Introduction
Children in larger families entered the pandemic at disproportionate risk of poverty. Children in households with three or more children (our marker for larger families) were twice as likely as those in smaller families to be living in poverty in 2019/20, and most of the increase in child poverty since 2012/13 has been driven by increases in poverty among larger families (Stewart et al, 2021).
Larger families have always faced a disproportionate risk of poverty (Bradshaw et al, 2006). This is due to a double bind of higher household needs and lower average work intensity: more children mean more mouths to feed, more childcare to pay, and if childcare is unaffordable, fewer hours left in the day to conduct paid work. Historically, the tax-benefit system has played a large role in mitigating poverty risk among larger families, but cuts to social security since 2012/13 have left larger families more exposed to poverty, despite increases in employment and education (Cooper and Hills, 2021; Stewart et al, 2021). On the eve of the pandemic, larger families on a low income were, therefore, in a particularly precarious financial position.
Yet despite the importance of family size to recent child poverty trends, and the acknowledgement that poverty shaped experiences of the pandemic, little is known about the distributional impact of the pandemic by family size. This is surprising given that the disproportionate burden of COVID-19 for larger families has been evident across the income distribution. The demands of childcare, home schooling, and the risk of children’s school bubbles bursting are inevitably enlarged for households with a greater number of children.
This chapter addresses this gap in our knowledge by using quantitative and qualitative data to explore the experiences of low-income larger families during the pandemic. In particular, the chapter investigates the extent to
Our methodological approach
We draw on quantitative and qualitative evidence generated as part of the Benefit Changes and Larger Families research project. This project is investigating the two-child limit and the benefit cap, both key ‘welfare reforms’ that have significantly affected larger families.
For the quantitative analysis presented here, we draw on individual-level data throughout the pandemic from Understanding Society (the UK Household Longitudinal Survey), a high-quality panel survey based on probability sampling (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2021a, 2021b). We use regular monthly and quarterly data from Waves 1–8 of the COVID-19 survey over the period April 2020 to March 2021 and match respondents longitudinally to pre-pandemic data from Wave 10 of the main survey (based on fieldwork from 2017 to 2019).1 Longitudinal weights are applied to correct for non-response and are customised versions of those described in Benzeval et al (2021).2 We use this survey data to track and compare outcomes for four distinct groups, by family size and receipt of means-tested social security benefits. This enables us to separate out the contribution of family size and income to the experiences of families with children during the pandemic. We use means-tested social security benefits as a proxy for low income because this is the mechanism through which the two-child limit and benefit cap are implemented.3 Segmenting our quantitative sample by social security status thereby enables us to integrate insights from our qualitative and quantitative research.
We also draw on early interviews conducted as part of ongoing qualitative longitudinal research for the Benefit Changes and Larger Families project. This research explores how families are impacted by the two-child limit and the benefit cap, and how they respond to these policy changes, by interviewing 44 parents or carers three times over the course of 18 months. The research takes place in Bradford, London, and York. As this project focuses on larger families, our sample is composed of parents or carers with three or more children who are subject to either the benefit cap or the two-child limit, or both. To obtain in-depth data relevant to the participants’ experiences of these welfare reforms, we conduct semi-structured individual interviews. The interviews uphold good ethical practice and particular attention is paid to informed consent, confidentiality, and anonymity, prevention of harm (for example, though handling participants’ accounts sensitively), and reciprocity. This chapter reports on findings from the first 12 interviews. All of these interviews were conducted by telephone due to COVID-19 regulations.
As the UK first locked down in March 2020, working hours plummeted and, although the furlough scheme staved off a surge in unemployment, there was a significant reduction in household earnings at the bottom of the income distribution, particularly among younger workers, those from minority ethnic groups, and those in precarious work (Benzeval et al, 2020; Crossley et al, 2021). Larger families on a low income were no exception. In fact, Figure 7.1 shows that among families with children, larger families on benefits saw the sharpest falls in working hours. Average working hours for respondents in larger families on benefits halved between January and May 2020, while they fell by roughly a third for smaller families on benefits.
Mean weekly working hours during the pandemic by family type
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N=2862, 2701, 2243, 2040, 1996, 1777, 1584, 1490 and 1732 in each wave.
Mean weekly working hours during the pandemic by family type
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N=2862, 2701, 2243, 2040, 1996, 1777, 1584, 1490 and 1732 in each wave.
