The rights to housing, social security, food, fuel and an adequate standard of living are rights that form part of the UK’s international legal obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. In 1976, the UK government voluntarily ratified the ICESCR, which requires states, including the UK, to progressively realize ESC rights in their domestic legal systems. The rights it contains are broad and range from the rights to housing, food, health, education, social security, labour rights and the right to cultural identity. The international legal framework for human rights is based on the principle of indivisibility recognizing the interdependency of one right being dependent on the enjoyment of another. Often the nature of the obligations under this treaty are misunderstood and erroneously sidelined as being of lesser status than civil and political (CP) rights, such as the right to vote or the right to a fair trial.1 Other international treaties to which the UK has signed up also include protections for ESC rights, but the focus of this chapter is to better understand the obligations under the ICESCR as the first of the treaties to set out specific obligations for ESC rights.2 In so doing, it becomes easier to navigate the broader international and regional framework in connection with ESC rights and the steps that are required to ensure their protection and realization at the domestic level.

This chapter should be read alongside the empirical research and is designed with a non-expert audience in mind. Moreover, it is intended for those who are becoming newly acquainted with the international human rights framework engaging with ESC rights (noting of course the discussion on the right to fuel/energy is a new contribution to this discourse). For those readers who have expertise in ESC rights and are keen to explore the nuanced empirical research and the deeper theoretical explorations of our data, we would direct you to Chapters 35 where our discussions on the case studies and theorization of our findings using critical discourse analysis takes place. For those who are interested in a deeper dive into the rights discussed here, including food, social security, fuel and housing, we would also signpost you to the briefings on ICESCR obligations and each of the rights produced under the Nuffield Foundation funded study ‘Access to justice for social rights: addressing the accountability gap’. These briefings include wider treaty engagement (beyond the ICESCR), a closer look at the devolved context and a comparative analysis in terms of how these rights are protected in other countries. The focus of this chapter is to explain the international legal obligations and query whether the UK is in compliance with these.

Progressive realization

The duty to progressively realize, or to progressively achieve, ESC rights is derived from international law.3 Article 2(1) ICESCR states that:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.4 (Emphasis added)

The nature of state party obligations has been further elaborated in documents supplementary to the treaty, in particular General Comment 3 (1990), which was preceded by the Limburg Principles (1986) and reaffirmed by the Maastricht Guidelines (1997).5 Progressive realization can be understood as the need to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of rights.6 In closer detail, it constitutes a multitude of interlinked obligations which work in tandem to ensure that ESC rights are gradually realized over time. Unpacking the ‘subduties’ of progressive realization provides a complete framework from which to analyse both current performance of the state and its commitment to realizing ESC rights over time.

The duty to ‘take steps’

Article 2(1) requires states to ‘take steps’ towards the full realization of ESC rights. Taking steps can be understood as a duty to design strategies and programmes to achieve the full realization of ESC rights.7 The steps taken must be deliberate, concrete and targeted.8 This is an immediate and process-based obligation, meaning that the obligation gives rise to the right to a process and the development of a policy to achieve a rights-compliant outcome. It is considered an immediate duty as it is expected that any state, in whatever level of development, can put in place basic steps to progress ESC rights realization. Thus, while the full realization of a particular right might not always be possible immediately, a component of the duty to progressively realize ESC rights is that there is a plan, process or policy in place to achieve fulfilment. A violation of this duty can be understood as a failure to reasonably plan, adopt strategies and implement policies or programmes to achieve a specific ESC right. International law applies ‘proportionality inflected reasonableness’ in assessing whether reasonable steps have been taken, learning from the established practice in the South African Constitutional Court.9

The duty to respect, protect and fulfil

States are under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil all rights.10 This approach suggests that:

the individual be protected from interference by the state in the exercise of certain freedoms [respect]; that the state protect the individual from interference by other actors, whose conduct the state is in a position of control [protect]; and that the state provide certain public goods that would be undersupplied if their provision were left to marker mechanisms [fulfil].11

