Introduction

In this chapter, we explore public attitudes and social dispositions related to the sustainable welfare of urban and rural residents in Sweden. We reveal patterns of support by investigating attitudes towards the general policy goal of an eco-social agenda and more specific eco-social policies. We focus not only on how public attitudes provide legitimacy for different policies and institutions or challenge established arrangements but also on more fundamental and often unconscious traits of people’s dispositions that strongly shape and determine their positions in the eco-social spectrum. We interpret these attitude and disposition patterns concerning inertia, emergence and transformation towards sustainable welfare (Chapter 2).

We first study the support for an eco-social agenda in general and five eco-social policies in particular, that is, a maximum income, a wealth tax, a universal basic income (UBI), a working time reduction and a meat tax. This is guided by recent contributions to degrowth/post-growth and sustainable welfare, arguing for a move away from the policy priority of economic growth in monetary terms of GDP towards identifying a ‘safe and just operating space for humanity’ (Rockström et al, 2009, 2023; Raworth, 2017; Koch, 2022) in biophysical and social terms and corresponding ‘ecological ceilings and social floors’ (Khan et al, 2023).

When discussing the extent of support for the general policy goals related to sustainable welfare and for corresponding eco-social policies, we consider the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals supporting such an agenda and policies. Previous research results suggest that urban and rural residents differ significantly (for example, McGrane et al, 2017; Gimpel et al, 2020; Huijsmans et al, 2021). Hence, we compare urban vis-à-vis rural residents’ eco-social attitudes. We subsequently take a Bourdieusean perspective linking social positions, dispositions and position takings (Bourdieu, 1998). Since attitudes can vary and be short term while dispositions are more stable and fundamental, we can achieve a deeper and more complex understanding of the empirical material. In other words, we go somewhat beyond the surface of public attitudes and explore their links to deeper-lying habitus traits that we understand to be the products of long-term and socially specific appropriations of society and nature, beginning with socialisation processes in the family and school system. In addition, we study how the distribution of habitus types varies in cities and rural areas.

The concepts of transformation, emergence and inertia allow us to capture which parts of the population display joint support for environmental and welfare values and policies and for eco-social policies to be most prone to social-ecological transformations and sustainable welfare (that is, ‘transformation’). Just as previous research indicates that urban residents hold more progressive, tolerant and liberal values compared to their rural counterparts (for example, Huijsmans et al, 2021; Luca et al, 2023), we now explore if urban residents dominate an ‘avant-garde’ in pushing for change. Attitudes and dispositions that primarily convey a rejection pattern of policy reforms can be understood in terms of ‘inertia’ and thus as representing the status quo or societal change in a direction other than towards sustainable welfare. Moreover, attitude and disposition patterns with a rather one-sided tendency to favour environmental or welfare issues can represent the silo-based logic of keeping environmental and welfare concerns separate, thus representing the status quo (that is, ‘inertia’). In cases, however, where there is a tendency of relatively strong favouring of environmental issues but still with traces of welfare support, and vice versa, we understand these as emergent standpoints of reforms (that is, ‘emergence’).

The chapter draws on a Swedish cross-sectional citizen survey fielded from January 2020 to April 2020. The survey questionnaire included questions and statements about environmental and social welfare policies and concerns, personal values, engagement in various political activities and individual background characteristics. To target residents living in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, as well as those living in Sweden at large, a stratified random sampling strategy was used, targeting 5,000 Swedish residents in the age group of 18–84 years. In total, 1,529 individuals responded to the survey, giving an overall response rate of 31 per cent. The response rates differed, however, across the different strata, from 27 per cent in the Malmö stratum to 33 per cent in the Sweden at large stratum. Of these 1,529 respondents, 1,120 individuals (73 per cent) were urban residents, and 409 individuals (27 per cent) were rural residents. A post hoc non-response analysis indicated a slight over-representation of older respondents and respondents with higher education and incomes in the sample (see ‘middle class bias’ in survey studies – Goyder et al, 2002). For a more thorough methodological discussion, see Emilsson (2023).

Sustainable welfare attitudes

Research into different patterns of support and non-support for an eco-social agenda and eco-social policies takes various forms. In contrast to well-established separate social welfare and environmental policy agendas, the precise elements of a combined eco-social agenda are not (yet) set in stone. The sustainable welfare literature, however, provides some suggestions as to what some of these constitutive elements could be: social justice, equality, redistribution of work and time and wealth and income, decarbonising measures and policies, distributist institutions and a questioning of the economic growth paradigm (for example, Koch and Mont, 2016; Koch, 2018, 2022; Hirvilammi, 2020; Büchs, 2021; see Chapter 1). This has been subject to investigation in research on welfare (Kumlin et al, 2021) and environmental attitudes (Cruz and Manata, 2020). By drawing on these two research fields, it is possible to explore the nexus between social welfare attitudes and environmental attitudes and thus operationalise attitudes related to an eco-social agenda.