Mean weekly working hours during the pandemic by family type
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N=2862, 2701, 2243, 2040, 1996, 1777, 1584, 1490 and 1732 in each wave.
These large falls in working hours for larger families on benefits appear to be driven by two factors: the labour market position of low-income families; and larger families’ household needs. First, low-income families were more exposed to reductions in working hours, redundancies, and furlough as a result of their labour market position prior to the pandemic. Of those in work at the beginning of the pandemic, families on benefits were significantly more likely to be working part-time: 51 per cent of respondents in families on benefits were in part-time work, compared to 38
Proportion of adult respondents who identify as key workers and are able to work from home some or all of the time by family type, April 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N = 2709 and 2708 respectively. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are shown. These indicate a range of values which we can be 95 per cent confident includes the true value. If confidence intervals between two groups do not overlap, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Proportion of adult respondents who identify as key workers and are able to work from home some or all of the time by family type, April 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N = 2709 and 2708 respectively. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are shown. These indicate a range of values which we can be 95 per cent confident includes the true value. If confidence intervals between two groups do not overlap, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Proportion of adult respondents who identify as key workers and are able to work from home some or all of the time by family type, April 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N = 2709 and 2708 respectively. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are shown. These indicate a range of values which we can be 95 per cent confident includes the true value. If confidence intervals between two groups do not overlap, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
However, as Figure 7.2 shows, despite their reduced ability to work from home, families on benefits were not statistically more likely to be classed as key workers. This appears to be explained in part by the high concentration of low-income families in industries such as manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail, accommodation, food, and other service industries. For many workers in these industries, it was not possible to work from home, yet these respondents were excluded from the government’s definition of key worker status.4 The survey data shows that workers in these industries were more likely than the wider working population to be in precarious work at the beginning of the pandemic, with no minimum hours guaranteed by their employer. At best, where there was some continuity of demand, workers in these industries were able to continue going to work (albeit facing the additional health risks that entailed, with none of the social rights and status of the ‘key worker’ label). At worst, these workers were more likely to experience redundancy, reductions in working hours, or furlough (Crossley et al, 2021; see also Chapters 3 and 8).
A second driver of reduced working hours that became particularly salient for larger families was caring and home-schooling responsibilities. As Figure 7.3 shows, parents in larger families spent more time helping their children with home schooling within both low-income and higher-income groups. However, parents in low-income larger families spent the most time of all: 3.9 hours every day on average compared to 2.9 hours among higher-income larger families.5 This is likely to be both a consequence of reduced working hours and a further contributor towards it. Additionally, fewer home learning resources among low-income larger families – including working space, laptops, and books – may have made parental involvement and supervision of home schooling more intensive. While 39 per cent of smaller families on benefits had a designated computer for each child when home schooling, just 25 per cent of larger families on benefits did. Parents in larger families on benefits may therefore have had to be more actively involved in home schooling.
Average hours reported by parents and family members helping children with home schooling by family type, April 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents with school-aged children who are not attending school in April 2020, N=3484. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are shown. These indicate a range of values which we can be 95 per cent confident includes the true value. If confidence intervals between two groups do not overlap, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Average hours reported by parents and family members helping children with home schooling by family type, April 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents with school-aged children who are not attending school in April 2020, N=3484. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are shown. These indicate a range of values which we can be 95 per cent confident includes the true value. If confidence intervals between two groups do not overlap, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Average hours reported by parents and family members helping children with home schooling by family type, April 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents with school-aged children who are not attending school in April 2020, N=3484. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are shown. These indicate a range of values which we can be 95 per cent confident includes the true value. If confidence intervals between two groups do not overlap, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
This greater burden of home schooling and childcare is likely to have contributed towards the higher rates of furlough among larger families on benefits in Figure 7.4 – a dynamic which holds both relative to smaller families on benefits and relative to larger families not on benefits. In April
Proportion of adult respondents who have ever been furloughed by family type, April–July 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N=2174, 1803, 1617 for each wave. Since it should not be possible for there to be a fall in the proportion of people who have ever been furloughed, the slight fall from May to July 2020 among smaller families on benefits is likely due to changes in the sample of respondents.
Proportion of adult respondents who have ever been furloughed by family type, April–July 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N=2174, 1803, 1617 for each wave. Since it should not be possible for there to be a fall in the proportion of people who have ever been furloughed, the slight fall from May to July 2020 among smaller families on benefits is likely due to changes in the sample of respondents.