The duty to respect requires states to refrain from acting in a way that would undermine the right – that is, taking any action that results in a reduction of the right in law (de jure) or in practice (de facto). The duty to protect requires action to prevent others from interfering with the enjoyment of the right, including private third parties that may be responsible for operationalizing the right – for example, in cases of private actors delivering services that are central to realizing ESC rights, such as housing or the care sector. Finally, the duty to fulfil can be understood as a need to facilitate, promote and provide for ESC rights by taking the necessary steps to ensure they can be enjoyed by all within the maximum available resources of the state. This means that states should take concrete steps to progressively improve ESC rights to the maximum of their available resources (that is, the amount of revenue the state generates).12

The duty to gather and deploy maximum available resources

The duty to gather and deploy the maximum available resources (MAR) to achieve progressive realization can be broken down into subcategories. First, there is an expectation that states will prepare and plan budgetary allocation in advance in order to realize ESC rights. This does not mean that a state must use all of its resources on meeting ESC rights, but rather that it must use the MAR that can be expended for a particular purpose without sacrificing other essential services.13 In order to meet this obligation, states must ensure that resources are generated in a manner that reflects national economic growth – in other words, that there is a correlation between overall national wealth and the generation of revenue through tax resources.14 If, for example, government spending on the realization of ESC rights is dropping relative to gross domestic product (GDP) or other government expenditures, while not an immediate violation, it is a ‘strong indication that there are available resources but that a particular right has not been prioritised’ and thus risks falling short of the MAR obligation.15

Second, according to the international framework, the allocation of resources must be effective (achieve its aim), efficient (achieve the highest quality with minimum waste/effort), adequate (sufficient to meet the thresholds of dignity/progressive realization) and equitable (prioritization of the most marginalized with the aim of achieving substantive equality). Adequacy can be further broken down into subcategorizations of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality (the AAAQ framework).16 Third, an important point to note is that resources should not be viewed as purely financial, but human, social, technological, informative, natural and administrative resources can also be considered.17 States can demonstrate how each of these resources is deployed as part of any national strategy/policy. Importantly, compliance with the obligations is largely left to the discretion of state parties to demonstrate what steps it has taken to deploy resources in order to realize ESC rights.

In short, there is no singular framework from which to monitor the use of MAR. Assessment of whether the state is meeting its obligations would be dependent on whether the state can demonstrate and justify that its approach is reasonable. This in turn requires budgetary decision making to be transparent, participatory and accountable, and there remain numerous practical steps that states can take to better realize human rights through their budgets and demonstrate compliance with MAR.18 As an example, by disaggregating data to better understand how money is spent, uncovering potential hidden gaps in the allocation of funding can illuminate how different groups are impacted, including those groups specifically protected under international human rights law and who face potential intersectional inequality (including women, children, disabled persons and ethnic minorities). This type of budget analysis is already well underway across the UK from the perspective of gender justice, but is also increasingly of interest to human rights practitioners and advocates both internationally and within the UK.19

The duty to ensure nondiscrimination

States must ensure nondiscrimination so that access to and delivery of rights occurs in a way that does not exclude groups, particularly those who are marginalized and possibly ‘hidden’ from the system. Before designing and implementing an inclusive system to deliver/provide a right, decision makers should explore and understand those who are disadvantaged and excluded, including what their needs and vulnerabilities are.20 The ICESCR obliges states to guarantee the rights without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (Article 2(2)). To fulfil this obligation, states need to gather and generate disaggregated data across various characteristics, including gender, age, geographical location, ethnicity, health status and economic status. It is important that a reliable evidence base is developed to ensure that people are not denied access to the system or inadvertently excluded from the government’s strategy. This approach means that a ‘deeper evidence base can improve the understanding of how programmes can best address structural and societal power imbalances, while also encouraging greater equity and empowerment for society’s most disadvantaged members’.21

