty.
Many International Relations (IR) theories have not excluded benevolence, especially neoliberalism and some realist thinkers. Nevertheless, they have confined this conduct to materialist motivations whose finality depends on state self-interest without a strong and genuine recognition process. They have not factored in the links that benevolence has set up with the transformation of interstate society into a more global society. And lastly, these approaches have not explored the notion of relation per se, relation which can be made up of components beyond rationality. All these characteristics help us to cultivate theoretical bridges thanks to our conception of benevolence inspired by the philosophies of moral sense and a subtle approach that includes the potential side effects of the conducts it inspires. This chapter sees how my reflection meets three main theories that have triggered a series of academic debates, some of which underlie the limits of materialist theories: recognition; the English School of IR, and especially those ideas aiming to take up the concept of the civilization process elaborated by Norbert Elias; and, finally, the logic of relationality, which takes the very concept of international relations seriously.
From an etymological point of view, benevolence initially refers to willing – wanting – before referring to the spirit of watchfulness – applying one’s attention to something. The 19th-century Littré dictionary associates it with a ‘favourable disposition of the will’ in order to do good to others. But what are the properties of this will and what is its destination? The philosophers of the moral sense are clearly those who offer the most consistent answers to these questions, notably those belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment in modernity whose aim was to update the teachings of ancient Stoicism. But to revive this conception of benevolence implies proposing a subtle reading of conduct driven by the moral sense. It is based on the idea of a continuum of actions making benevolence a median virtue that cannot oblige everyone to a form of moral heroism in their daily lives. In other words, a virtue situated between ethical minimalism and maximalism. Such an approach is a clear alternative to realist perspectives in International Relations (IR), but it is distinct from the philosophies of care while building some bridges with the ethics of virtues.