Support for general policy goals related to an eco-social agenda

So far, only a few studies have investigated the intersection between social and environmental attitudes (Jakobsson et al, 2018; Fritz and Koch, 2019; Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Armingeon and Bürgisser, 2021; Emilsson, 2022). Much of this research has studied potential conflicts or synergies between welfare and environmental attitudes. Accordingly, a four-fold typology of eco-social attitudes has been developed, consisting of (1) a synergy pattern in which individuals express joint support for social welfare and environmental concerns; (2) a green crowding-out pattern where individuals express relatively high support for environmental concerns but relatively low support for social welfare; (3) a red crowding-out pattern where individuals express relatively high support for social concerns but relatively low support for environmental concerns; and (4) a rejection pattern in which individuals express relatively little or no support at all for either concern. Compared to rural residents, urban residents have more often attitudes related to a synergy attitude pattern and thus express support for an eco-social agenda (Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Emilsson, 2022). This points to an urban and rural divide in attitudes related to sustainable welfare.

Before exploring potential differences in eco-social attitudes between urban and rural residents according to the four-fold typology, let us first look exclusively at the urban sample. Though previous studies indicate that urban residents tend to be more supportive of an eco-social agenda than rural ones, these studies do not supply much information about (potential or actual) differences within this group. Our results show a variation in attitudes among Swedish urban residents (Figure 5.1).

This figure explains the support for sustainable welfare among urban residents in Sweden. It distinguishes between those expressing support for synergy, green crowding-out, red crowding-out, and a rejection stance. The numbers show that 35 per cent express support for synergy, followed by 25 per cent for rejection and 24 per cent for green crowding-out. The least support is for red crowding out, with 16 per cent.
Figure 5.1:

Sustainable welfare attitude patterns among urban residents

A relative majority of urban residents support an eco-social agenda: this is the synergy pattern, with more than one third expressing joint support for social welfare and environmental concerns. About equal shares, that is, about a quarter of the residents, express attitudes related to either a green crowding-out (24 per cent) or rejection (25 per cent) pattern. The least common eco-social attitude pattern is red crowding out, with 16 per cent of urban residents expressing relatively high support for social concerns but relatively low support for environmental concerns.

Previous research that focuses on cross-national and national samples (Fritz and Koch, 2019; Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Emilsson, 2022; see, however, paper 2 in Emilsson, 2023, with an explicit urban focus) further indicates that distinctive socioeconomic and value-based factors are associated with expressing relatively high or low support for an eco-social agenda. One previous study based on the same cross-sectional survey as in this chapter but focusing on the whole sample demonstrated that Swedish residents who express joint support for social welfare and environmental concerns (the synergy attitude) tend to have low- to middle-range income levels and high educational attainment. Almost at the opposite end of the spectrum were individuals expressing relatively low welfare and environmental support (the rejection attitude), who tended to have higher incomes and lower educational attainment (Emilsson, 2022). Concerning the education factor, these findings align with previous research (Fritz and Koch, 2019; Otto and Gugushvili, 2020), indicating that higher educational attainment is a crucial component for transformations towards sustainable welfare. However, the income factor needs to be explored further. In line with the study by Emilsson (2022), Otto and Gugushvili (2020) found that individuals less satisfied with their income are more inclined to express joint support. In contrast, Fritz and Koch (2019) indicated that higher income levels were associated with joint support. Lower income levels could instead explain the rejection pattern.

Nevertheless, these results indicate that classifications of individuals with synergy and rejection attitudes in the low to high socioeconomic continuum are more complicated. Traditionally, in the lower areas of this continuum, we find both lower income levels and lower educational attainment. In the higher areas, we see higher incomes and higher education levels. Individuals with red crowding-out and green crowding-out attitudes seem to follow the low to the high end of the socioeconomic continuum and, as predicted by previous research, focus either on welfare attitudes or environmental attitudes (Svallfors et al, 2012; Calzada et al, 2014; Fairbrother et al, 2019; Sivonen and Koivula, 2020). Individuals with lower incomes and lower educational attainment are associated with a red crowding-out pattern. In contrast, individuals with higher incomes and higher educational attainment tend to feature the green crowding-out pattern (Emilsson, 2022).