Proportion of adult respondents who have ever been furloughed by family type, April–July 2020
Note: Sample is adult respondents who were in paid work (employment or self-employment) at the COVID-19 survey baseline in January–February 2020. N=2174, 1803, 1617 for each wave. Since it should not be possible for there to be a fall in the proportion of people who have ever been furloughed, the slight fall from May to July 2020 among smaller families on benefits is likely due to changes in the sample of respondents.
Furlough may have afforded some benefits to larger families, enabling more time for bonding with babies and children, and protecting job security and earnings in the short term (see Chapter 9; also, Power et al, 2020; Tarrant et al, 2020). However, being on long-term furlough or reduced working hours has potential scarring effects and puts workers at increased risk of redundancy (Cominetti et al, 2021). By September 2020, when schools had reopened, working hours had recovered to pre-pandemic levels for most families, but larger families on benefits saw the largest shortfall, of 3.6 hours on average. This suggests that there were indeed scarring effects on this group’s working patterns from furlough and reduced working hours, even in the short term.
Furlough and reduced working hours also pose a particular challenge for larger families who are at risk of the benefit cap, as they can be pushed onto
Households in professional sectors who were able to work from home largely saw their household earnings and job security unchanged throughout the crisis. Some managed to accrue significant savings as they cut back on non-essential purchases. However, for low-income households, a higher proportion of their incomes is spent on essentials, and their household costs increased during the pandemic (Brewer and Patrick, 2021). Increased costs were commonly associated with higher food bills, the costs of home schooling and of trying to keep children entertained during lockdown. These increased costs are likely to have a greater impact on larger families due to their larger household consumption needs. As a result, larger families found it particularly difficult to meet basic essential needs during the pandemic. According to the Understanding Society data, in April 2020 11 per cent of larger families on benefits had used a food bank in the last month compared with 6 per cent of smaller families on benefits.7
Our qualitative research evidences the difficulties larger families faced during the pandemic in meeting basic needs. Several participants reported that they struggled to afford food and had to resort to using food banks. As well as having difficulty affording basic living costs, some of the participants also found it hard to access necessities including clothes and furniture, as well as food. One participant’s comments illuminate the difficulties of trying to go food shopping with multiple children during the pandemic: “And I couldn’t get to Asda cos of the queue, like if you saw the queue and you try to take four kids to a COVID two-metre queue and like it’s mental, especially, and three of us have asthma so my anxiety levels are going [up]” (Amanda, single mother, four children, subject to the benefit cap and the two-child limit). The qualitative data suggests that larger families experienced particular difficulties in affording food and negotiating the new procedures for shopping brought about by the pandemic. As Amanda’s comment also indicates, this impacted on her mental health, which we turn to next.
Impact on mental health
Mental health worsened considerably at the beginning of the pandemic, and there are reasons to think that this would impact disproportionately on larger families given the distributive effects detailed earlier (Banks and Xu, 2020). In addition, there is causal evidence that school closures had greater impacts on the mental health of mothers who had more than one child (Blanden et al, 2021). Later in the year, larger families were particularly negatively affected by social distancing regulations that were put in place in September 2020 through the ‘rule of six’, which in its initial form meant that many larger families were less able to meet up with others outside of their household
Several participants spoke of the isolation they experienced during the lockdowns. They explained that it was very difficult not being able to visit anyone or have anyone come and visit them. This put a lot of strain on the parents and negatively impacted their children. One of the participants explained: “The lockdown was hard, especially for the kids and being stuck at home … not being able to do normal kids’ stuff, and the baby she didn’t really experience the outside life cos she’s just been stuck at home with you” (Kalima, single mother, five children, subject to the benefit cap and the two-child limit). Somewhat to our surprise, however, the quantitative survey data does not suggest that the change in mental health due to the pandemic was larger among low-income larger families relative to other families. Figure 7.5 charts the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) measure of mental health, distress, and wellbeing in the COVID-19 survey data from the pre-pandemic main survey (2017–19) to March 2021, with higher scores signifying a worsening of mental health over the period prior to survey. Larger families on benefits entered the pandemic with the worst mental health. In the immediate stages of the crisis, mental health worsened for all groups but particularly sharply among higher-income groups. Meanwhile, larger families on benefits saw the least relative change in mental health at the beginning of the pandemic.
