One: From Westphalian to Post-Westphalian? The Origins of the PHEIC Declaration and the 2005 International Health Regulations

Modern-day international cooperation for the control of infectious disease began in 1851 with the first International Sanitary Conference (ISC). In these meetings, ten European (city) states and Turkey gathered to map out coordinated guidelines to minimize the effects of disease along trade routes, spurred on by a series of cholera outbreaks in the 18th and 19th centuries, which had devastated port cities.1 Importantly, their mandate was to establish mechanisms to reduce disease spread, and to do so with minimal interference with international trade – a balancing act that remains at the very heart of the current IHR. Conferences continued for almost a century, expanding membership of participating states, and topics covered. While the ISCs were progressive in respect to recognizing the need for international cooperation, they were hampered by the inability to agree to terms, and indeed differences in opinion about understanding disease transmission.2 This limited efforts to create common processes for outbreak response; a tension that continues to blight cooperation for health security 170 years later. Despite these setbacks, ISCs did identify key tools for international infectious disease control: the standardization of quarantine at points of entry; the reporting of outbreaks internationally; and public health capacities to respond to an epidemic.3 By the early 20th century, international health cooperation led to the development of intergovernmental organizations for health: the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OHIP), the Health Organization of the League of Nations4 and the International Sanitary Bureau, the precursor to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).5

International Sanitary Conferences

Modern-day international cooperation for the control of infectious disease began in 1851 with the first International Sanitary Conference (ISC). In these meetings, ten European (city) states and Turkey gathered to map out coordinated guidelines to minimize the effects of disease along trade routes, spurred on by a series of cholera outbreaks in the 18th and 19th centuries, which had devastated port cities.1 Importantly, their mandate was to establish mechanisms to reduce disease spread, and to do so with minimal interference with international trade – a balancing act that remains at the very heart of the current IHR. Conferences continued for almost a century, expanding membership of participating states, and topics covered. While the ISCs were progressive in respect to recognizing the need for international cooperation, they were hampered by the inability to agree to terms, and indeed differences in opinion about understanding disease transmission.2 This limited efforts to create common processes for outbreak response; a tension that continues to blight cooperation for health security 170 years later. Despite these setbacks, ISCs did identify key tools for international infectious disease control: the standardization of quarantine at points of entry; the reporting of outbreaks internationally; and public health capacities to respond to an epidemic.3 By the early 20th century, international health cooperation led to the development of intergovernmental organizations for health: the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OHIP), the Health Organization of the League of Nations4 and the International Sanitary Bureau, the precursor to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).5

Such international cooperation greatly expanded in the wake of the Second World War with the creation of the WHO, a key pillar of the post-war multilateral system.6 As part of this mandate, the World Health Assembly (WHA) (the legislative arm of the WHO) was granted the authority to adopt regulations concerning sanitary and quarantine requirements to prevent the international spread of disease.7 Such activity is structurally aligned to the Constitutional Functions of the Organization, which state that the WHO will ‘establish and maintain administrative and technical services as may be required including epidemiological and statistical services … and to stimulate work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases’.8 Interestingly, the IHR (and the ISC predecessors) are adopted pursuant to Articles 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution, and are legally binding on member states of the WHO without needing to be independently ratified within the domestic legal system; a unique power within international law making, with the intention to bypass domestic political interference in public health processes, instead of a Treaty approach, such as that of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, which requires state ratification.

In 1951 the WHA adopted the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR), replacing the existing international health conventions such as ISCs, as well as regional arrangements that had been created through PAHO, and firmly entrenching the WHO at the centre of disease governance arrangements.9 These Regulations focused on ‘sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease’.10 They identified standard epidemiological procedures;11 a unified consensus on six notifiable diseases (cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhoid and yellow fever);12 and minimum hygiene measures at ports;13 as well as harmonizing the requirements in respect of vaccine certification for certain infectious diseases.14 Importantly for our narrative, while states had to report any predetermined notifiable disease to the WHO, in turn the WHO had to notify other states of any outbreaks emerging. Thus, the WHO played a central role in communicating whatever information was known about the disease. The fact that such powers and duties were developed through international law is also pertinent, as it shows that, even in 1951, the WHO was cognizant of the need to ensure that governments complied with the public health recommendations and recognized that, in order to achieve this, there needed to be some attempt at a binding agreement between states themselves, rather than a mere mandate or policy of the organization.

The 1969 International Health Regulations – need for reform

The 1951 ISR were updated and renamed the International Health Regulations in 1969, in which the emphasis on quarantine as a method of controlling disease was lessened, and the list of notifiable diseases was reduced to cholera, plague and yellow fever. These measures reflected the belief that the world was winning the battle against infectious disease.15 Accordingly, international cooperation for disease control became less pressing for diplomatic efforts: high-income settings did not consider cholera, plague or yellow fever to be a risk, and LMICs that suffered had little to gain from reporting disease, other than trade restrictions, and thus this area of global disease control began to languish.

By the mid-1990s, the WHO and member states began to reconsider the IHR, and the need to bring international disease control efforts into the 21st century.16 These efforts were spurred on following outbreaks of: plague in Surat (India) in 1994, which demonstrated the reality of major travel and trade disruption caused by an outbreak; and Ebola in Kikwit (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]) in 1995, where the WHO launched its first coordinated response to an epidemic, which occurred outside the mandate of the IHR. Areas of contention with the IHR consolidated on the narrow definition of diseases and on state compliance with the legal mechanism.

As outlined, the 1969 IHR only applied to three notifiable diseases. This meant that there was no duty on states to report any outbreak of disease not on this explicit list, even if the disease posed human pandemic potential. For example, although the DRC did report the Ebola outbreak to the WHO, it did so in order to seek assistance in managing the response when it was unable to do so independently;17 there was no legal obligation to report, despite the risk that it clearly posed to neighbouring countries. Moreover, the reaction to the outbreak in Surat highlighted that the WHO had little control over how states implemented disease control protocol embedded within the IHR, and that after the negative experience that India suffered, states would be even less likely to report.18

The reporting mechanisms within the 1969 IHR were highly deferential to state sovereignty and based on the principle of state reporting of notifiable diseases to the WHO. The IHR did not allow for any other method of obtaining disease-pertinent data if a state was not forthcoming with this information. Indeed, there had been increasing evidence of many states failing to report outbreaks to the WHO in a timely manner as they feared that they would suffer from trade or travel reductions from other states.19 Governments reporting cholera, for example, indirectly admit to having their water supply contaminated by faeces and therefore run the risk of severe economic repercussions: export restrictions on food goods and a downturn in tourism. These served to create a strong incentive to not report.20

Indeed, despite the WHO’s expansive constitutional mandate to be the central coordinating authority of international disease control, under the 1969 IHR states retained significant power and influence over the international response to infectious disease outbreaks. Even if the WHO had credible evidence to suggest that there was an outbreak occurring, it could not act until official notification came from the state in question. This quandary was further compounded by the delicate geopolitical aspects of disease control: the WHO would not (publicly) challenge states into declaring outbreaks. The only example of an exception to this rule was the anomaly whereby the WHO shared information about a cholera outbreak in Guinea, without the government having formally reported this.21

Reforming the regulations

The move to update the IHR in the 1990s also reflected a broader normative shift towards the securitization of disease within both the WHO and the broader global community.22 This was seen in four ways. First, globalization, migration and rapid urbanization impact the potential speed and spread of infectious disease, and an outbreak in one part of the world could rapidly be elsewhere in a matter of hours.23 Second, the risk of bioterrorism was highlighted, acutely apparent after the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo Subway in 1995.24 Third, the connection was made, through HIV/AIDS, that increased prevalence of a disease within a military would directly affect the readiness of an army to be able to respond to a potential attack, and thus would pose a direct security threat as classically understood.25 Finally, there was an increased recognition that a major epidemic would cause economic insecurity across affected societies as public health interventions disrupt routine capital accumulation and trading.26 Social breakdown was also highlighted as a concern,27 although this was untested (until COVID-19). As Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton argue, the increased securitization of disease offered enabling conditions for revisions to the 1969 IHR, through norm entrepreneurs in key states and at the WHO, to create an understanding that global disease control required a collective globalist approach to tackling the transnational threat of emerging pathogens. Thus, starting in 1995, the WHO began the process of updating the IHR.28