Another determining factor of the attitudes is political ideology, which can be measured in terms of self-placement on the political left–right scale or identification with political parties. Whereas previous studies indicate that supporters of social welfare and environmental sustainability tend to be left wingers and also identify with red-green political parties, individuals with rejection attitude patterns tend to be right wingers associated with liberal, conservative and/or nationalist right-wing parties (Fritz and Koch, 2019; Emilsson, 2023). The results regarding individuals with green crowding-out and red crowding-out patterns are somewhat mixed, where, for example, the latter ones are right wingers in one national study (Emilsson, 2023) and left wingers in a cross-national study (Koch and Fritz, 2020).

Moreover, concerning previous research, there are good reasons to assume that urban residents’ eco-social attitudes are different from rural residents’ (Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Emilsson, 2022).1 Let us see how this is the case when focusing on residents in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö only and compare them to the rest of the population in Sweden. Can the former be understood as a sort of ‘avant-garde’ pushing for change towards sustainable welfare? Figure 5.2 indeed indicates that there are relatively significant differences between urban and rural residents. Compared to the rest of the country, urban residents in Sweden’s three largest cities express more support for an eco-social agenda. A chi-square test confirms a statistically significant difference between the two groups.2

The figure compares the support for an eco-social agenda among urban and rural residents in Sweden. It shows that urban residents express much higher support for a synergy position compared to rural residents. The research shows the opposite regarding support for a rejection stance, as this is much more supported by rural residents.
Figure 5.2:

Support for an eco-social agenda among urban and rural residents

In addition, Figure 5.2 indicates that urban and rural residents’ attitudes stand in almost perfect opposition to each other. While the largest share, around one third, of urban residents express synergy attitudes and around a quarter relatively low or no support for an eco-social agenda (rejection), it is the other way around for rural residents. Around one third express rejection attitudes, and around a quarter express joint support for social welfare and environmental concerns. The same applies to the green and red crowding-out attitude patterns, where we find larger shares of urban residents in the former attitude category and smaller shares in the latter. Conversely, rural residents feature smaller proportions of green crowding out and larger ones of red crowding out.

Hence, people actively pushing for transformational change towards sustainable welfare will likely live in Sweden’s three largest cities. Whereas the synergy attitude pattern is most common among urban residents, the rejection attitude pattern is most prevalent among rural residents. This aligns with previous studies on eco-social attitudes, indicating that urban residents tend to be more supportive of eco-social concerns than rural ones (Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Emilsson, 2022). If we consider that some of the survey items in the eco-social attitude variable are rather ‘radical’, for example, a maximum income cap and a meat tax, and combine this with other eco-social attitude studies indicating that individuals expressing joint welfare and environmental support tend to place themselves to the left on the left–right scale (Fritz and Koch, 2019; Emilsson, 2023), our results align quite well with previous research on the urban–rural divide and the ‘progressiveness’ and liberal tendencies of urban residents (for example, Huijsmans et al, 2021; Luca et al, 2023). Generally, thus, the results indicate an urban–rural divide in eco-social attitudes, where urban residents’ attitudes can be seen as expressions of emergence or even transformation towards sustainable welfare. Conversely, the rural residents’ attitudes are best understood in terms of inertia representing the status quo or societal change in a direction other than towards sustainable welfare. It should be noted, however, that there are also signs of inertia in urban residents’ attitudes.

In the next section, we explore attitudes towards five eco-social policies and whether the distinctiveness of urban residents is also apparent in these cases. Complementing our analysis of support rates of a general eco-social agenda, the subsequent exploration of support for specific policies provides insight into the different components concerning sustainable welfare.

Support for eco-social policies

In the introduction, we defined eco-social policies as addressing production and consumption patterns to stay below the ‘ecological ceilings’ of planetary boundaries while at the same time providing ‘social floors’ to satisfy basic human needs. We now analyse the public support for five examples of such policies: a maximum income, a wealth tax, a UBI, a working time reduction and a meat tax. While UBI (on top of universal basic services and voucher systems) is often discussed as a policy means that may turn out useful to safeguard needs satisfaction (for example, van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017) – the inner boundary or the social floor of the ‘safe operating space’ – a maximum income and the more known and discussed, albeit less radical, wealth taxation would address the upper boundary. New philosophical approaches defending ‘limitarianism’ in an ecologically constrained world (Robeyns, 2019, 2022) provide relevant theoretical discussions, while critical economists have suggested more concrete proposals of maximum incomes (Concialdi, 2018; Pizzigatti, 2018) as some quantitative proportion from minimum incomes (for example, 10:1 or 20:1; see François et al, 2023). Two further eco-social reform suggestions are reducing working hours to defuse the work–spend–consume circle and a tax on meat consumption to support ecological agriculture, more vegetarian nutrition and a general transition to a post-fossil lifestyle.