The duty to provide a minimum core

The minimum core obligation (MCO) for each ESC right acts as a basic minimum threshold below which no one should fall. It is the absolute minimum criteria that is immediately applicable to all states in the fulfilment of ESC rights. It should be understood as complementary to progressive realization rather than as an alternative. This is important in order to ensure that the MCO of the right remains a floor of realization and does not risk becoming a ‘ceiling’.22 International law suggests that a MCO is legally binding and most likely nonderogable (meaning states cannot justify noncompliance).23 However, what it means in practice is not necessarily always clear. Some of the UN General Comments elaborate minimum core entitlements, but they do not carry this out in a consistent manner across all ESC rights.24 Those in favour of the doctrine argue that it is necessary to ensure that, at the very least, minimum criteria are in place to avoid destitution and that the obligations of progressive realization is not overly flexible. Critics of the MCO doctrine fear that by setting minimum criteria, states will be concerned with achieving minimum standards rather than reaching beyond minimum criteria to progressive standards. There is also disagreement as to what the MCO constitutes in both the literature and practice.25 By way of a brief summary, these arguments centre on whether the obligation requires all states to meet the same minimum absolute standards or whether a relative standard should apply.26 Put more simply, should all countries be expected to meet the same core standards or are states parties to the ICESCR free to adopt their own ‘core’ for ESC rights which better reflect the basic needs, culture and resources of the state? Some prominent commentators question its value to the legal framework as a whole due to the complexity of considerations it raises when implemented.27

In practice, the UN legal position has been to place the onus on states themselves to determine what actually constitutes an MCO in any given context, depending on a number of variables such as the right in question, the resources available, the measures taken and the prevailing social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other conditions.28 Best practice would suggest that states adopt both absolute and relative criteria to assess MCO compliance.29 Adopting both means ensuring there is an international minimum core entitlement to survival, while also enabling individual states to be able to set a higher standard of core obligations domestically in accordance with their particular constitutional arrangements and individual capacity. Current discussions in the UK on the incorporation of international human rights treatises, most notably in Scotland, have led to novel approaches to defining MCO via participative and deliberative approaches, the development of which has, for example, notably included the voices of those most marginalized and disadvantaged in Scottish society.30

Limitations and the duty of nonregression

Rights can be limited according to the principles of legality, legitimacy, and proportionality. States are under a duty to avoid measures which reduce access to or delivery of the right (nonregression). The principle of nonregression, also referred to as the duty not to take retrogressive steps, is key to decision-making frameworks for governments. It imposes a duty on states to ensure that there is no ‘backsliding’ on rights provision and that progressive realization is not subject to periods of decline, even in the most difficult of circumstances, including national or international crises.31 Indeed, it is in times of crisis that states must do all they can to avert any backsliding in the realization of ESC rights, as a failure to do so may result in longer-term damage.32 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) suggests regressive measures that amount to a ‘general decline of living and housing conditions directly attributable to policy and legislative decisions by State Parties, and in the absence of accompanying compensatory measures, would be inconsistent with the obligations under the Covenant’.33

In other words, backward steps in the provision of rights are counterproductive to progressive realization. In international law, any deliberate retrogressive measure requires the most careful consideration.34 Any violation of a right because of a deliberate retrogressive measure can only be justified in the most exceptional of circumstances and states must be able to explain that the action is reasonable, proportionate, nondiscriminatory, temporary and does not breach the MCO, as well as demonstrating that all other potential alternatives were considered.35 Further, as recent work by Liebenberg on nonretrogression in South Africa has demonstrated, the doctrine provides a potential tool from which to hold states accountable for regressive budgetary allocations.36

Access to an effective remedy

States are under a duty to provide access to an effective remedy if there is a failure to meet the obligations imposed by progressive realization. Effective remedies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Effective remedies include facilitating access to a legal remedy in court if necessary, implying the existence of both a substantive and procedural duty towards rights bearers on the part of state parties.37 Remedies may also include administrative, judicial and legislative actions.