Reform began with WHO Executive Board Resolution 95/12 proposing changes to the IHR, including that member states build capacity for surveillance, laboratory facilities, research and diagnostics activity, and mechanisms for data sharing and collaboration between actors.29 These discussions progressed to the WHA through Resolutions WHA 48.730 and WHA 48.13,31 beginning the process of revisions. While member states agreed that there should be a coordinated governance arrangement for infectious disease control, vast differences remained between states as to what this should look like.32

Throughout the negotiation processes, a key feature of the discussions was the role, power and duties of the WHO. From the early discussions on IHR reform there was a desire to expand the mandate and power of the WHO during a health emergency; early proposals positioned the WHO as the technical lead for coordinating and disseminating surveillance data from a multitude of national and international sources,33 not limiting this to a state power, and, indeed, the WHO could share information without the consent of the affected state.

The intention of the reformed IHR was to further the legitimacy of the WHO as the primary source of information and norms for global health security. Most notably the IHR (2005) sought to formalize the WHO’s role during SARS (broadly seen as successful34) as the lead coordinator of the global response to disease outbreaks. Crucially, the developments proposed the IHR transition from being an inter-state agreement within international law, with the WHO a recipient of information at the behest of the state party concerned (as was the case with the 1969 Regulations), to the WHO being an agent in the process with power in the relationship, or rather a ‘hubs and spokes’ model for the WHO and member states.35 In this way, the WHO would remain at the centre of any governance arrangements, states would be required to report information to the WHO, alongside non-state actors, and the WHO would then have the power to share that information globally after verification, to prevent the international spread of disease.36 This significantly boosted the WHO’s political power in global disease control, but doing so demonstrated the importance that states placed on global health security, that they were willing to cede some sovereignty to the normative goal of global health security.

Importantly, the 1969 Regulations provided no guidance to governments on how to respond to an outbreak, nor did the IHR provide formal scope for the WHO to conduct this vital coordination role, despite the constitutional mandate of the WHO to function as the ‘directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work’.37 While of course the WHO did informally fulfil this role during health emergencies, the fact that such action was not grounded in the IHR themselves meant that the WHO lacked the normative force associated with functions grounded within international law. Therefore, the ability of the WHO to make preparedness and response recommendations was a key development within the legal framework of the IHR (2005). As such, this power was groundbreaking and further consolidated the novel leadership role for the WHO within the IHR and broadly within global health security.

A second key feature of the proposed plans was to ensure that any future powers given to states or the WHO for infectious disease control was done with ‘minimal interference with traffic and trade’. To do so, instead of specifying public health interventions that the WHO could recommend during outbreaks (allowing for political interference within the WHO that might favour public health over that of trade), it was preferred that recommendations be context specific and based on the judgement of ‘expert consensus opinion’.38 This formed the starting basis for deliberations around the role of an ‘expert committee’ to meet during a health emergency to decide on what measures are appropriate. In the earliest draft of the revisions to the IHR in 1997, the creation of such a committee was central to the planned reforms. By 2004, the WHO (and by default, states that governed the IHR process) had doubled down on this, stating that ‘advisories played a crucial role in coordinating [and] orientating the international response to events and public health threats’.39 This ‘expert committee’ would eventually become the EC in the finalized revisions of the IHR (2005). It was clear that while the WHO would receive expanded powers to recommend interventions that may interfere with travel and trade (albeit minimally), this needed to be done in consultation with an independent expert committee, and this power could not be exercised solely at the discretion of the DG. In this sense, the creation of an EC served two functions: a scientific one, to ensure that the DG was furnished with the highest standard of available evidence on which to make an informed decision; and the EC was also seen as an important check on the executive power to be exercised by a DG during a health emergency – an executive power that would come to be the subject of intense scrutiny and discontent by member states during the SARS outbreak.40

The declaration of a PHEIC also emerges in these early draft papers on IHR reform, albeit slightly later in the process. At the time of the mid-1990s draft papers, the PHEIC was referred to merely as an ‘outbreak alert’. This outbreak alert did not appear in the 1998 provisional IHR draft,41 nor in the 2001 IHR report.42 By 2002, with the publication of Global Crisis, Global Solutions, the need for a ‘transparent process for how to make recommendations’ was being explicitly considered. Indeed, the first time we see the term ‘public health emergency of international concern’ is in the context that states must have the capacity to ‘detect and quickly respond to a public health emergency of international concern’43 even though the declaration of a PHEIC (and the process by which this would occur) was not initially part of the reform agenda.

This language is important: it was a clear signal that the proposed IHR revisions were to move away from a restrictive list of notifiable diseases, to encapsulate a broader all-hazards approach to global health security, whereby any disease event of known, or unknown, origin could be included under the IHR remit, including deliberate events, or a chemical or radionuclear event. However, this was not without challenges; some states preferred specific diseases to always be included in the PHEIC mechanism – ultimately, these two approaches were combined in Annex 2 of the IHR.44 The move from the prescribed list to an all-hazards approach warranted a decision instrument to assist states in determining when a potential health emergency was to be reported to the WHO, and when the WHO would act on such notification and make recommendations. This resulted in a ‘Decision instrument for the assessment and notification of events that may constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern’ – at Annex 2 of the IHR (2005). Under Annex 2, notification by states to the WHO must occur if the response to two of four criteria45 are affirmative, or if a health emergency is caused by poliomyelitis, smallpox, human influenza caused by a new subtype or SARS.

SARS, China and the use of discretionary powers at the WHO

SARS emerged as an airborne virus in China in 2002/3, infecting people in 26 countries with 8,000 cases and just under 800 deaths, with a short-term economic impact of over $80 billion,46 demonstrating the realities of a globalized pathogen affecting public health, the economy and security simultaneously. For many, SARS was a catalyst for pushing through revisions to the IHR.47 The epidemic personified many of the fears of policy makers and epidemiologists who had justified the previous decade’s conversations about revisions, and indeed demonstrated the need for coordinated efforts to mitigate against international spread.

Although it subsequently became clear that China was concealing the severity and scale of the outbreak, from a contemporary IHR perspective, SARS did not constitute a ‘notifiable disease’ and therefore China was not legally bound to disclose this information. Moreover, the Chinese response to SARS further demonstrated the limitations of the state-centric governance system embedded within the 1969 IHR. First, the 1969 IHR were concerned only with disease surveillance and notification at international entry points (ports and airports); internal disease outbreaks within a states’ territory were outside of the remit of the IHR until an infected individual attempted to travel across borders, making detection of SARS all the more difficult. Indeed, the IHR (2005) all-hazards approach remedies this by requiring that a state party has capacity to detect and assess health emergencies across the whole national health system.48 In addition, under the IHR (2005), disease notification can come from other states, as well as non-state actors.49 This was a key development in the IHR (2005), providing for an expanded role of all actors within global health security, and for the WHO as the central coordination point in the previously Westphalian-centric model of governance.

SARS presented the world with ‘an opportunity to develop new governance structures between multiple actors as infectious diseases continue to interact with humans in the national international and global contexts’.50 As Kamradt-Scott observed, the WHO now found itself acting simultaneously as ‘real time epidemic coordinator, policy advisor, government assessor, and government critic’.51 Through SARS the WHO became central to collating and analyzing data, and providing technical guidance to states, and indeed travel and trade recommendations to minimize the disease’s spread, even when it had no explicit legal mandate to do so.52 Indeed, the WHO’s leadership and coordination during the SARS outbreak ‘represent one of the high marks in the IHR in terms of centralization of alert and information functions’53 and, as a result, ‘the alert and response mechanisms of the [revised] IHR are modelled on the tools, processes and assumptions that characterized the global response to SARS’,54 with some concerned that the IHR were being overly shaped by the global response to the 2003 SARS outbreak.55

Reforming the IHR – process, politics and an innovative treaty

The following chapter highlights some key aspects of the IHR (2005), in particular those pertaining to the process of the notification and declaration of the PHEIC, yet it is important first to assess the normative changes that took place to the IHR during renegotiation. We can categorize these into five key developments.

