In establishing what housing costs should be, market price has been the dominant norm. Indeed, commentators working within the neoliberal perspective maintain that, if a tenant does not pay a market rent, they are subsidised even if the tenant has paid the historic cost (and more) for his/her accommodation. As examples, Davis and Field (2012, p 9) state:

The subsidy for social housing rent varies by region but is substantial. Social rents are well below market rents, ranging from around 60 per cent of private rents in the North to less than 40 per cent in London.

While Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne asserted ‘social housing is subsidised because the price of private rental stock is the real price, reached by logic of the market’ (Osborne, 2015a). Thus, when assessing ‘affordability’, market price has become the dominant benchmark with the state intervening – via consumer subsidies, debt extension measures, deposit raising support and other means – to make housing more ‘affordable’. An alternative approach would be focus on reducing housing production costs. Box 6.1 sets out the historical forms of state housing market intervention aimed at reducing housing costs. According to Fears, Wilson and Barton (2016, p 3):

Currently, the most commonly referred to definition of affordable housing is set out in Annex 2 to the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). This is the definition that local planning authorities apply when making provision within their areas to meet local demand/need for affordable housing.

The National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012a, p 50) defines affordable housing as ‘Social rented, affordable rented and intermediate housing, provided to eligible households whose needs are not met by the market.

There are three principal reasons for engaging in comparative studies.

First, cross-national comparison offers the opportunity to identify possible global factors in housing policy development and thereby highlight specific national housing policy determinants. This involves exploring broad structural trends and the contribution of relationships between the state, the market and civil society in particular countries. Nonetheless, identifying cross-national policy trends is bedevilled by complexity in national policy interventions. Policy inputs are diverse ranging across intricate and constantly changing direct subsidies, cheap loans and tax breaks to producers, often applied at regional and local level, to the state’s regulatory activities and complex consumer assistance systems in the forms of tax concessions and means-tested allowances. These policy interventions interact and are embedded in the pathways established in specific national historical contexts. Housing policy is not ‘path determined’ (Murie, 2016b) but it is ‘path dependent’, characterised by Bengtsson (2012, p 161) as:

... if, at a certain point in time, the historical development takes one direction instead of another, some, otherwise feasible, alternative paths will be closed, or at least difficult to reach at a later point.

Second, examining housing policies in other countries can supply ideas to apply in the UK by identifying what policies are in operation elsewhere and, perhaps, assessing their effectiveness. Stephens (2013) regards this function as the most important comparative housing studies purpose, but insists that the comparisons must be embedded in particular housing systems and their interactions with wider social and economic structures. Thus, for example, it is unwise to advocate the transfer of the German rent control system to England (Labour Party, 2015) without appreciating its German policy context: long-term support for private landlords; a far higher proportion of direct institutional investment in the sector; and success in controlling house price inflation thereby reducing the investment dimension in renting/owning decisions.

This chapter examines various answers to the ‘housing question’ organised under the perspectives set out in Chapter One and, in so doing, explores the strengths and weaknesses of each standpoint. Not all the solutions fit neatly into the approaches and they are not related directly to political party policies. Contemporary political parties have adopted programmes, not in accordance with policy rationality or ideological purity, but to win elections.

The financial institutions’ misdemeanours in generating the housing boom and bust gave cold comfort to neoliberals. There was no rational supply/demand calculus driving the credit explosion – it was the product of fees to be harvested from each ‘securitisation’ stage, passing liabilities onto others (Financial Services Authority, 2010) and that ‘risk-taking was given priority over and above the imperative of protecting the capital of the banks’ (Brown, 2010, p 101). The orthodox neoliberal response to the credit crunch would have been to allow to market to wreak revenge on the culprits, but the banks were ‘too big to fail’. With the Royal Bank of Scotland about to join Northern Rock in going bust, Alistair Darling (2011, p 154) told his Treasury officials:

I feel a deep chill in my stomach. If we don’t act immediately, the banks doors would close, cash machines would be switched off, cheques would not be honoured, people would not be paid.

On hearing about a 37% reduction in mortgage lending the prime minister declared ‘these figures made my blood run cold’ (Brown, 2010, p 35).

It took nation state involvement, augmented by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank to prevent the crisis becoming a catastrophe.

Most local authorities adopted the model bylaws for building new homes set out in the 1875 Public Health Act and subsequent local authority building regulations meant that new houses were ‘decent’ according to the norms of the time. However, because dwellings deteriorate and standards change, governments have established minimum housing benchmarks and attempted to ensure the existing dwelling stock meets these requirements.