If we examine the support for these five eco-social policies among Swedish urban residents, we can see that the amount of support varies depending on the specific policies (Figure 5.3).

This figure compares the support among urban Swedish residents concerning five policy items: working time reduction, wealth tax, meat tax, maximum income and basic income. The figure illustrates that urban residents express the most support for reducing working time and somewhat less for a wealth tax. Urban residents clearly reject basic and maximum income. The research illustrates a divided position concerning the meat tax, as some urban residents support it, whereas others reject it.
Figure 5.3:

Support for eco-social policies among urban residents

Figure 5.3 indicates that working time reduction is the most popular eco-social policy among urban residents, with a relatively high level of support (59 per cent) and a relatively low level of non-support (28 per cent). The second popular policy is the wealth tax, with 47 per cent of the urban residents considering it very or fairly good. The meat tax policy is the third most popular (with 40 per cent support). However, the two latter policy proposals indicate that there are also large shares of urban residents who are sceptical. Around 40 per cent consider the wealth tax and the meat tax policies, respectively, to be very or quite bad. Maximum income and basic income are the least popular policy proposals. Only a quarter of urban residents support the two policies, while two thirds are sceptical. Potential explanations for the higher support levels of working time reduction and wealth tax policies include the fact that both are well known and have been on the Swedish political agenda for a long time. The lower support levels of a basic income can be understood as a general reluctance among the Swedish population to replace the current comprehensive welfare system with something completely different (Khan et al, 2023).

When it comes to the characteristics of the individuals expressing support, previous research indicates, for example, that individuals with lower income levels tend to express support for working time reduction, wealth tax and income caps, whereas individuals with higher levels of education tend to support meat taxation (Grimsrud et al, 2020; Rowlingson et al, 2021; Khan et al, 2023). One previous study, which again was based on the same cross-sectional survey as in this chapter but focused on the whole sample, demonstrated that only one explanatory factor was associated with all five policies: political ideology. Self-placement to the left on the left–right scale was significantly related to eco-social policy support (Khan et al, 2023). Regarding the urban–rural divide, results from previous research are mixed. For example, whereas income cap and wealth tax policies seemed to attract support among rural residents, the basic income policy and meat tax had more support among urban residents (Grimsrud et al, 2020; Khan et al, 2023). What does the urban–rural divide look like when specifically analysing and comparing the support of urban residents in Sweden’s three largest cities vis-à-vis the rest of the country?

Urban residents are, in most cases, more supportive of eco-social policies than rural residents (Figure 5.4). Some policies yield more significant differences in support, particularly the meat tax policy, whereas in others, the support is relatively even, such as the maximum income policy.

This figure compares the support among urban and rural residents regarding five policy items: working time reduction, wealth tax, meat tax, maximum income, and basic income. Compared to those living in rural areas, people living in Swedish cities are generally more in favour of any of these policy suggestions compared. Most support is expressed for working time reduction, followed by wealth and meat tax. Less support is given to maximum or basic income, especially among rural residents.
Figure 5.4:

Support for eco-social policies among urban and rural residents

Figure 5.4 indicates the same general support pattern for the five eco-social policies for rural and urban residents (Figure 5.3): working time reduction is the most popular policy, followed by wealth taxation, meat taxation, maximum income and, lastly, basic income. In general, though, the support for the policies tends to be lower among rural than urban residents. For example, regarding working time reduction, 59 per cent of the urban residents consider it to be a very or somewhat good policy proposal, compared to 50 per cent of rural residents. In particular, the meat tax policy is much more popular among urban residents than among rural residents. Only the maximum income policy attracts the same amount of support, that is, 25 per cent, among urban and rural residents.

The differences in supporting eco-social policies between urban and rural respondents are statistically highly significant in the case of the meat tax and slightly less for working time reduction and basic income.3 Basic income and meat taxation feature the most important differences in expressing low or no support: 66 per cent and 43 per cent of the urban residents consider the basic income and meat tax proposals bad policy proposals. The numbers were even higher for the non-urban residents. The higher acceptance rate among urban residents for eco-social policies targeting food consumption, as in the case of meat taxation, may be seen as an expression of the ‘progressiveness’ and tolerance of urban residents (Huijsmans et al, 2021; Luca et al, 2023) to change their way of living for environmental reasons. No statistically significant differences exist between urban and rural respondents regarding wealth taxation and maximum income. Maximum income does not exist as a policy, and no Swedish political party currently promotes it. As a result, urban and rural residents are equally uninformed and indifferent about this suggestion.