First, Article 7 of the IHR (2005) jettisoned specific notifiable diseases and instead states are required to report ‘any public health event of international concern (PHEIC)’ – that is, syndromic reporting. The IHR (2005) therefore adopt a significantly broadened scope, and it was hoped in doing so that increased reporting would occur, increasing transparency and the frequency of information sharing to strengthen global health security. Such transparency would, in turn, create an environment for greater dialogue between actors, leading to a more fruitful disease governance mechanism, with increased trust in reporting potential outbreaks.56 The previous IHR had stifled the ability of the WHO to fulfil its constitutional functions of the organization to ‘act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work’57 and to ‘stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases’.58 Moreover, formalizing the notification aspects shows an important shift in the relationship between states and the WHO; the new IHR were intended to incentivize states to over-report, thereby essentially giving the WHO influence over how public health data collection systems operate at the domestic level.59 It also gave the WHO the power to decide which of the outbreaks reported are worth investigating and, indeed, which need to be shared internationally. This reaffirms the WHO’s power and position as the central hub of epidemic intelligence. However, this power came with constraints through the IHR, which provide a framework to guide state reporting to the WHO, and crucially for our purposes, provide a framework within which the DG must exercise their powers to declare a PHEIC, as outlined at Article 12. ‘Legalizing’60 the powers of the DG does not just constrain the DG within the limitations set out at Article 12, but the exercise of these powers can also be viewed under administrative law principles such as reasonableness, proportionality and necessity,61 albeit not in a justiciable manner.

Second, the revised IHR allow for the expansion of sources able to report outbreaks to the WHO, to avoid bottlenecks of states which see no incentive to report any potential emerging threat. Article 9 states that the ‘WHO may take into account reports from sources other than [state] notifications or consultations and shall assess these reports according to established epidemiological principles and then communicate information on the event to the state party in whose territory the event is allegedly occurring’.62 Non-state reports can be received from other states, sub-national agencies, non-governmental organizations, individuals, news reports and internet sources and the WHO is empowered to act on these non-official reports as it sees fit.63 Importantly, in recognition of sovereignty, such a process is moderated by the requirement to verify any emerging reports with the state affected prior to more widespread information sharing with the global community. The WHO has always had the constitutional right to consult with non-governmental and international organizations;64 however, its shift under the IHR to engage with non-state providers of disease-pertinent information was unprecedented. Such revision can be viewed as a game changer – these newly permissible non-state actors legitimized a host of new eyes and ears to assist in holding governments accountable for their response to public health emergencies by creating a new source of information surveillance, which led the way for the globalization of disease surveillance.65

Third, the IHR (2005) include the explicit obligation on states to assess, strengthen and maintain core capacities for surveillance, risk assessment, reporting and response.66 As previously noted, the pre-IHR (2005) were concerned only with disease surveillance and notification at international entry points; the all-hazards approach of the IHR (2005) required the ability to detect and assess health emergencies across the whole national health system.67 Although the IHR do not specify the exact structure of any national surveillance system, they do tell states what outputs of such processes and systems must be.68 This requires establishing technical leadership during field responses, building local capacity for future epidemics and ensuring respect for legal, human rights and cultural sensitivities.69 There is a further obligation to establish a National Focal Point (NFP), which is required to notify the WHO of any event that may constitute a PHEIC within 24 hours of the discovery of a potential health emergency. Through this move to require core capacities and the non-derogable obligations70 found at Articles 5 and 13, ‘national health systems under the IHR 2005 become an issue of legitimate international concern and must correspondingly generate accountability and responsibility akin to those arising from erga omnes obligations’.71

Such a requirement for domestic structural changes in the updated IHR represented a significant change in the relationship between the WHO and member states. Prior to these revisions the WHO had been loathed to impose standards on the health systems of its member states, thus such an introduction was seen as a potential challenge to the sovereignty of states, which no longer had sole discretion as to when to report an outbreak, nor what public health utilities they needed to have domestically (that is, a potential challenge to their sovereign decision about how to organize their public health system).72 As noted elsewhere, ‘the intrusiveness and implications of the core capacity obligations under the IHR (2005) are one of [their] most striking features and were probably underestimated during the revision process’.73 For many, meeting the core competencies required a substantial upgrade to surveillance capabilities, with many states lacking the resources to do this and/or the political will to prioritize the funding over other domestic concerns.74 In 2012, on the fifth anniversary of the IHR (2005) ratification, when states were supposed to have met these prescribed requirements, 107 state parties asked for two further years to implement the requirements.75 In 2014, only 42 states declared that they had met the core requirements.76 This still left 152 state parties in breach of at least one of the core capacity requirements under the IHR. Although there may be several reasons for this lack of compliance, Gostin and Friedman suggest that a key problem is that the IHR do not consider the financial burden put on states to meet the requirements and nor do they offer them a funding mechanism to develop the necessary infrastructure,77 an issue that continues to plague IHR implementation.

Fourth, having been absent from previous iterations, human rights are strongly embedded within the IHR (2005). Human rights are referenced at Article 3 in that ‘the implementation of these Regulations shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons’78. They are also expressly mentioned in Article 32, stating that ‘[i]n implementing health measures under these Regulations, States Parties shall treat travellers with respect for their dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms and minimize any discomfort or distress associated with such measures’.79 The Article further provides for a non-exhaustive list of considerations for state parties to consider, including courtesy and respect, and taking into consideration gender, sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns. It is worth noting that these are limited only to a ‘traveller’, defined as ‘a natural person undertaking an international voyage’;80 therefore, the human rights standards contained within Article 32 only become engaged when an individual crosses an international frontier and do not apply to health measures adopted within a state party’s territory.

Fifth, and importantly, the IHR (2005) revisions reflect the global community’s contemporary understanding of health, disease and obligations to one another within a normative understanding of global health security.81 First, the IHR reflect a biomedical interpretation of health and disease, rather than considering social or traditional conceptions of these issues, or a recognition of the downstream effects of epidemics.82 Second, the approach seeks to contain disease at the source, and to alert the global community as soon as possible, through the IHR mechanism.83 Thus, the revisions echo an understanding that disease control is a global phenomenon that requires cooperation, compliance and the good will of all, thereby underlining the goals of global health security that the WHO and other norm entrepreneurs had been highlighting in the previous decade.84 The IHR took this normative approach one step further, codifying norms into international law, and imposing an increasing sense of responsibility for global health security onto individual states. States that are party to the IHR have an explicit responsibility to meet the core capacities for disease control, and to be able to detect an outbreak at the earliest moment within the domestic health system, not just at international points of entry. Not only are states legally required to, but the assumption is that states should prioritise global health security, at the cost of other health priorities the state may have (and with it, the state’s absolute control over its health system and internal affairs). Such transparency, regular reporting and becoming good international citizens was rooted in an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility, even if this places socioeconomic constraints on governments for doing so.85

As has been widely debated in the literature on the IHR, a key concern is the lack of a formal compliance mechanism;86 indeed, there is no enforcement apparatus other than naming and shaming.87 However, this issue is not resolved by creating an enforcement arm for the WHO to implement punitive measures on states with weak health systems which fail to meet their obligations. The issue of sovereignty within the IHR exists in a delicate balance; concern has been raised that some state parties have a degree of distrust around the IHR, as they could, in their view, represent the WHO acting as a Trojan horse for external interference in their domestic affairs.88 Moreover, the design of the IHR (2005) ‘imported certain assumptions about the compliance pull and effectiveness of WHO’s alert and guidance that were generated by the response to the 2003 SARS outbreak’,89 the effectiveness of which has not been replicated in subsequent outbreaks.90 Despite this, in agreeing to the IHR (2005), states subscribed to new expectations of each other, and of the WHO, new material requirements and new social norms compounding global health security;91 an achievement not to be dismissed for lack of formal enforcement tools. Indeed, as we come to analyse the PHEIC mechanism, it is important to remember that it (and the IHR) is not merely a legal process providing a framework around the emergency executive powers of the WHO (although such processes are important for their own sake), but it is also a normative call to arms for responding to a potential health emergency, which requires an explicit response from states. We explore the detail of the PHEIC mechanism in detail in the next chapter.