GHQ-12 mental health scores from a pre-pandemic baseline to March 2021 by family type (higher scores indicate worse mental health)
Note: GHQ-12 scores are based on a Likert scale, with a higher score denoting worse mental health. N=7274, 3034, 2631, 2384, 2343, 2026, 1825, 1738 and 2036 for each wave.
GHQ-12 mental health scores from a pre-pandemic baseline to March 2021 by family type (higher scores indicate worse mental health)
Note: GHQ-12 scores are based on a Likert scale, with a higher score denoting worse mental health. N=7274, 3034, 2631, 2384, 2343, 2026, 1825, 1738 and 2036 for each wave.
GHQ-12 mental health scores from a pre-pandemic baseline to March 2021 by family type (higher scores indicate worse mental health)
Note: GHQ-12 scores are based on a Likert scale, with a higher score denoting worse mental health. N=7274, 3034, 2631, 2384, 2343, 2026, 1825, 1738 and 2036 for each wave.
Looking at the change in GHQ subscales between the pre-pandemic period and April 2020, all families saw a decline in their ability to enjoy day-to-day activities and an increase in feeling under strain. Higher-income families and smaller families on benefits saw increases in being unable to concentrate, feeling depressed, losing sleep due to worry, problems overcoming difficulties, losing confidence, feeling worthless, and reductions in happiness. Low-income larger families saw less relative change in these aspects of wellbeing.
However, it is crucial to note that low-income larger families entered the pandemic with the worst wellbeing across these indicators, and these measures are relative by construction because responses refer to respondents’ ‘usual’ experiences as a baseline.8 The low base of larger families in terms of wellbeing in the pre-pandemic period therefore meant that there was less room for decline across these measures. What these results collectively suggest is that larger families on benefits were experiencing poor mental wellbeing and high psychological distress prior to the pandemic, and that the initial onset of COVID-19 did not change this significantly.
Case study: “I’ve just been kinda struggling to get back on my feet at the moment due to this COVID”
‘I do receive like things like school vouchers but £15 a week; I mean, I shop from Lidl and Aldi which is like you can’t go below Aldi and Lidl, there is no other store that’s going to be cheaper than them two stores, and I shop the bare minimum … when the COVID hit it was like before from breakfast to just, you know, teatime meal it went from three set meals a day … But then this is what I’m saying that what are we supposed to do as parents? Do we starve our kids, you know, where do we go from here?’
Daneen incurred additional costs as she had to provide more food for her children (see Brewer and Patrick, 2021), including a lunchtime meal, which was difficult to do despite sourcing low-priced food. Although she was receiving free school meals vouchers, she found that this was insufficient to cover the extra spending on food that the pandemic necessitated.
As well as financial hardship, Daneen also experienced isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Her children only saw their father on an ad hoc basis and her parents were not able to help with the children due to health problems. Consequently, she had almost sole responsibility for the care of her children and, as a result of the pandemic, ended up staying at home a lot with the children and did not interact very much with other people. She explained: “I don’t usually speak to people a lot … I haven’t spoken to someone in a long time.”
Daneen cited not being able to get out much as a negative impact of the pandemic. However, in line with the quantitative mental health findings outlined earlier, she also explained that in some ways, the pandemic relieved some pressure from her interactions with her children given her financial circumstances: “I can’t imagine if the COVID wasn’t here what we’d be doing … COVID is an excuse for everything, like, oh, we can’t do this because everything’s closed.” Daneen’s comment indicates larger families who are subject to the two-child limit will continue to struggle financially once the pandemic and associated restrictions ease. Some additional household expenditure incurred by the pandemic may no longer be needed, but many larger families in receipt of benefits will still face difficulties affording basic necessities. This is partly due to the two-child limit and the benefit cap, introduced before the pandemic, which break the link between entitlement and need, and disproportionately affect larger families who were already at greater risk of poverty. The government’s refusal to suspend these policies during the
Conclusions and implications
The research presented in this chapter demonstrates that family size played a crucial and largely unrecognised role in shaping families’ experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Larger families on a low income were particularly vulnerable to the economic shock of the pandemic. In part due to their labour market position and in part due to greater caring responsibilities, they experienced the sharpest falls in working hours and were consistently more likely to be on furlough. This puts them at risk of labour market scarring as the economy recovers. It also means that the future of the furlough scheme is a particularly salient issue for larger families. Unless job support is extended until the economy fully recovers, we can expect a wave of redundancies that will hit larger families especially hard. Investment will be required to ensure that those who have been on low working hours throughout the pandemic or on long-term furlough receive employment support to prevent permanent scarring in labour market prospects.