A more complex picture arises when comparing these results to previous research. In the study by Khan et al (2023), two policies seemed to be more favoured by rural residents, that is, the maximum income and wealth tax policies. In contrast, the present results suggest that urban residents are more supportive than their rural counterparts, or there are no differences between the two groups. It should be noted, however, that Khan et al (2023) applied a different urban/rural categorisation where the urban category included residents living in densely populated areas and thus also cities other than Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, and medium-sized cities such as Linköping, Uppsala and Umeå. These differences can be an indication that urban residents’ attitudes in larger cities (that is, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö in this case) are somewhat different from residents’ attitudes in smaller cities and that the former ones are even more progressive compared to the latter (McGrane et al, 2017; Huijsmans et al, 2021).

Again, it seems as though urban residents are the ones pushing for change towards sustainable welfare. They are more supportive in the cases of four out of five eco-social policies – that is, the policies of working time reduction, basic income, meat and wealth taxation – even though there are only statistically significant differences between the urban and rural residents concerning the three last-mentioned policies. Urban residents’ attitudes can thus be seen as expressions of ‘emergence’ with some potential of ‘transformation’. By contrast, the attitudes expressed by rural residents are best understood as being in line with ‘inertia’. Overall, however, when considering the urban sample in isolation but also when contrasting the urban sample with the rural sample, there are large shares that are reluctant towards all five policies, indicating that these results point to stability (that is, ‘inertia’) with some glimpses of change towards sustainable welfare (that is, ‘transformation’ or ‘emergence’). To arrive at a deeper understanding of these attitude expressions, the following section addresses the fundamental and often unconscious traits of people’s dispositions, which strongly shape and determine their position on the eco-social spectrum.

Eco-social dispositions within the Swedish population

Attitudes are the ‘front end’ of what people think and feel. Their answers and reactions to survey questions and statements make their inner dispositions visible to us. Because expressing inner beliefs and dispositions to the outside world is context-sensitive, attitudes are often variable and short term. For example, a person generally favouring environmental regulation (the person’s disposition) may, in one situation, oppose a carbon tax (attitude), for example if it is regressive, and in another situation, support it, for example during an economic boom. Hence, when studying a population’s stances towards a broad and long-term project such as sustainable welfare, it makes sense also to consider the ‘back end’: people’s more fundamental and stable dispositions and their typical patterns – in Bourdieu’s terminology, their habitus (Bourdieu, 1993).

Bourdieu understands the habitus as a system of structured and, at the same time, structuring dispositions in terms of thoughts, perceptions, expressions, beliefs and actions. Social agents can make a difference, but their actions are limited by their historical periods and social conditions (Bourdieu, 1993; Koch, 2020). The habitus’s traits (or dispositions) are acquired during socialisation in the family and the education system and are presumed to be relatively durable. They thus outlast political or economic conjunctures and constitute an objective limitation to capabilities and possibilities of creating societal alternatives. As an internalised product of the social structures that conditioned it, habitus provides us with a sensibility towards these structures and the options these include and exclude. The result is a sort of social orientation, by which the occupants of a given position in social space are guided towards sociocultural and political practices that suit them (Fritz et al, 2021).

Though the capacity of people to act and initiate social change is more or less limited due to different positions in social space and corresponding dispositions, the habitus always involves an element of spontaneity. According to Bourdieu (2000), the chance that the customary correspondence between structure, habitus and practice breaks depends upon the existence of a crisis of the very social structures the habitus originated from. We consider the current climate emergency a situation in which society’s economic, political, cultural and symbolic structures are undergoing a transition process. Thus, transformational change becomes a possibility (Koch, 2020b).

This figure is a map with four squares. On the Y-axis, we find high to low social status. The X-axis is divided by economic capital to the right and cultural capital to the left. The graph places the habitus types of environmental centralism and fossil liberalism in the upper-right corner, with extensive economic capital and high social status. In the opposite low-left corner, we find four habitus types. These are moderate traditional welfare, eco-modernist conservatism, self-centred privatism, and passive anti-ecological conservatism. They share low social status but extensive cultural capital by being placed in this corner of the graph. The remaining habitus type is active sustainable welfare, which we find in the square to the upper-left, marked by high social status and cultural capital.
Figure 5.5:

Habitus in the space of social positions (urban and rural residents plotted)

Source: Calculations based on own research

More than 60 survey items measure attitudes towards climate change, energy preferences and ecological consciousness, opinions on social policy, benefits and services, redistribution and basic human values. On this empirical basis, we empirically identified seven habitus types in Sweden about eco-social topics. To reflect that habitus types are socially embedded and specific for social positions (see Chapter 2), we constructed a model of social space following Bourdieu’s conception of economic and cultural capital as determinants of the two axes of this space: the vertical axis reflects power, privileges and social status as the amount of economic and cultural capital combined, and the horizontal axis represents the foundation on which this social status is based. On the left this foundation is cultural capital in the first place; on the right it is rather economic capital (for all details of this analysis, see Fritz et al, 2021). The study was based on the whole sample, which allowed us to compare urban and rural residents.