The three potential functions of a remedy are:

  1. a)its capacity to place the right holder in the same place as was the case prior to the SR violation (restitution);
  2. b)ensuring ongoing compliance with a SR (equilibration); and
  3. c)engaging with the feature of the legal system that caused the rights violation (nonrepetition).38

Remedies should also be appropriate, sufficient and accessible in terms of meeting these aims.39 Domestic remedies for SR violations usually take three broad forms: individual (they help address a violation for one person), programmatic (they address a systemic issue that impacts lots of people) and hybrid (they achieve a mixture of both individual and systemic relief). A singular focus on any one of these could result in problems. For example, courts that focus solely on individual cases may jeopardize relief for a broader class of petitioners, while leaving intact a systemic feature of a legal system that may require attention, thereby being unable to ensure nonrepetition of the rights violation. Likewise, delivering only system-wide relief may leave individual petitioners without access to a remedy. Hybrid remedies that combine individual and systemic relief have been the most ‘effective’ kind, while also being capable of engaging with structural constitutional principles like the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty that seek to constrain judicial power in jurisdictions like the UK.

Hybrid remedies of the kind referred to earlier may also take the form of collective litigation in situations involving multiple complainants and multiple duty bearers. Such ‘dialogic’ forms of judicial remedies are especially suited to claims involving ESC rights, which may often require an institutional expertise that courts may not have. In such cases, courts may consider the meaning and content of rights, but defer back to the decision maker in relation to the remedy. The court can also play an important role in mitigating interinstitutional confrontation where there may be more than one department responsible (this can include between executive departments at the national level or indeed disputes about obligations between the national and devolved levels). Dialogic forms of judicial remedies can be innovative in nature in an exploration of how best to address systemic issues. In such kinds of remedies, courts can act as an intermediary between different rights holders and duty bearers to find an effective remedy that requires multiple duty bearers to respond as part of a structural interdict (a hybrid remedy that can offer individual and systemic relief potentially involving multiple applicants and multiple defendants). Structural remedies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Thus far we have explored, in brief, the outlines of the obligation to progressively realize ESC rights and the interlinked multitude of subduties to which this gives rise. Understanding this framework not only provides further clarity to states as to the expected actions in relation to ESC rights, but also a toolkit for advocates, practitioners and rights holders with which to hold states and domestic public institutions to account. The following discussion focuses on unpacking this in relation to the well-established ESC rights to food, housing, social security and fuel. Each has a wealth of international guidance and accompanying academic commentary which cannot exhaustively be covered in this chapter. The aim is therefore to set out key aspects of the rights normative content and explore how other jurisdictions have provided domestic legal protection.

The right to food

The CESCR, the body responsible for overseeing compliance with the right to food (Article 11 ICESCR), provides helpful guidance on this right. General Comment No. 12 provides a comprehensive overview of what is required to respect, protect and fulfil the right, defining the right to food as being met when ‘every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement’.40 Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has defined the right as having ‘regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensures physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear’.41

Additionally, the CESCR highlights ‘the right to adequate food indivisibly links to the inherent dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human rights’, further elaborating that it is inclusive and must not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense42 – for example, equating it with a ‘minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients’.43

A key term used when analysing the right to food is food security, which exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet the dietary needs necessary for an active and healthy life.44 The CESCR has outlined the right to food to normatively raise and require the progressive realization of the availability, accessibility and adequacy of food.

Availability

Availability ‘refers to the possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from productive land or other natural resources, or for well-functioning distribution, processing and market systems that can move food from the site of production to where it is needed in accordance with demand’.45 Therefore, it:

requires on the one hand that food should be available from natural resources either through the production of food, by cultivating land or animal husbandry, or through other ways of obtaining food, such as fishing, hunting or gathering. On the other hand, it means that food should be available for sale in markets and shops.46

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have taken this further and elucidated the need for, at a national level, the facilitation of stable and sustainable food supplies. Sustainability is now a key feature of the right to food and has been further cemented by the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture),47 which stretches the definition to encompass a state’s overall agricultural production and its place in global food markets.48

Accessibility (physical and economic)