One of the most striking and counter-intuitive conclusions of this chapter, however, is that the relative change in mental health due to the pandemic appears to have been more muted among larger families on a low income. The survey data and qualitative interviews conducted so far give some indications of what might be driving this, including the lower baseline of mental health that larger families on benefits entered the pandemic. These findings are a sobering demonstration that larger families on benefits had the odds stacked against them going into the pandemic, hence why they simultaneously saw greater economic impacts and less relative change in mental health than other groups. Our qualitative interviews have shown that the benefit cap and two-child limit have a significant impact on families’ ability to meet basic needs in ‘good times’, let alone the bad (Hills, 2017). Further qualitative longitudinal research as part of the project will help us explore whether mental health ‘bounces back’ among larger families on benefits, or whether their mental health sees little change while the rest of the economy and society recovers.
The government has refused to suspend or modify two policies which disproportionately affect larger families: the two-child limit, and the household benefit cap. These policies were driven by a ‘machinery’ of ‘anti-welfare commonsense’ (Jensen and Tyler, 2015) that was forged in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. For many, the assumptions behind
Finally, COVID-19 exposed a wider group of families to these punitive social security policies: smaller families have been become increasingly likely to be affected by the benefit cap over the course of the pandemic (Hirsch, 2020; Department for Work and Pensions [DWP], 2021). These factors may have led to a realignment in public attitudes towards social security, the benefit cap, and the two-child limit, though the extent and permanence of this realignment is unclear as of yet. Recent polling indicated that 61 per cent of the British public supported the suspension of the two-child limit during COVID-19 (British Pregnancy Advisory Service [BPAS], 2021). Is this an early sign of a new, pro-welfare ‘commonsense’ to emerge from the crisis? Perhaps. Regardless, if a new social security settlement is to reverse the hardship inflicted on larger families – not least by the benefit cap and two-child limit – it will need to make an overdue acknowledgement that family size matters.
Notes
There were approximately 34,000 adult respondents in Wave 10 of the main Understanding Society survey and 12,000 in each COVID-19 survey wave. We restricted our main sample to respondents with children aged under 16 in their household at the time of survey. This resulted in a total unweighted sample of 10,082 adult respondents in Wave 10 of the main survey, 5,319 in Wave 1 of the COVID-19, 3,932 in Wave 2, 3,583 in Wave 3, 3,505 in Wave 4, 3,118 in Wave 5, 2,773 in Wave 6, 2,672 in Wave 7, and 2,999 in Wave 8.
We are grateful to Dr Jamie Moore for his assistance in customising these weights for the purposes of this chapter.
In the survey analysis, we define a household as being on benefits if they were in receipt of Universal Credit or Child Tax Credit at any point up to and including the wave in question within the Understanding Society COVID-19 survey, including the baseline in January–February 2020. For data points with Wave 10 of the Main Survey, benefit receipt is derived exclusively from this wave. We define a household as being a larger family if they report having three or more children aged under 16 in the given wave or if they reported this in Wave 10 of the Main Survey. We rely on the latter to minimise under-reporting of larger families within the COVID-19 survey, since it does not contain an exact measure of the number of children in the household but instead reports the number of children in different age categories with a binned frequency approach. For example, if an individual reports having ‘2+’ children aged 0–4 and no children aged 5–15, we would code them as a smaller family with two children based on the COVID-19 survey alone, even though it is technically possible that they have three children aged 0–5 and
Children of critical workers and vulnerable children who can access schools or educational settings. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-maintaining-educational-provision/guidance-for-schools-colleges-and-local-authorities-on-maintaining-educational-provision
A further contributory factor may also be that younger children require more supervision at home, and larger families on benefits are more likely to have young children due to the link between caring responsibilities, work intensity, and benefits receipt (the average of school-age children among larger families on benefits is 9.9 years compared to 10.4 years for larger families not on benefits).
All participant names given in this chapter are pseudonyms.
These differences are not statistically significant, however, due to the small number of people using food banks.
Survey response options for each GHQ subscale are typically of the form: ‘Better than usual’; ‘Same as usual’; ‘Less than usual’; ‘Much less than usual’. They are therefore inherently relative and tied to a baseline level of wellbeing.