In summary, the habitus can be regarded as the incorporated practices of actors that reproduce existing norms and values. As such, it is shaped by and in concurrence with people’s social position and contributes to stabilising the unsustainable and socially unfair status quo (inertia). Yet habitus can also facilitate the questioning of the established material and symbolic order – be it gradually by demanding reforms in specific sectors (emergence) or fundamentally by calling for profound and fundamental change of societal institutions and modes of living (transformation) – if and when this order is caught up in a crisis and previously developed future aspirations are starting to be perceived as unrealistic.

Three habitus groups of ‘inertia’

In our empirical material, the three habitus groups – passive anti-ecological conservativism, self-centred privatism and fossil liberalism – either uphold the status quo or favour a societal change in a direction other than towards sustainable welfare. Beyond the mostly negative attitudes that these groups feature concerning the selected eco-social policies described earlier, we now turn to deeper-lying and specific traits of inertia, which further help us understand their political position takings towards and against sustainable welfare.

Passive anti-ecological conservativism (n = 143, 10 per cent of the sample (S) of which 69.9 per cent live in urban areas (U))

A rejection of ecological and social justice concerns characterises this habitus. Respondents with this habitus often live in rural spaces and do not feel affected by climate change. They refuse climate policies and are oriented towards the short term and against state interventions. The position of passive anti-ecological conservativism in social space (Figure 5.5) indicates a disadvantaged position with low incomes and low to medium educational degrees. Moreover, persons with this habitus are older and more religious than the average population. Their political preferences reflect a reluctance towards societal change: support for socially and/or ecologically progressive parties (Greens, Social Democrats, Left Party, Liberal) is rare, while voting for the Sweden Democrats (a right-wing party) and political disinterest is widespread. There is generally low involvement and interest in public affairs and civil society (low incidence of organisation memberships and lack of willingness for political action).

Self-centred privatism (n = 108, S: 8 per cent/U: 68.5 per cent)

Similar to the first habitus, there is a low interest in broader political and societal issues, with concern instead of focusing on personal and private matters. Self-centred privatism is characterised by a general lack of universalism: ecological as care for nature and the environment, and social as being helpful to others and flying the flag of fairness and equality. Persons with this habitus hold the lowest educational degrees, earn low to average incomes and often live in rural areas. Older persons, men and skilled and unskilled workers are over-represented. Politically, there is a clear preference for the right and a reluctance towards personal political engagement, such as joining a demonstration.

Fossil liberalism (n = 146, S: 10 per cent/U: 79.5 per cent)

This habitus rejects renewable energy and prefers to stick to fossilism. It combines a liberal market orientation, animosity towards climate and welfare policies and a lack of trust in societal institutions. Fossil liberalism is a predominantly male habitus (over 70 per cent), with persons living in urban areas and with higher incomes likewise being over-represented. Small business owners are more widespread, as are ‘independent’ and ‘technical’ work logics. Politically, this cluster holds views closest to the right and party preferences for the Christian Democrats, Moderates and Sweden Democrats.

In summary, the habitus that stands for the option of ‘inertia’ in Sweden makes up 28 per cent of the respondents in the sample and illustrates different aspects of rejecting socio-ecological change: a disinterest in societal matters in general, a more self-centred disposition, which does not care so much about others and nature as well as a somewhat reckless and unsocial understanding of individual freedom (libertarian). While they all share a clear political right orientation – perhaps unsurprisingly given that maintaining the current mode of living is the goal – the three variants differ in their average positions in social space: the first two habitus types are located in the most disadvantaged regions of social space and also in rural areas. The reaction is not rebellion or innovation but a retreat or an alienation from society (Merton, 1938). Fossil liberalism, in contrast, is located in the upper-right social space, indicating decent amounts of capital primarily based on income. Since transformation involving improvements in social justice and ecological care threatens established business models and corresponding lifestyles typical of this habitus, the status quo is actively defended.

Three habitus varieties of ‘emergence’

Three further habitus groups – environmental centralism, eco-modernist conservativism and moderate traditional welfare – all support some degree of change, either to an environmental or welfare agenda, but not combined. In what follows, we provide more profound knowledge on the groups previously categorised under the ‘red’ or ‘green’ crowding out labels. Their habitus types are somewhat contradictory as they constitute mixes of social-ecological continuity and change.