1

Hugh S Cumming, ‘The International Sanitary Conference’ (1926) 16 American Journal of Public Health 975.

2

Neville M Goodman, International Health Organizations and Their Work (2nd edn, Churchill Livingstone 1971).

3

Valeska Huber, ‘The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894’ (2006) 49 The Historical Journal 453; Mark Harrison, ‘Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce: The Origins of International Sanitary Regulation in the Nineteenth Century’ (2006) 1 Journal of Global History 197.

4

The World Health Organization, The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization (1st edn, World Health Organization 1958).

5

Bolivar J Lloyd, ‘The Pan American Sanitary Bureau’ (1930) 20 American Journal of Public Health and the Nations Health 925.

6

Marcos Cueto, Theodore M Brown and Elizabeth Fee, The World Health Organization: A History (Cambridge University Press 2019).

7

Article 21(a), Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) 14 UNTS 185.

8

Article 2(g), Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) 14 UNTS 185.

9

Jeremy R Youde, Global Health Governance (Polity Press 2012) 118.

10

Article 22, International Sanitary Regulations (1951) 175 UNTS 214.

11

Article 10, International Sanitary Regulations (1951) 175 UNTS 214.

12

Article 1, International Sanitary Regulations (1951) 175 UNTS 214.

13

Articles 14 and 15, International Sanitary Regulations (1951) 175 UNTS 214.

14

Article 1 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4, International Sanitary Regulations (1951) 175 UNTS 214.

15

Max Hardiman and Annelies Wilder-Smith, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations and Their Relevance to Travel Medicine’ (2007) 14 Journal of Travel Medicine 141; Lawrence O Gostin and Rebecca Katz, ‘The International Health Regulations: The Governing Framework for Global Health Security’ (2016) 94 The Milbank Quarterly 264.

16

Sara E Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security (Johns Hopkins University Press 2015).

17

JJ Muyembe-Tamfum and others, ‘Ebola Outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Discovery and Control Measures’ (1999) 179 The Journal of Infectious Diseases S259.

18

Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (1st edn, Hyperion 2000); Sara E Davies, Global Politics of Health (Polity 2010) 149.

19

Mark W Zacher and Tania J Keefe, The Politics of Global Health Governance: United by Contagion (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2008).

20

B Velimirovic, ‘Do We Still Need International Health Regulations?’ (1976) 133 Journal of Infectious Diseases 478; David Ofori-Adjei and Kwadwo Koram, ‘Of Cholera and Ebola Virus Disease in Ghana’ (2014) 48 Ghana Medical Journal 120; David C Griffith, Louise A Kelly-Hope and Mark A Miller, ‘Review of Reported Cholera Outbreaks Worldwide, 1995–2005’ (2006) 75 The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 973.

21

Lorna Weir and Eric Mykhalovskiy, Global Public Health Vigilance: Creating a World on Alert (Routledge 2012) 74–5.

22

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security; Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee, ‘Health, Security and Foreign Policy’ (2006) 32 Review of International Studies 5; AT Price-Smith, The Health Of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and their Effects on National Security and Development (MIT Press 2001); Jeremy Youde, ‘Enter the fourth horseman: health security and international relations theory’ (2005) 6 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations, 193.

23

Simon Rushton, ‘Global Health Security: Security for Whom? Security from What?’ (2011) 59 Political Studies 799.

24

Kyle B Olson, ‘Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?’ (1999) 5 Emerging Infectious Diseases 413.

25

UNSC Res 1308 (17 July 2000) UN Doc/S/Res/1308; UNSC Res 1983 (7 June 2011) UN/DOC/S/Res/193; McInnes and Lee, ‘Health, Security and Foreign Policy’.

26

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security.

27

Pieter Fourie, ‘The Relationship between the AIDS Pandemic and State Fragility’ (2007) 19 Global Change, Peace & Security 281.

28

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security 6.

29

WHO, ‘WHO response to global change – Progress report by the Director-General’ (31 October 1994) EB95/12 Ninety-fifth Session.

30

World Health Assembly, ‘Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations’ (May 12, 1995) WHO Doc. WHA 48.7.

31

World Health Assembly, ‘Communicable Disease Prevention and Control: New, Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases’ (May 12, 1995) WHO Doc. WHA 18.13.

32

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security 7.

33

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security 7.

34

Adam Kamradt-Scott, Managing Global Health Security: The World Health Organization and Disease Outbreak Control (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).

35

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security.

36

Adam Kamradt-Scott, ‘The Evolving WHO: Implications for Global Health Security’ (2010) 6 Global Public Health 8 801.

37

Article 2(a), Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) 14 UNTS 185.

38

David P Fidler, ‘International Law and Global Public Health’ (1999) 48 Kansas Law Review 2.

39

WHO, ‘Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Explanatory Notes. Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health Regulations, provisional agenda item 3’ (7 October 2004) A/IHR/IGWG/4.

40

David P Fidler, ‘SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post-Westphalian Pathogen’ (2003) 31 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 485.

41

WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report’ (10 March 1998) A51/8.

42

WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report, February 2001’ (2001) 76 Releve Epidemiologique Hebdomadaire 61.

43

WHO, ‘Global crises, global solutions – managing public health emergencies of international concern through the revised International Health Regulations’ (2002) WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2002/4/ENP. P.11.

44

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security 61.

45

‘Is the public health impact of the event serious? Is the event unusual or unexpected? Is there a significant risk of international spread? Is there a significant risk of international restrictions to travel and trade?’, which is typically used by state parties to determine if a public health event within their territory ought to be notified to the WHO under Article 6 of the International Health Regulations, as a potential PHEIC.

46

KS Chan and others, ‘SARS: Prognosis, Outcome and Sequelae’ (2003) 8 Respirology S36.

47

Jeremy Youde, ‘Biosurveillance, Human Rights, and the Zombie Plague’ (2012) 24 Global Change, Peace & Security 83; David P Fidler, SARS: Governance and the Globalization of Disease (Palgrave Macmillan 2004).

48

Gostin and Katz, ‘The International Health Regulations: The Governing Framework for Global Health Security’; Feng-Jen Tsai and Rebecca Katz, ‘Measuring Global Health Security: Comparison of Self- and External Evaluations for IHR Core Capacity’ (2018) 16 Health Security 304.

49

Article 9, International Health Regulations (2005) UNTS 2509.

50

Obijiofor Aginam, Global Health Governance: International Law and Public Health in a Divided World (University of Toronto Press 2005) https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/519380.

51

Kamradt-Scott, Managing Global Health Security.

52

David L Heymann and Guenael Roider, ‘SARS: A Global Response to an International Threat’ (2004) 10 The Brown Journal of World Affairs 185; Adam Kamradt-Scott, ‘The WHO Secretariat, Norm Entrepreneurship, and Global Disease Outbreak Control’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Organizations Studies 72.

53

Gian Luca Burci and Mark Eccleston-Turner, ‘Preparing for the next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’ (2020) 2 Yearbook of International Disaster Law.

54

Burci and Eccleston-Turner, ‘Preparing for the next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’.

55

Burci and Eccleston-Turner, ‘Preparing for the next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’.