The accessibility of food captures both physical and economic realities. The Committee has provided that:

economic accessibility implies that personal or household financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised. Socially vulnerable groups such as landless persons and other particularly impoverished segments of the population may need attention through special programmes49 … [while] physical accessibility implies that adequate food must be accessible to everyone, including physically vulnerable individuals.50

Adequacy

Explicitly mentioned within the ICESCR, the adequacy of food has been slowly unpicked and is commonly understood as:

Food must satisfy dietary needs, taking into account the individual’s age, living conditions, health, occupation, sex, etc. For example, if children’s food does not contain the nutrients necessary for their physical and mental development, it is not adequate. Food that is energy-dense and low-nutrient, which can contribute to obesity and other illnesses, could be another example of inadequate food. Food should be safe for human consumption and free from adverse substances, such as contaminants from industrial or agricultural processes, including residues from pesticides, hormones, or veterinary drugs. Adequate food should also be culturally acceptable. For example, aid containing food that is religious or cultural taboo for the recipients or inconsistent with their eating habits would not be culturally acceptable.51

From here, the adequacy of food can be broken down into three key components, each providing its own layer of protection:

  1. 1)Adequate food must satisfy dietary requirements.
  2. 2)Adequate food must be safe for human consumption.
  3. 3)Adequate food should be culturally appropriate.

The minimum core requires a minimum essential level of benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential healthcare, basic shelter and housing, food, water and sanitation, and the most basic forms of education.52 With regard to the right to food, states have a core obligation to take all necessary action to ‘mitigate and alleviate hunger’.53 Moreover, if any significant number of individuals within the state is suffering from acute hunger or starvation, it is prima facie failing to meet the core obligation of the right. If the state fails to meet these obligations owing to resource constrains, it must demonstrate that every possible effort has been made to use all available resources to satisfy the minimum core.

UK compliance with the right to food

Currently, due to the lack of domestic legal protection for the right to food, alongside rising food insecurity and food bank usage, and a failure to fully implement the UK right to food strategy,54 it has been widely argued the UK is not complying with the right to adequate food.55 This is emphasized by the fact that the number of UK food banks in use in the last ten years has grown from fewer than 30 to now well over 2,000.56 The need for food charity is now widespread across all four nations of the UK.57 While Scotland and Wales have acted within their devolved competencies to mitigate the worst effects of austerity policies, food bank usage has continued to grow.58 Other issues with the food system range from the existence of ‘food deserts’, where there is lack of access to nutritional food, to issues within sustainability of food production and a reliance within the UK on food imports and international trade.59

To provide more context, the UK’s approach to the right to food has been increasingly raised and criticized by the UN treaty monitoring and reporting as well as by UN Special Rapporteurs. In its concluding observations in 2016, the CESCR raised its concerns ‘about the lack of adequate measures adopted by the State party to address the increasing levels of food insecurity, malnutrition, including obesity, and the lack of adequate measures to reduce the reliance of food banks’.60

The CESCR also urged the UK to restore the link between the rates of state benefits and the costs of living and guarantee that ‘all social benefits provide a level of benefit sufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living, including access to health care, adequate housing and food’.61 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) has recommended that the state should regularly monitor and assess the effectiveness of policies and programmes on child food security and nutrition, including school meal programmes and food banks, and programmes addressing infants and young children, as well as to systematically collect data on food security and nutrition for children.62 Further concerns were raised by the Special Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty in 2019, with the report identifying ‘a shocking increase in the number of food banks’ across the UK.63 The report brought to light the inadequacy of the UK’s social security system to meet the needs of people who are food insecure. This has been echoed by a range of reports.64

Further still, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food wrote a letter to the UK government concerning ‘the deepening level of food insecurity among low-income households, particularly families with children, and the lack of comprehensive measures to ensure their access to adequate food’.65 Evidently, there is strong international concern that the UK is not complying with the right to food as laid out by international human rights law.