Environmental centralism (n = 306, S: 21 per cent/U: 76.8 per cent)

While this habitus rejects public welfare policies, there is also some awareness of climate change, and state action in this policy area is appreciated. Persons with this habitus actively support the capitalist economic order and social structure. This is, however, not understood in the sense of individualised market liberalism but accompanied by a very high trust in societal institutions such as the government, political parties and trade unions. Environmental centralism is widespread among people of average age, those born in Sweden and those living in cities. Incomes are very high, and work positions in the higher service class are common. The combination of market liberal and somewhat traditional welfare leanings makes this habitus a centralist one, reflected in party preferences for the Centre and Liberal parties. Political extremes (Left Party and Sweden Democrats) are rejected. Environmental centralism supports environment-friendly lifestyles such as reducing eating meat, stopping flying and investing in environmental measures such as solar panels.

Eco-modernist conservativism (n = 234, S: 16 per cent/U: 64.5 per cent)

This habitus features moderate support for universalism and sustainable welfare. More distinct characteristics are a strong liberal market orientation, distrust in institutions and support for ecological modernisation regarding a transition to renewable energy. Education, income and socioeconomic status are about average. Persons with an eco-modernist conservative habitus are slightly older than average. They are often born in Sweden and usually live in rural areas. This habitus further consists of nearly 60 per cent women and slightly more religious persons than average. Politically, it is located on the right, with voting preferences for the Christian Democrats, Moderates and Sweden Democrats. Their support for climate policies is average regarding personal contributions like increased taxes but rather high concerning renewable energy and green electricity – measures that do not directly hurt financially. Support for welfare policies is average. Overall, the eco-modernist conservative habitus approves of environmental protection – so long as one’s own lifestyle can remain the same.

Moderate traditional welfare (n = 227, S: 16 per cent/U: 70 per cent)

This habitus is only ostensibly characterised by a disposition of ‘red crowding out’ (Jakobsson et al, 2018; see earlier), where environmental concerns are less important than welfare issues. Though this reflects a difference in the relative importance of both goals, it does not imply that environmental concerns are low in absolute terms. Actually, moderate traditional welfare supports eco-social concerns instead. It includes a disposition of responsibility and care and universalist values. Support for climate policies is above average. Moreover, this habitus reflects a traditional social democratic mindset in which caring and solidarity are as crucial as the submission to hierarchical structures and the notion that welfare is not ‘for free’ – individuals (instead of the state or companies) are held responsible for welfare and climate change action. Moderate traditional welfare features the highest share of persons not born in Sweden (25 per cent), and over 80 per cent of people with this habitus belong to some official religion. It is spread equally over urban and rural parts of the country. Politically, there is a preference for the Social Democrats and a dislike of the Christian Democrats and the Left, taking positions somewhat left (in a traditional sense) from environmental centralism.

The habitus types of ‘emergence’ are widespread among the majority of respondents (and therefore probably also in Sweden, given that the data is almost representative). 53 per cent favour a partial, incremental change in specific fields or areas of society. All three manifestations of ‘emergence’ described earlier support some gradual shift towards ecological sustainability but are hesitant about more profound structural transformations. The first wants the state, markets and consumers to work together for ecological modernisation but is against improvements in social justice. The second focuses on renewable energy and rejects any other possible changes. The third is actually close to supporting a transformation but somewhat hampered by hierarchical thinking and power orientation, which conflicts with participative democratic ideas prominent in most approaches to ideas of social-ecological transformations. Politically, the three ‘emergence’ habitus share a middle position, sometimes shifting a bit to the right and sometimes to the left. This makes sense, as the political middle ground should be broad enough to sustain niches for developments that slowly replace old ideas with new ones. Concerning their positions in social space, two of the ‘emergence’ habitus can be considered parts of the lower middle class: eco-modernist conservativism and moderate traditional welfare. Environmental centralism, by contrast, is a habitus of the dominating class in the upper-right social space with preferences for technological modernisation and ideas of green capitalist growth.

One habitus of ‘transformation’

Finally, we identified one habitus oriented towards social-ecological ‘transformation’: active sustainable welfare. Future hopes and aspirations are no longer associated with the continuance of the ancien régime, and they should be overcome via active support of a social-ecological agenda.

Active sustainable welfare (n = 265, S: 19 per cent/U: 79.2 per cent)

This habitus combines high support for social welfare and redistributive policies, universalism, long-term orientations, dispositions of care and responsibility and a high ecological consciousness. Moreover, it is characterised by high political activism, whether political consumer behaviour, membership in organisations or non-institutionalised actions such as joining a demonstration. It assembles the highly educated, young people and persons living in urban areas. There is an over-representation of women (over 57 per cent) and the highest share of non-religious persons (42 per cent). Incomes are somewhat below the average. Bourdieu may have located this habitus in the ‘dominated-dominant’ class characterised by a maximum of cultural but merely average amounts of economic capital. Politically, it takes a clear left position at the opposite pole from fossil liberalism and passive anti-ecological conservativism with clear preferences for the Greens and the Left Party.