56

This obviously relies on states acknowledging outbreaks through the IHR (2005). This has not always been the case and there are still states that choose to ignore these requirements such as Syria and the polio outbreak 2013/4; see: Bachir Tajaldin and others, ‘Defining Polio: Closing the Gap in Global Surveillance’ (2015) 81 Annals of Global Health 386.

57

Article 2(a), Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) 14 UNTS 185.

58

Article 2(g), Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) 14 UNTS 185.

59

Jeremy R Youde, Biopolitical Surveillance and Public Health in International Politics (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010).

60

Legalization refers to a specific set of characteristics that an institution may or may not possess: obligation, precision and delegation; see: Kenneth W Abbott and others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401.

61

Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations’ (2008) 09 German Law Journal 11, 1948; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 15.

62

Article 9, International Health Regulations (2005) UNTS 2509.

63

Eric Mack, ‘The World Health Organisation’s New International Health Regulations: Incursion on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated Response to Global Health Issues’ (2006) 7 Chicago Journal of International Law 365.

64

Article 71, Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) 14 UNTS 185.

65

Sara E Davies and Jeremy Youde, ‘The IHR (2005), Disease Surveillance, and the Individual in Global Health Politics’ (2013) 17 The International Journal of Human Rights 133.

66

Articles 5, 13 and Annex 1, International Health Regulations (2005) UNTS 2509.

67

Gostin and Katz, ‘The International Health Regulations: The Governing Framework for Global Health Security’; Tsai and Katz, ‘Measuring Global Health Security: Comparison of Self- and External Evaluations for IHR Core Capacity’.

68

Youde, ‘Biosurveillance, Human Rights, and the Zombie Plague’.

69

Jessica L Sturtevant, Aranka Anema and John S Brownstein, ‘The New International Health Regulations: Considerations for Global Public Health Surveillance’ (2007) 1 Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 117.

70

Meaning a legal obligation from which no derogation is permitted.

71

Burci and Eccleston-Turner, ‘Preparing for the next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’.

72

Mack, ‘The World Health Organisation’s New International Health Regulations: Incursion on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated Response to Global Health Issues’. It is important to note that there are a number of concessions in respect of sovereignty built into the IHR, leading Burci to describe it as an agreement ‘that balances respect for national sovereignty with the new realities of international health cooperation and the increased importance of human security as a political and normative principle’ – Gian Luca Burci, ‘Shifting Norms in International Health Law’ (2004) 16 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 18.

73

Burci and Eccleston-Turner, ‘Preparing for the Next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’.

74

Clare Wenham, ‘Examining sovereignty in global disease governance: surveillance practices in United Kingdom, Thailand and Lao People’s Democratic Republic’ (doctoral dissertation, Aberystwyth University) (2015).

75

WHO, ‘Summary of States Parties 2012 report on IHR core capacity implementation’ (2014) WHO/HSE/GCR/2014.5.

76

WHO, ‘Summary of States Parties 2013 report on IHR core capacity implementation’ (2014) WHO/HSE/GCR/2014.10.

77

Lawrence O Gostin and Eric A Friedman, ‘A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation and an Empowered WHO at the Apex’ (2015) 385 The Lancet 1902.

78

Article 3, International Health Regulations (2005) UNTS 2509.

79

Article 32, International Health Regulations (2005) UNTS 2509.

80

Article 1, International Health Regulations (2005) UNTS 2509.

81

Youde, Biopolitical Surveillance and Public Health in International Politics.

82

Nancy Krieger, Epidemiology and the People’s Health: Theory and Context (Oxford University Press 2011).

83

Guénaël Rodier and others, ‘Global Public Health Security’ (2007) 13 Emerging Infectious Diseases 1447.

84

Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations: Socialization, Compliance and Changing Norms of Global Health Security’ (2012) 24 Global Change, Peace & Security 57.

85

Davies and Youde, ‘The IHR (2005), Disease Surveillance, and the Individual in Global Health Politics’.

86

Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security.

87

Sophie Harmann, ‘Norms Won’t Save You: Ebola and the Norm of Global Health Security’ (2017) 11 Global Health Governance.

88

Mack, ‘The World Health Organization’s New International Health Regulations: Incursion on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated Response to Global Health Issues’.

89

Burci and Eccleston-Turner, ‘Preparing for the next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’.

90

Ali Tejpar and Steven J Hoffman, ‘Canada’s Violation of International Law during the 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak Notes and Comments’ (2016) 54 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 366; Nicole J Cohen et al, ‘Travel and Border Health Measures to Prevent the International Spread of Ebola’ (2016) 65 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 57; Nicole J Cohen and others, ‘Travel and Border Health Measures to Prevent the International Spread of Ebola’ (2016) 65 MMWR Supplements 57.

91

Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations: Socialization, Compliance and Changing Norms of Global Health Security’.

  • Abbott KW, Keohane RO Moravcsik A, Slaughter AM and Snidal D ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 3

  • Aginam O, Global Health Governance: International Law and Public Health in a Divided World (University of Toronto Press 2005) https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/519380

  • Asian Development Bank, The Economic Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak of Developing Asia (Asian Development Bank 2020), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/571536/adb-brief-128-economic-impact-covid19-developing-asia.pdf

  • Aylward B and Tangermann R, ‘The Global Polio Eradication Initiative: Lessons Learned and Prospects for Success’ (2011) 29 Vaccine D80

  • Balakrishnan A, ‘Zimbabwe Declares State of Emergency over Cholera Epidemic’ The Guardian (4 December 2008) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/04/zimbabwe-health

  • Barnett M and Finnemore M, ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’ (1999) 53 International Organization 4

  • Barry M, Al Amri M and Memish ZA, ‘COVID-19 in the Shadows of MERS-CoV in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (2020) 10 Journal of Epidemiology and Global Health 1

  • Barua D, ‘History of Cholera’ in D Barua and WB Greenough (eds) Cholera (Springer US 1992)

  • Benton A and Dionne KY, ‘International Political Economy and the 2014 West African Ebola Outbreak’ (2015) 58 African Studies Review 223

  • Bifani AM, Ong EZ and de Alwis R, ‘Vaccination and Therapeutics: Responding to the Changing Epidemiology of Yellow Fever’ (2020) 12 Current Treatment Options in Infectious Diseases 349

  • Brown TM and Ladwig S, ‘COVID-19, China, the World Health Organization, and the Limits of International Health Diplomacy’ (2020) 110 American Journal of Public Health 1149

  • Brunnée J, ‘International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility’ (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 21

  • Brunnée and Toope SJ, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press 2010)

  • Burci GL, ‘Shifting Norms in International Health Law’ (2004) 16 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 18

  • Burci GL and Eccleston-Turner M, ‘Preparing for the Next Pandemic: The International Health Regulations and World Health Organization during COVID-19’ (2020) 2 Yearbook of International Disaster Law

  • Butler D, ‘Tensions Linger over Discovery of Coronavirus’ (2013) Nature News

  • Chan K, Zheng JP, Mok YW, Li YM, Liu YN, Chu CM and IP MS, ‘SARS: Prognosis, Outcome and Sequelae’ (2003) 8 Respirology S36

  • Cheng M, ‘Emails: UN Health Agency Resisted Declaring Ebola Emergency’ Associated Press (20 March 2015) https://apnews.com/article/2489c78bff86463589b41f3faaea5ab2

  • Chinazzi M and others, ‘The Effect of Travel Restrictions on the Spread of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak’ (2020) 368 Science 395

  • Chorev N, ‘The World Health Organization between the United States and China’ (2020) 20 Global Social Policy 378

  • Cohen NJ and others, ‘Travel and Border Health Measures to Prevent the International Spread of Ebola’ (2016) 65 MMWR Supplements 57

  • Cueto M, Brown TM and Fee E, The World Health Organization: A History (Cambridge University Press 2019)

  • Cumming HS, ‘The International Sanitary Conference’ (1926) 16 American Journal of Public Health 975

  • Cuneo CN, Sollom R and Beyrer C, ‘The Cholera Epidemic in Zimbabwe, 2008–2009: A Review and Critique of the Evidence’ (2017) 19 Health and Human Rights 249

