Notes

Chapter 1

1 The interviews were conducted in Beijing, Shanghai and Brussels with policymakers, officials and academic experts with substantial levels of experience and expertise on EU–China security relations, or Chinese or European foreign and security policy. The results from these interviews are used as narrative evidence in the book. Moreover, they provide insights into the rationales behind EU–China security cooperation and thereby go beyond official declarations or statements. Due to confidentiality concerns, no information about the institutional affiliation of the interviewees can be disclosed.

2 However, building on the huge body of literature on interregionalism, one could argue that the EU’s and China’s region-to-state relationships could also be characterized as quasi-interregional (see for example, Gilson, 2005; Hänggi, 2006; Rüland, 2012; Baert et al, 2014).

3 The distinction between traditional and non-traditional security issues followed throughout this book is drawn from Williams (2013). He distinguishes between traditional or hard security issues – which include conventional threats to state security and are directed against essential values of a state, including territorial integrity and political sovereignty – and non-traditional or soft security issues, which are non-conventional threats of transnational scope.

4 The Tiananmen Square Protests took place in 1989 and became famous as the Tiananmen Square Massacre after the Chinese military fired at the demonstrating crowd, killing several hundred people.

5 This office is now called the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP).

6 This policy asserts that there is only one sovereign Chinese state, called the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is opposed to the idea of two Chinas: the PRC and the the Republic of China (ROC). In this context, the PRC insists that Taiwan is an inalienable part of one China and should be reunified one day.

7 At the time of completing this book, the ratification and implementation of the CAI was still pending and discussions arose concerning the potential and pitfalls of this agreement for the EU.

Chapter 2

1 The specific behaviours indicated in Table 2.1 were developed inductively, based on a detailed mapping of the EU’s and China’s policy papers and joint declarations that make explicit reference to these behaviours.

2 The choice of the category is justified by the explicit reference that both Chinese and EU official policy papers and key documents make to this particular term. For example, the ‘EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’ proposes to ‘hold regular dialogues on defence and security policy’ (EEAS, 2013). Furthermore, the overall EU–China cooperation architecture is composed of three pillars, which are officially labelled as
dialogues (e.g. Pillar I is Political Dialogue) and consist of different sub-dialogues (e.g. Security and Defence Dialogue).

3 Cooperation could then emanate from the will to increase economic gains, to ensure economic interests or to prevent economic losses.

**Chapter 3**

1 These values are enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

2 The five principles are (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.

3 In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the three pillars of the doctrine, which were originally laid out in a report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001.

4 Rumours are spreading that China is planning to construct additional military bases in Central Asia or the Middle East (Lin, 2017). In 2019, the Washington Post reported about a Chinese outpost in Tajikistan (Shih, 2019). For the time being, the government has not yet acknowledged this outpost officially.

5 However, there are no specific documents, rules or mechanisms between the EU and China concerning cooperation in the UNSC.

6 The most cited contributor to Chinese discussions on good governance is Yu Keping, whose book *Democracy Is a Good Thing* has kicked off intra-Chinese debates on this concept. For further information see Keping (2006).

**Chapter 4**

1 The earliest statistics date back to 1999, but still show this temporal pattern very clearly.

2 In comparison, the EU imported goods worth around €232 billion from the US (Eurostat, 2020b).

3 In comparison, the US had a share of 18 per cent in EU exports (Eurostat, 2020b).

**Chapter 5**

1 This is not only characteristic of China, but affects other so-called ‘emerging powers’ whose colonial histories matter for an analysis of their current behaviour and foreign policy choices.

2 This pivot culminated in the ‘Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in Asia’ (2012) and had been initiated by the former High Representative for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policies, Javier Solana (1999–2009). For further information about the guidelines, see Council of the European Union (2012).

**Chapter 6**

1 Da’esh is the Arabic acronym for the so-called Islamic State.

**Chapter 7**

1 This is further fuelled by the rising tensions in neighbouring waterways in recent years, such as the oil tanker attacks in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz in 2019. In this context, it was often discussed whether the US would be open to countries like China participating in the Persian Gulf and contributing to the regional security architecture.
As has been argued elsewhere, China’s naval far-seas security model has achieved a qualitative leap in the GoA over the past 10 years and the presence of the PRC has increased significantly. This shows that China’s motives for the fight against piracy in the GoA does not only stem solely from economic reasons, but also has wider implications for regional security (Gurol and Shahmohammadi, 2019).

Chapter 8

It has to be mentioned that CCS is a highly controversial topic in Europe. Experts are divided over the advantages and disadvantages. This discussion cannot be deepened in the course of this chapter. For further information, see (Bouvart et al, 2011; von Stechow et al, 2011; Corsten et al, 2013; Volkart et al, 2013; Bruhn et al, 2016).

This picks up the debate between climate security and energy security, and shows that in the Chinese case, both issues are inextricably connected, as discussed in the literature (Bo et al, 2016).