Research
You will find a complete range of our monographs, muti-authored and edited works including peer-reviewed, original scholarly research across the social sciences and aligned disciplines. We publish long and short form research and you can browse the complete Bristol University Press and Policy Press archive.
Policy Press also publishes policy reviews and polemic work which aim to challenge policy and practice in certain fields. These books have a practitioner in mind and are practical, accessible in style, as well as being academically sound and referenced.
Books: Research
The concluding chapter takes stock of the overall experience of Russia’s membership to distil certain lessons for the future. It notes that although the authorities of Russia are exclusively responsible for their violations of the Convention and the Statute, the experience of engagement and the asymmetric responses by the CoE to the serious breaches of its norms point to systemic and structural weaknesses within the CoE. The chapter refers to these as the ‘Triple Fault’ scenario whereby the primary responsibility rests with Russia, due to its pattern of bad faith over many years, culminating in its gross violations of the Statute. A secondary failure relates to the inability or unwillingness of the CM to effectively safeguard the Statute despite progressive democratic decay in Russia and increasing hostility towards the rules-based international order, as demonstrated by the illegal annexation of Crimea. A third more conditional failure is that of the CoE system (to include the Convention system) to effectuate compliance with CoE values and standards. The chapter concludes by considering how the CoE might adapt to the ‘post-peace’ Europe, as well as the prospects of a future relationship with Russia.
The chapter covers the period from 1998 to 2013, although its conclusion looks a little beyond that, to 2016. The focus is on aspects of an evolving and increasingly troubled relationship over the 2000s and into the 2010s, including major human rights abuses in Chechnya. The chapter demonstrates how, under its government, Russia was not a willing patient of ‘therapeutic admission’ over the period examined. It observes that at no point did Russia ever come close to being a fully-fledged democracy, even if it may have been taking steps along a democratic path up to around 2004–2005. However, things changed then, with Russia regressing from that point and thereafter. This is reflected towards the endpoint of the chapter which highlights the critical juncture reached by 2012, when, in the words of a Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Monitoring Committee report, Russia was at a ‘crossroads, confronted with the choice of its own future’.
This chapter examines Russia–CoE relations from 2013 until the eve of Russia’s expulsion in February 2022. There is a focus on Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea and illegal activities in eastern Ukraine from 2014, and, following this, an assessment of how Russia manufactured a major crisis at the CoE over 2014–2019, and how this was resolved. It is argued that politics played a major part in what increasingly became a type of ritualistic membership of the CoE on the part of Russia. The chapter analyses this and then looks to the situation after 2019, when the ritualism argument seemed even stronger. The role played by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), particularly in relation to the role of inter-state cases involving Russia, is addressed. The chapter concludes with some reflections on Russia’s membership and the issues arising.
The introductory chapter sets out the overarching narrative of the book, that of Russia’s attempted transition towards European liberal democratic standards within the Council of Europe (CoE) framework, and its gradual but dramatic retreat from that path. It outlines the rationale of the book to provide a uniquely detailed account of Russia’s experience of membership of the CoE, ultimately leading to its expulsion. The chapter stresses the realist underpinning of the book as well as its limitations.
This chapter discusses the significant impact that Russia’s expulsion has had on the European human rights system, not least in terms of the number of former rights-holders no longer served by that system, but also the impossibility for the ECtHR to have any meaningful impact on the human rights situation in areas under Russian jurisdiction now that Russia is no longer a member state. The chapter also considers the complexity of interpretation of Article 58 ECHR, which regulates how the Convention can be denounced. This examination centres on whether Russia should have ceased being a party to the Convention from the moment of expulsion by the CM (16 March 2012) or six months later. Finally, in relation to the execution of judgments, the chapter considers that the sui generis nature of the situation can provide a justification for innovation by the CM, subject to the political will of the remaining member states.
Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe (CoE) after 26 years following the invasion of Ukraine.
This timely and in-depth analysis explores Russia's tumultuous relationship with the CoE/ECHR institutions. It examines Russia’s membership record and the profound impacts of its expulsion for Europe’s human rights system. The authors provide valuable insights for future policy to safeguard the integrity of international human rights institutions.
The book fills an important gap in legal scholarship by exploring the legality and legitimacy of its membership and expulsion, and represents a key reference in understanding the challenge of protecting human rights in the face of rising authoritarianism.
Chapter 5 considers the legality and legitimacy of the membership sanctions applied to Russia in 2022. It notes the speed and decisiveness of the response by the Committee of Ministers (CM) to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and examines the procedure adopted by the CM leading to the ultimate expulsion of Russia from the CoE. The chapter considers the scope of the appropriate statutory provisions in detail, and notes that while justifiable, in the absence of a formal ‘request’ for Russia to withdraw before it was expelled a new precedent for the use of these provisions has been established though the threshold for their use remains exceptionally high.
The chapter sets out and analyses the international legal obligations that Russia voluntarily accepted and the specific commitments it made upon accession to the CoE. It then focusses on how and in what circumstances Russia acceded to the CoE in 1996 and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998. The chapter reveals that on the question of whether Russia should join the CoE, political considerations – based on a perceived unique opportunity in European history – prevailed over the compelling legal case against it doing so. It argues that the CoE’s invitation for Russia to join it was based on a calculated risk and the optimism of its so-called ‘therapeutic admission’, that is. the hope that Russia would evolve into a state that complied with Article 3 of the CoE Statute in the future.
Article VI of the NPT obliges all parties to the treaty to pursue negotiations toward arms control and eventual disarmament. A number of gaps in our understanding of Article VI exist, however, and these impede efforts to revive negotiations today.
Under international law, an obligation to negotiate is an obligation of best efforts, not an obligation of result. It is therefore an enduring puzzle why the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 1996 advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, said that Article VI obliges disarmament as a result. The ICJ read too much into Article VI. Realists, by contrast, deprecate Article VI: they describe it as hortatory—the expression of a wish, not the stipulation of a duty.
To negotiate in good faith, a party must do more than go through the motions. The party must come prepared to make, and to entertain, fresh proposals. Moreover, the party must observe an essentially negative obligation: it must not seek to impose a fait accompli in respect of the subject matter of the negotiations; and it must not aggravate the problem that it has committed to negotiate to resolve.
Policy makers across the political spectrum in the US and allied countries recognize that China’s nuclear weapons buildup is a challenge to the strategic balance that had prevailed for decades among nuclear-weapon states. However, consensus is lacking as to what to do about it. One element of our response should be to negotiate toward arms control, as Article VI of the NPT requires.
It takes more than one party to hold a negotiation. China has refused to take part in a nuclear arms control negotiation. China maintains that only when China is at nuclear weapons parity with the US and Russia will it be appropriate for China to negotiate. But NPT Article VI does not stipulate parity as a precondition for the pursuit of negotiations.
An NPT party violates Article VI that refuses to negotiate. An NPT party that instigates an arms race and seeks to impose a strategic fait accompli also violates Article VI. The US, its allies, and like-minded countries should call attention to the inconsistency of China’s conduct, including its nuclear weapons buildup, with Article VI.