The only transformative habitus occurs more frequently among politically left-oriented persons and in the position of the educated middle class in social space (Figure 5.5). This is unsurprising as new and radical ideas often develop in intellectual circles first. A comparison of the prevalence of the seven habitus types along urban and rural spaces helps to go some way in answering the issue of whether such intellectual and progressive centres are, at the same time, urban hubs. In descending order, the three most common urban habitus types are fossil liberalism, active sustainable welfare and environmental centralism. Since we find a representative for ‘inertia’, ‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’ in urban contexts, these may be understood as hotspots of society where all kinds of dispositions, lifestyles and political actions can be found and sometimes clash. The fact that cities serve as innovation labs indicates that the only habitus of transformation – active sustainable welfare – is distinctively urban: four in five respondents with this habitus live in urban areas.

Conversely, the most frequent rural habitus is that of eco-modernist conservativism. Although people are generally more conservative and have less trust in societal institutions in rural areas, they are not against pursuing ecological goals, as the relatively high approval rates for renewable energies indicate. While the two most common urban habitus types are environmental centralism and active sustainable welfare, eco-modernist conservativism, environmental centralism and moderate traditional welfare are most prevalent in rural surroundings. The likelihood of forming political alliances thus differs between urban and rural parts of the country. In cities, the proponents of green growth and environmental modernisation, as well as post-growth and social-ecological transformation, are the two most prominent groups and would be the structurally most likely candidates for an electoral reform coalition. In rural areas, a broader compromise seems more likely as positions are generally less radical and, in principle, reconcilable in a somewhat socially balanced ecological modernisation strategy. Though this may be insufficient to address the ecological crisis, it could be a structural base for political moves in this direction.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored public attitudes regarding the sustainable welfare of urban and rural residents in Sweden. We first studied general discourses and ideas about sustainable welfare and then the support for selected eco-social policies such as working time reduction, maximum and basic incomes, wealth taxation and basic income. The attitude perspective was finally supplemented by a more in-depth analysis of dispositions relative to sustainable welfare in the Bourdieusean tradition and a discussion about how these are linked to political practices.

Those parts of the population most prone to social-ecological transformations (‘transformation’) display support for values and policies on welfare and the environment simultaneously. Within this ‘avant-garde’ group, urban residents dominate while rural residents are more likely to reject welfare and environmental policies and display a somewhat conservative unwillingness to change the status quo; in other words, ‘inertia’ in combination with sometimes romanticising views of the past. Attitudes related to either preferences of welfare over the environment (‘red crowding out’) or the opposite (‘green crowding out’) can be understood as representations of a societal silo-based logic and thus holding on to the status quo (‘inertia’) whereby urban residents give precedence to the environment and rural ones to welfare. The generally more significant popularity of sustainable welfare ideas among the urban population is also reflected in the support for particular eco-social policies. Except for a maximum income (where the support is the same) and wealth taxation, all suggested policies enjoy higher support from urban residents than rural residents. Yet, at the same time, large shares – both among the rural and the urban population – are sceptical towards all five policies. Hence, though we have found (especially in cities) some indications for gradual and transformational change (‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’), ‘inertia’ is likewise a common structural feature (especially but not only in rural areas).

The relational in-depth analysis of over 60 survey items comprising attitudes towards climate change, welfare and social policy, and basic human values generated seven habitus types that occupy the eco-social space in Sweden. One of these (active sustainable welfare) displays dispositions inclined to a broad and deep social-ecological ‘transformation’. Three habitus types (environmental centralism, eco-modernist conservatism and moderate traditional welfare) can be understood as combinations of ‘conservative’ and ‘reformative’ traits concerning sustainable welfare but display hallmarks of ‘emergence’. The last three habitus types (passive-ecological conservatism, self-centred privatism and fossil liberalism) are located furthest from any transformational mood and feature a range of social-ecological ‘inertia’ characteristics.

Again, urban space is an arena (or hotspot) where different groups struggle for other meanings and principles of societal influence and domination on relatively small amounts of space. Swedish cities assemble habitus representatives of ‘inertia’, ‘emergence’ and ‘transformation’, while the transformational habitus type is under-represented in the more rural parts of the country. Though a political alliance for social-ecological change between environmental centralism and active sustainable welfare is structurally possible, it will most likely emerge in urban settings.