  • Davies SE, Global Politics of Health (Polity 2010)

  • Davies SE, ‘The International Politics of Disease Reporting: Towards Post-Westphalianism?’ (2012) 49 International Politics 591

  • Davies SE, Kamradt-Scott A and Rushton S, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security (Johns Hopkins University Press 2015)

  • Davies SE and Rushton S, ‘Public Health Emergencies: A New Peacekeeping Mission? Insights from UNMIL’s Role in the Liberia Ebola Outbreak’ (2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 3

  • Davies SE and Wenham C, ‘Why the COVID-19 Response Needs International Relations’ (2020) 96 International Affairs 1227

  • Davies SE and Youde J, ‘The IHR (2005), Disease Surveillance, and the Individual in Global Health Politics’ (2013) 17 The International Journal of Human Rights 133

  • Deardorff Miller S, Political and Humanitarian Responses to Syrian Displacement (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2017)

  • Eccleston-Turner M and Kamradt-Scott A, ‘Transparency in IHR Emergency Committee Decision Making: The Case for Reform’ (2019) 4 BMJ Global Health e001618

  • Eccleston-Turner M and McArdle S, ‘Accountability, International Law, and the World Health Organization: A Need for Reform?’ (2017) XI Global Health Governance 27

  • Eccleston-Turner M and McArdle S, ‘The Law of Responsibility and the World Health Organization: A Case Study on the West African Ebola Outbreak’ in M Eccleston-Turner and I Brassington (eds) Infectious Diseases in the New Millennium: Legal and Ethical Challenges (Springer 2020)

  • Elbe S, Pandemics, Pills, and Politics: Governing Global Health Security (Johns Hopkins University Press 2018)

  • Elliott I, ‘“A Meaningful Step towards Accountability”?’ (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 239

  • Fidler DP, ‘International Law and Global Public Health’ (1999) 48 Kansas Law Review 2

  • Fidler DP, ‘SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post-Westphalian Pathogen’ (2003) 31 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 485

  • Fidler DP, SARS: Governance and the Globalization of Disease (Palgrave Macmillan 2004)

  • Fidler DP, ‘From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New International Health Regulations’ (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 325

  • Fidler DP, ‘To Declare Or Not to Declare: The Controversy over Declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern for the Ebola Outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2019) 14 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 287

  • Fidler DP and Gostin LO, ‘The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health’ (2006) 34 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 85

  • Forsyth CF and Wade W, Administrative Law (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2014)

  • Fourie P, ‘The Relationship between the AIDS Pandemic and State Fragility’ (2007) 19 Global Change, Peace & Security 281

  • Franck TM, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990)

  • Garrett L, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (1st edn, Hyperion 2000)

  • Goodman NM, International Health Organizations and Their Work (2nd edn, Churchill Livingstone 1971)

  • Gostin L, ‘The Future of the World Health Organization: Lessons Learned From Ebola’ (2015) 93 Milbank Quarterly 475

  • Gostin L, ‘Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Time to Sound a Global Alert?’ (2019) 393 The Lancet 617

  • Gostin L and Friedman E, ‘Ebola: A Crisis in Global Health Leadership’ (2014) 384 The Lancet

  • Gostin LO, ‘New Ebola Outbreak in Africa Is a Major Test for the WHO’ (2018) 320 JAMA 125

  • Gostin LO and Friedman EA, ‘A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation and an Empowered WHO at the Apex’ (2015) 385 The Lancet 1902

  • Gostin LO and Katz R, ‘The International Health Regulations: The Governing Framework for Global Health Security’ (2016) 94 The Milbank Quarterly 264

  • Governments of France and Germany, ‘Non-Paper on Strengthening WHO’s Leading and Coordinating Role in Global Health’ (2020) http://g2h2.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Non-paper-1.pdf

  • Griffith DC, Kelly-Hope LA and Miller MA, ‘Review of Reported Cholera Outbreaks Worldwide, 1995–2005’ (2006) 75 The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 973

  • Grigorescu A, ‘Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations’ (2007) 51 International Studies Quarterly 625

  • Guha-Sapir D and others, ‘Civilian Deaths from Weapons Used in the Syrian Conflict’ (2015) BMJ h4736

  • Hale TN, ‘Transparency, Accountability, and Global Governance’ (2008) 14 Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 73

  • Hardiman M and Wilder-Smith A, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations and Their Relevance to Travel Medicine’ (2007) 14 Journal of Travel Medicine 141

  • Harmann S, ‘Norms Won’t Save You: Ebola and the Norm of Global Health Security’ (2017) 11 Global Health Governance

  • Harmann S and Wenham C, ‘Governing Ebola: Between Global Health and Medical Humanitarianism’ (2018) 15 Globalizations 362

  • Harrison M, ‘Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce: The Origins of International Sanitary Regulation in the Nineteenth Century’ (2006) 1 Journal of Global History 197

  • Hasegawa, A, Ohira T, Maeda M, Yasumura S and Tanigawa K, ‘Emergency Responses and Health Consequences after the Fukushima Accident; Evacuation and Relocation’ (2016) 28 Clinical Oncology 4

  • Heymann DL and others, ‘Zika Virus and Microcephaly: Why Is This Situation a PHEIC?’ (2016) 387 The Lancet 719

  • Heymann DL and Roider G, ‘SARS: A Global Response to an International Threat’ (2004) 10 The Brown Journal of World Affairs 185

  • Hovell D, ‘The Deliberative Deficit: Transparency, Access to Information and UN Sanctions’ in JM Farrell and K Rubenstein (eds) Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press 1999)

  • Huber V, ‘The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851–1894’ (2006) 49 The Historical Journal 453

  • Ilunga Kalenga O and others, ‘The Ongoing Ebola Epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2018–2019’ (2019) 381 New England Journal of Medicine 373

  • International Law Association, Final Report of the ILA Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations (ILA 2004)

  • Jee Y, ‘WHO International Health Regulations Emergency Committee for the COVID-19 Outbreak’ (2020) 42 Epidemiology and Health e2020013

  • Kamradt-Scott A, ‘The WHO Secretariat, Norm Entrepreneurship, and Global Disease Outbreak Control’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Organizations Studies 72

  • Kamradt-Scott A, ‘The Evolving WHO: Implications for Global Health Security’ (2010) 6 Global Public Health 8

  • Kamradt-Scott A, Managing Global Health Security: The World Health Organization and Disease Outbreak Control.(Palgrave Macmillan 2015)

  • Kamradt-Scott A, Managing Global Health Security: The World Health Organization and Disease Outbreak Control (Springer 2015)

  • Kamradt-Scott A, ‘What Went Wrong? The World Health Organization from Swine Flu to Ebola’ in A Kruck, K Oppermann and A Spencer (eds) Political Mistakes and Policy Failures in International Relations (Springer International Publishing 2018)

  • Kamradt-Scott A and Rushton S, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations: Socialization, Compliance and Changing Norms of Global Health Security’ (2012) 24 Global Change, Peace & Security 57

  • Katz R, ‘Pandemic Policy Can Learn from Arms Control’ (2019) 575 Nature

  • Katz R and Fischer J, ‘The Revised International Health Regulations: A Framework for Global Pandemic Response’ (2010) III Global Health Governance 1

  • Kekulé A, ‘Learning from Ebola Virus: How to Prevent Future Epidemics’ (2015) 7 Viruses 3789

  • Kingsbury B, Krisc, N Stewart R, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 3

  • Klabbers J, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional Law’ (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 151

  • Koblentz GD, ‘Chemical-Weapon Use in Syria: Atrocities, Attribution, and Accountability’ (2019) 26 The Nonproliferation Review 575

  • Koskenniemi M, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 4

  • Kraemer MUG and others, ‘Spread of Yellow Fever Virus Outbreak in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015–16: A Modelling Study’ (2017) 17 The Lancet Infectious Diseases 330