Cuming (2016, p 24) states that ‘the first citation of the word slum “in a dictionary of slang” was in ‘James Hardy Vaux’s Vocabulary of the Flash Language (1812) –where it refers to a room as well as a criminal racket or “rig”’. ‘Slum’ was also applied to an entire area and its surrogates were ‘plague spot’, ‘rookery’, ‘mean streets’, ‘Abyss’ and ‘Labyrinth’ with the term retaining its association with criminality. Manchester’s Angel Meadow – ‘Victorian Britain’s Most Savage Slum’ (Kirby, 2016) – contained all the slum’s ‘externalities’. Its slaughter houses, gasworks, boneyards and catgut factories created a stench than ‘even in a hard frost was sickening’. Its men were ‘malnourished and short, squat and sallow’ and its women ‘stunted and pale’. Cholera attacked the area with ‘extraordinary venom’ (Kirby, 2016, pp 8, 9, 32). ‘Putty shops’ where criminals fenced their stolen goods and drinking dens were common, ‘scuttle’ gangs were at war and Angel Meadow inhabitants were well represented in the frequent riots.

From the 1830s, attempts were made to deal with the ‘nuisance’ caused by individual unfit dwellings and legislation sponsored by authorities in Liverpool and Manchester made it possible to close cellar dwellings.

Margaret Thatcher had little time for ‘governance’. According to Rifkind (2016, p 1) ‘Once, when asked whether she believed in consensus, she replied she did and then added ‘There should be a consensus around my convictions’. She governed, albeit to strengthen the market as a resource distributor. John Major edged towards a ‘governance’ agenda with his Citizen’s Charters placing emphasis on a mixed economy of welfare, value for money and state directed performance benchmarks. For New Labour, ‘governance’ was also a mantra under which market forces could be combined with modest state direction. Words and phrases such as ‘enabling’, ‘what works is what counts’, ‘targets’, performance indicators’, ‘partnerships’, ‘joined up government’ and ‘modernisation’ entered its lexicon. Under the ‘Big Society’ banner, the coalition government abandoned New Labour’s ‘target-setting’ approach, promoting ‘localism’ and voluntary sector involvement in service delivery. Nevertheless, despite ‘Big Society’ rhetoric, the nationally determined social objectives dearth was an act of government and the coalition promoted market provision and efficiency improvements via expenditure cuts. As the Conservative Party tightened its grip on coalition policies it governed to enforce its agenda being at ease in letting market outcomes rest where they fell. This mindset continued into the 2015 Conservative government although Theresa May’s speeches after she became prime minister (May, 2016a; 2016b) indicated a possible change in approach (see Chapter Eleven).

Some commentators have identified a different policy attitude in the devolved governments. A ‘Scottish style’, ‘which refers to the ways in which the Scottish government makes policy following consultation and negotiation with pressure participants such as interest groups, local government organisations and unions’ (Cairney et al, 2016, p 337), has been detected with collaborative objectives formed thereby enlisted ‘pressure participants’ in implementation.

Meanings attached to the term ‘homelessness’ influence estimates of the problem’s extent and the causal notions ascribed to it. Three main definitions are current in the UK. Homelessness can be equated with rooflessness, and can only be legitimately applied – to quote the definition suggested by the government in 1994 – to ‘those who have no accommodation of any sort available for occupation’ (DoE, 1994, p 4). On this meaning, homelessness is often interpreted as ‘rough sleeping’, the ‘homeless’ count will be relatively low and homelessness may be construed as a personal matter, located in an individual’s lifestyle, rather than a ‘social problem’ caused by structural factors. The 1996 Housing Act definition is somewhat broader. It defines homelessness in terms of whether a person has a legal right to occupy a dwelling, qualified by clauses such the accommodation must be ‘reasonable’ to occupy and the person can secure access to it. On this definition, despite the obstacles homeless applicants have to overcome before being accepted as homeless and an accommodation offer made, there were 73,120 homeless households living in temporary accommodation in England in 2016. Such a high number makes it difficult to link homelessness to personal, lifestyle problems although this has not deterred such attempts.

Including ‘home’ in the term ‘homelessness’ indicates a third definition. As Waldron (1993) suggests, humans, as social beings, require a private and secure base in which to carry out functions such as washing, sleeping, reproduction, socialising, and so on. especially if using public space for performing such functions is forbidden.

There being no agreement on its meaning, philosophers have labelled social justice a ‘contested’ concept. At a basic level, distributive justice is concerned with fair processes in disseminating goods and services. There are two broad approaches to assessing process outcomes. Current time-slice theorists view the existing social product as a collectively created cake to be allocated according to impartial principles. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls maintains that rational people, behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ about their future life chances, will agree to join a particular society so arranged that social and economic inequalities are permitted only if they are ‘to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’ (Rawls, 1971, p 102). Thus, for Rawls, inequalities are just if they lead to an improvement in the position of the ‘least advantaged’ to a situation better than they would have obtained from an equal resource division. Equality is Rawls’ starting point; inequalities require robust justifications. In contrast, entitlement theorists examine the procedures through which a particular social distribution has occurred. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that a social distribution is just if it has been fashioned through fair procedures, that is, by creating an object, barter between free agents or as a gift. If people attain resources by these legitimate means they are entitled to keep them (Nozick, 1974). Nozick, alongside Hayek, was instrumental in the 1970s renaissance of laissez-faire thinking but, unlike Hayek, he argued that justice was historical. If resources have been acquired by past unfair procedures, then current rectification is necessary.