References
Banks, J. and Xu, X. (2020) The mental health effects of the first two months of lockdown and social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
BBC (2020) Coronavirus: ‘rule of six’ hits larger families. 11 September. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-54101524
Benzeval, M., Burton, J., Crossley, T.F., Fisher, P., Jäckle, A., Low, H. and Read, B. (2020) The idiosyncratic impact of an aggregate shock: the distributional consequences of COVID-19. Understanding Society Working Paper 2020–09. Colchester: University of Essex.
Benzeval, M., Burton, J., Crossley, T.F., Fisher, P., Gardiner, P., Gardiner, C., Jäckle, A. and Moore, J. (2021) High frequency online data collection in an annual household panel study: some evidence on bias prevention and bias adjustment. Understanding Society Working Paper Series 2021–03. Colchester: University of Essex.
Blanden, J., Crawford, C., Fumagalli, L., and Rabe, B. (2021). School closures and parents’ mental health. ISER briefing note. Colchester: University of Essex.
Bradshaw, J., Finch, N., Mayhew, E., Ritakallio, V-M. and Skinner, C. (2006) Child Poverty in Large Families. Bristol: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Policy Press.
Brewer, M. and Patrick, R. (2021) Pandemic pressures: why families on low-income are spending more during Covid-19. London: Resolution Foundation.
British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) (2021) New polling shows majority of the public now oppose the government’s two-child limit policy. Available at: www.bpas.org/about-our-charity/press-office/press-releases/new-polling-shows-majority-of-the-public-now-oppose-the-government-s-two-child-limit-policy/
Cominetti, N., Henehan, K., Slaughter, H. and Thwaites, G. (2021) Long Covid in the labour market: the impact on the labour market of COVID-19 a year into the crisis, and how to secure a strong recovery. London: Resolution Foundation.
Cooper, K. and Hills, J. (2021) The Conservative Governments’ Record on Social Security from May 2015 to pre-COVID 2020: Policies, Spending and Outcomes. SPDO research paper. London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
Crossley, T.F., Fisher, P. and Low, H. (2021) The heterogeneous and regressive consequences of COVID-19: evidence from high quality panel data. Journal of Public Economics, 193 .
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (2021) Benefit cap statistics. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/collections/benefit-cap-statistics
Hills, J. (2017) Good Times, Bad Times (2nd edition). Bristol: Policy Press.
Hirsch, D. (2020) How the benefit cap has gone from a selective punishment for having high family needs to a generalised curb on benefit incomes. Welfare Reform and Larger Families Blog. Available at: https://largerfamilies.study/blog/how-the-benefit-cap-has-gone-from-a-selective-punishment-for-having-high-family-needs-to-a
iNews (2020) Rule of 6 explained: what new two households rule means for meeting outdoors, after lockdown restrictions ease. Independent News. 11 April. Available at: https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/rule-of-6-explained-what-mean-two-households-outdoors-england-lockdown-restrictions-roadmap-934387
Jensen, T. and Tyler, I. (2015) ‘Benefits broods’: the cultural and political crafting of anti-welfare commonsense. Critical Social Policy, 35(4), 470–91.
Joyce, R. and Xu, X. (2020) Sector shutdowns during the coronavirus crisis: which workers are most exposed? Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Palmer, S. (2020). Employees can be furloughed to carry out caring responsibilities, government confirms. People Management. Available at: https://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/news/articles/employees-can-be-furloughed-to-carry-out-caring-responsibilities#gref
Power, M., Patrick, R., Garthwaite, K. and Page, G. (2020) COVID realities: everyday life for families on a low income during the pandemic. Covid Realities briefing paper.
Stewart, K., Reeves, A. and Patrick, R. (2021) A time of need: exploring the changing poverty risk facing larger families in the UK. CASEpaper 224. London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
Tarrant, A., Way, L. and Ladlow, L. (2020) Negotiating ‘earning’ and ‘caring’ through the COVID-19 crisis: change and continuities in the parenting and employment trajectories of young fathers. University of Lincoln: Following Young Fathers Further Project. https://followingyoungfathersfurther.org/asset/working-papers/
University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2021a) Understanding society: Waves 1–10, 2009–2019 and Harmonised BHPS: Waves 1–18, 1991–2009. [data collection]. (13th edition). UK Data Service. SN: 6614. Available at: http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-14
University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2021b) Understanding society: COVID-19 Study, 2020–2021. [data collection]. (9th edition). UK Data Service. SN: 8644. Available at: http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8644-9