  • Kreuder-Sonnen C, ‘China vs the WHO: A Behavioural Norm Conflict in the SARS Crisis’ (2019) 95 International Affairs 535

  • Krieger N, Epidemiology and the People’s Health: Theory and Context (Oxford University Press 2011)

  • Krisch N, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 247

  • Lauterpacht H, The Function of Law in the International Community (1st paperback edn, Oxford University Press 2011)

  • Lloyd BJ, ‘The Pan American Sanitary Bureau’ (1930) 20 American Journal of Public Health and the Nation’s Health 925

  • Loughlin M, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Hart 2000)

  • Mack E, ‘The World Health Organisation’s New International Health Regulations: Incursion on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated Response to Global Health Issues’ (2006) 7 Chicago Journal of International Law 365

  • McCarthy DR and Fluck M, ‘The Concept of Transparency in International Relations: Towards a Critical Approach’ (2017) 23 European Journal of International Relations 416

  • McCloskey B and Endericks T, ‘The Rise of Zika Infection and Microcephaly: What Can We Learn from a Public Health Emergency?’ (2017) 150 Public Health 87

  • McCurry J, ‘Japan: The Aftermath’ (2011) 377 The Lancet 1061

  • McInnes C and Lee K, ‘Health, Security and Foreign Policy’ (2006) 32 Review of International Studies 5

  • Möllers C, ‘Constitutional Foundations of Global Administration’ in S Cassese (ed) Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016)

  • Mukandavire Z and others, ‘Estimating the Reproductive Numbers for the 2008–2009 Cholera Outbreaks in Zimbabwe’ (2011) 108 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 8767

  • Mullen L and others, ‘An Analysis of International Health Regulations Emergency Committees and Public Health Emergency of International Concern Designations’ (2020) 5 BMJ Global Health e002502

  • Muyembe-Tamfum JJ and others, ‘Ebola Outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Discovery and Control Measures’ (1999) 179 The Journal of Infectious Diseases S259

  • Ofori-Adjei D and Koram K, ‘Of Cholera and Ebola Virus Disease in Ghana’ (2014) 48 Ghana Medical Journal 120

  • Olson KB, ‘Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?’ (1999) 5 Emerging Infectious Diseases 413

  • Paddeu F and Waibel W, ‘The Final Act: Exploring the End of Pandemics’ (2020) 114 American Journal of International Law 698

  • Pantzerhielm L, Holzscheiter A and Bahr T, ‘Power in Relations of International Organisations: The Productive Effects of “Good” Governance Norms in Global Health’ (2020) 46 Review of International Studies 3

  • Pillinger M, Hurd I and Barnett MN, ‘How to Get Away with Cholera: The UN, Haiti, and International Law’ (2016) 14 Perspectives on Politics 70

  • Piot P, ‘Ebola’s Perfect Storm’ (2014) Nature: 1221

  • Previsani N and others, ‘World Health Organization Guidelines for Containment of Poliovirus Following Type-Specific Polio Eradication — Worldwide, 2015’ (2015) 64 MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 913

  • Price-Smith AT, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and their Effects on National Security and Development (MIT Press 2001)

  • Rainis Houston A, ‘Applying Lessons from the Past in Haiti: Cholera, Scientific Knowledge, and the Longest-Standing Principle of International Health Law’ in M Eccleston-Turner and I Brassington (eds) Infectious Diseases in the New Millennium: Legal and Ethical Challenges (Springer 2020)

  • Rasmussen SA and others, ‘Zika Virus and Birth Defects — Reviewing the Evidence for Causality’ (2016) 374 New England Journal of Medicine 1981

  • ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations. Progress Report, February 2001’ (2001) 76 Releve Epidemiologique Hebdomadaire 61

  • Rodier G and others, ‘Global Public Health Security’ (2007) 13 Emerging Infectious Diseases 1447

  • Rodriguez-Llanes JM and others, ‘Epidemiological Findings of Major Chemical Attacks in the Syrian War Are Consistent with Civilian Targeting: A Short Report’ (2018) 12 Conflict and Health 16

  • Rushton S, ‘Global Health Security: Security for Whom? Security from What?’ (2011) 59 Political Studies 799

  • Siedner MJ, ‘Strengthening the Detection of and Early Response to Public Health Emergencies: Lessons from the West African Ebola Epidemic’ 12 PLOS Medicine (2015)

  • Sprinz D and Wolinsky-Nahmias Y (eds),Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations (University of Michigan Press 2004)

  • Staples JE, ‘Yellow Fever: 100 Years of Discovery’ (2008) 300 JAMA 960

  • Sturtevant JL, Anema A and Brownstein JS, ‘The New International Health Regulations: Considerations for Global Public Health Surveillance’ (2007) 1 Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 117

  • Tajaldin B and others, ‘Defining Polio: Closing the Gap in Global Surveillance’ (2015) 81 Annals of Global Health 386

  • Tejpar A and Hoffman SJ, ‘Canada’s Violation of International Law during the 2014–2016 Ebola Outbreak: Notes and Comments’ (2016) 54 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 366

  • ‘The WHO Ebola Response Team, “Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa — The First 9 Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections” 371’ [2014] New England Journal of Medicine 1481

  • The World Health Organization, The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization (1st edn, World Health Organization 1958)

  • Thompson KM and Kalkowska DA, ‘An Updated Economic Analysis of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative’ (2021) 41 Risk Analysis 393

  • Tsai F-J and Katz R, ‘Measuring Global Health Security: Comparison of Self- and External Evaluations for IHR Core Capacity’ (2018) 16 Health Security 304

  • UK Government, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to United Nations General Assembly’ 26 September 2020 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-to-un-general-assembly-26-september-2020

  • United States Government, ‘Reviewing COVID-19 Response and Strengthening the WHO’s Global Emergency Preparedness and Response WHO ROADMAP’, 9 September 2020 https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/oga/about-oga/what-we-do/international-relations-division/multilateral-relations/who-roadmap-2020.html

  • Velimirovic B, ‘Do We Still Need International Health Regulations?’ (1976) 133 Journal of Infectious Diseases 478

  • Vogel C, Mathys G, Verweijen J, Benton A, Sweet R and Marijen E, ‘Clichés can Kill in Congo’ (2019) 30 Foreign Policy

  • Von Bernstorff J, ‘Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1939

  • Weir L and Mykhalovskiy E, Global Public Health Vigilance: Creating a World on Alert (Routledge 2012)

  • Weiss TG, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges’ (2000) 21 Third World Quarterly 795

  • Wenham C, ‘What We Have Learnt about the World Health Organization from the Ebola Outbreak’ (2017) 372 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 20160307

  • Wenham C, ‘The Oversecuritization of Global Health: Changing the Terms of Debate’ (2019) 95 International Affairs 1093

  • Wenham C, Feminist Global Health Security (Oxford University Press 2021)

  • Wenham C and Farias DB, ‘Securitizing Zika: The Case of Brazil’ (2019) 50 Security Dialogue 398

  • Wenham C, Kavanagh M, Phelan A, Rushton S, Voss M, Halabi S, Eccleston-Turner M and Pillinger M, ‘Problems with Traffic Light Approaches to Public Health Emergencies of International Concern’ (2021) 397 The Lancet 10287

  • Weyer J, Grobbelaar A and Blumberg L, ‘Ebola Virus Disease: History, Epidemiology and Outbreaks’ (2015) 17 Current Infectious Disease Reports 21

  • White ND, ‘Accountability and Democracy Within the United Nations: A Legal Perspective’ (1997) 13 International Relations 1

  • WHO (World Health Organization) ‘Ad Hoc Scientific Teleconference on the Current Influenza A(H1N1) Situation’, WHO, Geneva, 29 April 2009 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/swineflu/TCReport2009_05_04.pdf

  • WHO, Global Crises, Global Solutions: Managing Public Health Emergencies of International Concern through the Revised International Health Regulations (2002) WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2002/4/ENP

  • WHO, ‘Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) – Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009’ (2011) A64/10