‘Externality’ identification transformed housing into a social problem. Urban growth developed through short distance moves of less than 30 miles by young people in search of better-paid work, supplemented by the migration from Ireland and the Scottish Highlands. The migrants were of child-bearing age and those born in towns and cities soon provided the main population growth impetus. Dwelling supply and sewerage could not keep pace with the billowing population so many people crammed into low quality, insanitary accommodation. However, poor housing conditions are not necessarily problematic. Housing had to be constructed as a social problem, a mission pursued by a new group of ‘public good’ experts who thought it necessary to centralise administration to secure a more wholesome nation. Throughout the 19^th century, ‘health and housing were considered to be one problem and treated accordingly’ (Lawrence, 1985, p 124).

Edwin Chadwick was the most formidable sanitary reform advocate. His Report on the sanitary condition of the labouring population of Great Britain (1842) assembled a variety of statistics and opinions to demonstrate that existing sanitary arrangements generated ‘externalities’ (see Box 2.1 ).

Chadwick was so anxious to ensure his findings produced action he consulted Charles Dickens on how to present his report for maximum impact. He also ignored alternative analyses circulating at the time stressing ‘privation’ – gruelling work, low wages and poor food – as causing poor health in favour of the politically less controversial ‘miasma’ – polluted atmosphere – explanation (Hamlin, 1998). Nevertheless, his report did not produce immediate results and it required pressure group activity from the Health of Towns Association to promote the measures.

The private rented sector housed the large growth and shift in population during the 19th century. Estimates of the proportion of houses owned by private landlords before 1914 are influenced by land tenure complexities and vary from 90% to 77% according to homeownership assessments.

The typical residential market process was for freeholders to lease land for a perpetual annual ground rent (chief rent) or for a specified period at an annual ground rent. Sometimes the freehold was bought outright for cash. When in the right place, land value was high and Lloyd George constantly attacked landowners for making large profits from enhanced land values created by community investment. Builders/developers obtained finance from a variety of sources including short-term loans made by landowners and prospective purchasers plus longer-term mortgage advances from banks. Solicitors – important players in land and property transactions – also supplied a financial source via organising people interested in passive investment in urban growth into ‘building clubs’ (Offer, 1981). Building societies had a long history as ‘terminating’ societies. Working class people agreed to pay into a fund to build houses and, when sufficient funds had been accumulated buy a property, members drew lots to decide the first occupier. Payments continued until all subscribers owned a house when the society terminated. Some societies allowed people not requiring a house to join the society paying interest on the investment. The society then became ‘permanent’. In explaining ‘permanent’ building society expansion, Samy (2016, p 24) adopts Hansmann’s theory (Hansmann, 2000), stating:

The theory is centred on the premise that small-scale investors and mortgage borrowers were vulnerable to opportunist behaviour on the part of holders of permanent capital and managers seeking to extract rent from them.

In 1968, following Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech (Powell, 1968), Labour introduced Urban Aid, directed by the Home Office and aimed at steering resources to areas where racial tensions were high. It was accompanied by other initiatives such as Educational Priority Areas, Community Development Projects and Section 11 payments under the 1966 Local Government Act, made available to local authorities with a significant number of immigrants and mainly directed to employing additional teachers.

Local authorities had considerable discretion on how they used the extra resources available under Urban Aid. Most spent the money on coordinating services, self-help schemes, nursery education and youth projects. Urban Aid continued throughout Edward Health’s 1970–74 government and beyond. The 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act switched urban policy emphasis towards economic regeneration with central government resources directed towards creating partnerships between local government, central government and local residents and assisting local industries. The Department of the Environment became responsible for the Urban Programme although Section 11 payments remained with the Home Office.

Conservative commitment to reducing public expenditure from 1979 meant diminishing state resources for urban renewal and, rather than central/local partnerships with local residents, Michael Heseltine, then Secretary of State for the Environment, concentrated on private sector, property-led renewal via Enterprise Zones and Development Corporations primed by tax breaks and grants such as Derelict Land Grant. This property-led approach was revived in the 1990s, with more local government involvement via City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget, both accessed by competitive bidding.

Diminishing demand for council housing first received central attention in 1974 when a national survey identified 62,000 council properties in low demand, a consequence, in part, of the decline of Britain’s industrial heartlands, which accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s.