  • WHO, ‘Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health Regulations’ (12 January 2004) IGWG/IHR/working paper/12.2003

  • WHO, ‘Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health Regulations, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Explanatory Notes’ (7 October 2004) A/IHRIGWG/4

  • WHO, ‘Interim Report on WHO’s Response to COVID-19 January-April 2020 Geneva: World Health Organization’ (28 April 2020) https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/interim-report-on-who-s-response-to-covid---january---april-2020

  • WHO, ‘Response to Global Change – Progress Report by the Director-General’ EB95/12, Ninety-Fifth Session (31 October 1994)

  • WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report’ (10 March 1998) A51/8

  • WHO, ‘Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Explanatory Notes. Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health Regulations, Provisional Agenda Item 3’ (7 October 2004) A/IHR/IGWG/4

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Swine Influenza on 25th April 2009’ (25 April 2009) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090425/en/

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 4th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Concerning MERS-CoV’ (2013) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2013/mers_cov_20131204/en/

  • WHO, ‘Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)’ (9 July 2013) https://www.who.int/news/item/09-07-2013-middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-(mers-cov)

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 3rd Meeting of the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Wild Poliovirus’ (2014) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/polio-20141114/en/

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 4th IHR Emergency Committee Meeting Regarding the International Spread of Wild Poliovirus’ (27 February 2015) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-02-2015-statement-on-the-4th-ihr-emergency-committee-meeting-regarding-the-international-spread-of-wild-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 6th IHR Emergency Committee Meeting Regarding the International Spread of Wild Poliovirus’ (17 August 2015) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-polio-17-august-2015/en/

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 10th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding MERS’ (3 September 2015) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-emergency-committee-mers/en

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 1st Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Yellow Fever’ (2016) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/ec-yellow-fever/en/

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 8th IHR Emergency Committee Meeting Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (1 March 2016) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/01-03-2016-statement-on-the-8th-ihr-emergency-committee-meeting-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 1st Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR 2005) Emergency Committee on Zika Virus and Observed Increase in Neurological Disorders and Neonatal Malformations’ (1 February 2016) https://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/01-02-2016-who-statement-on-the-first-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-(ihr-2005)-emergency-committee-on-zika-virus-and-observed-increase-in-neurological-disorders-and-neonatal-malformations

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 5th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Concerning MERS-CoV’ (2014) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/mers-20140514/en/

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 6th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Concerning MERS-CoV’ (2014) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ihr-emergency-committee-merscov/en/

  • WHO, ‘Summary of States Parties 2012 report on IHR core capacity implementation’ (2014) WHO/HSE/GCR/2014

  • WHO, ‘Summary of States Parties 2013 report on IHR core capacity implementation’ (2014) WHO/HSE/GCR/2014

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 7th IHR Emergency Committee Meeting Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (2015) http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-ec-poliovirus/en/

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 9th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding MERS-CoV’ (2015) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-ec-mers/en/

  • WHO, ‘Press Conference for the Meeting of the Yellow Fever IHR Emergency Committee’ (19 May 2016) https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/YF-EC-19-May-2016.pdf

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 3rd Meeting of IHR Emergency Committee on Zika Virus and Observed Increase in Neurological Disorders and Neonatal Malformations’ (12 June 2016) https://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/12-06-2016-who-convenes-3rd-meeting-of-emergency-committee-on-zika-and-observed-increase-in-neurological-disorders-and-neonatal-malformations

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Yellow Fever’ (31 August 2016) https://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/31-08-2016-second-meeting-of-the-emergency-committee-under-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-concerning-yellow-fever

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 4th Meeting of IHR Emergency Committee on Zika Virus and Observed Increase in Neurological Disorders and Neonatal Malformations’ (2 September 2016) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/02-09-2016-fourth-meeting-of-the-emergency-committee-under-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-regarding-microcephaly-other-neurological-disorders-and-zika-virus

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 13th IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (2 May 2017) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/02-05-2017-statement-of-the-13th-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the Ebola Outbreak in 2018’ (18 May 2018) https://www.who.int/news/item/18-05-2018-statement-on-the-1st-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-ebola-outbreak-in-2018

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 18th IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (15 August 2018) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/15-08-2018-statement-of-the-eighteenth-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 17th IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (5 October 2018) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/10-05-2018-statement-of-the-seventeenth-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 19th IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (30 November 2018) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-11-2018-statement-of-the-nineteenth-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola Virus Disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 12th April 2019’ (12 April 2019) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/12-04-2019-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-for-ebola-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-on-12th-april-2019

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 21st IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (29 May 2019) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-05-2019-statement-of-the-twenty-first-ihr-emergency-committee

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola Virus Disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 14 June 2019’ (14 June 2019) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/14-06-2019-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-for-ebola-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola Virus Disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 July 2019’ (17 July 2019) https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/statement-emergency-committee-ebola-drc-july-2019.pdf

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 22nd IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (3 October 2019) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/03-10-2019-statement-of-the-twenty-second-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola Virus Disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 18 October 2019’ (18 October 2019) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/18-10-2019-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-for-ebola-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-NCoV)’ (23 January 2020) https://www.who.int/news/item/23-01-2020-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-NCoV)’ (30 January 2020) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 24th IHR Emergency Committee Meeting Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (8 April 2020) https://www.who.int/news/item/08-04-2020-statement-of-the-twenty-fourth-ihr-emergency-committee

  • WHO, ‘Statement of the 25th IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (8 April 2020) https://www.who.int/news/item/08-04-2020-statement-of-the-twenty-fifth-ihr-emergency-committee

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 3rd Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease (Covid-19)’ (1 May 2020) https://www.who.int/news/item/01-05-2020-statement-on-the-third-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-coronavirus-disease-(covid-19)

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 26th IHR Emergency Committee Meeting Regarding the International Spread of Poliovirus’ (22 October 2020) https://www.who.int/news/item/22-10-2020-statement-of-the-twenty-sixth-polio-ihr-emergency-committee

  • WHO, ‘Statement on the 5th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the Coronavirus Disease (Covid-2019)’ (30 October 2020) https://www.who.int/news/item/30-10-2020-statement-on-the-fifth-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-19)-pandemic

  • WHO, ‘Report of the Third Open Meeting of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) During the COVID-19 Response’ (3 November 2020) https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/third-meeting-of-the-review-committee-on-the-functioning-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-during-the-covid-19-response

  • World Health Assembly, ‘Communicable Disease Prevention and Control: New, Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases’ WHO Doc. WHA 18.13 (12 May 1995)

  • World Health Assembly, ‘Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations’ WHO Doc. WHA 48.7 (12 May 1995)

  • World Trade Organization, World Organisation for Animal Health, World Health Organization and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘Joint WTO/OIE/WHO/FAO Statement on A/H1N1 Influenza’ (2 May 2009) https://www.oie.int/en/for-the-media/press-releases/detail/article/joint-wtooiewhofao-statement-on-ah1n1-influenza/

  • Yamin AE and Habibi R, ‘Human Rights and Coronavirus: What’s at Stake for Truth, Trust, and Democracy?’ (2020) Health and Human Rights Journal https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/03/human-rights-and-coronavirus-whats-at-stake-for-truth-trust-and-democracy/

  • Youde J, ‘Enter the Fourth Horseman: Health Security and International Relations Theory’ (2005) 6 The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 6

  • Youde J, Biopolitical Surveillance and Public Health in International Politics (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010)

  • Youde J, ‘Biosurveillance, Human Rights, and the Zombie Plague’ (2012) 24 Global Change, Peace & Security 83

  • Youde J, Global Health Governance (Polity Press 2012)

  • Youde J, ‘MERS and Global Health Governance’ (2014) 70 International Journal 119

  • Zacher MW and Keefe TJ, The Politics of Global Health Governance: United by Contagion (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2008)

Content Metrics

May 2022 onwards Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 0 0 0
Full Text Views 29 29 3
PDF Downloads 28 28 3

Altmetrics