The right to adequate housing

General Comment Nos. 4 and 7 of the CESCR give a comprehensive overview of what is required to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate housing (Article 11 ICESCR).66 General Comment No. 4 defines adequate housing as the right of all persons, regardless of their income or economic resources, to ‘live somewhere in security, peace and dignity’.67

Applying the AAAQ framework

The following points give a summary of the right discussed earlier and what exactly it involves:

  • Availability: The availability of services, material, facilities, and infrastructure. In particular, access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of adequate housing storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services.

  • Cultural adequacy: The way in which housing is constructed, the building materials used and the policies supporting these must appropriately enable the expression of cultural identity and diversity of housing to reflect different housing needs.

  • Habitability: Adequate space and protection from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors must be ensured. The physical safety of occupants must also be guaranteed.

  • Affordability: Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised. Housing costs should be commensurate with income. There should be protection from unfair rent and unfair rent increases.

  • Accessibility: To be accessible for all disadvantaged groups.

  • Security of tenure: For example, legal protection against forced eviction.

  • Appropriate location: Adequate housing must be in a location which allows access to employment options, healthcare services, schools, childcare centres and other social facilities.

  • Adoption of a national housing strategy: This strategy should reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their representatives.

In January 2018 the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing introduced a set of key principles on which effective rights-based housing strategies should be based.68 In 2019, this was elaborated upon with 16 guidelines being provided in order to enable states to implement the right to housing.69 These principles and guidelines, alongside the normative content outlined earlier, provide states with adequate direction to realizing the right to housing domestically. The minimum core, as outlined by the CESCR, requires states to take action to address homelessness and inadequate housing within their jurisdictions.70 Forced evictions are considered to breach the right to housing and are only allowed in limited circumstances. When a forced eviction does occur, due process should be followed, there should be consultation in advance and an opportunity to seek a remedy, and those being evicted must be offered alternative accommodation.71

UK compliance with the right to adequate housing

The right to housing is currently not recognized in law in the UK, despite it being recognized commonly in other jurisdictions. States across Europe have recognized the right to housing in their constitutions.72 Alongside the expected treaty monitoring on the right to housing, in 2013, the UK was subject to scrutiny by the UN Special Rapporteur on housing, who raised significant concerns about access to the right, including the adverse impact on disadvantaged groups such as those living in poverty, homeless persons, the disabled, the elderly, young people, the Gypsy Traveller community, migrants, Roma and the Catholic community in Northern Ireland (NI).73 The UK has for a long time provided welfare and benefits through a number of different statutory schemes and when asked about implementing the right to housing, the UK government refers to the broad base of welfare-based legislation that constitutes the structure of the welfare state.74 However, the legislation, whether derived from Westminster or the devolved level, is not necessarily designed to comply with international standards, which can create a housing rights accountability gap.

In 2016, the CESCR raised concerns about the ‘persistent critical situation in terms of the availability, affordability and accessibility of adequate housing … in part as a result of cuts in State benefits’.75 The Committee also raised concerns about the lack of social housing, forcing households to move into the private rental sector, which is also not adequate in terms of affordability, habitability, accessibility and security of tenure.76 It noted the significant rise in homelessness, particularly in England and NI affecting mainly single persons, families with children, victims of domestic violence, persons with disabilities and asylum seekers. It also raised concerns about the adverse impact that reforms of social security and reductions in financial support to local authorities have had on the right to adequate housing, especially with regard to the criminalization of rough sleeping.77

Recent evidence submitted to the CESCR in early 2023 has demonstrated that many of the issues raised in 2016 are still prevalent throughout UK society, and in some instances have deteriorated further. As a UK-wide non-governmental organization promoting economic, social and cultural rights, Just Fair is responsible for preparing the UK parallel civil society report to CESCR as part of the Committee’s review of UK compliance. Just Fair has collated a range of evidence from across civic society in England and Wales, and raised a plethora of issues covering the right to housing. To provide some insight into the key areas raised, Just Fair’s evidence demonstrates concerns over the extensive use of the ‘private rental sector to meet public housing needs and address homelessness’ and an overall ‘lack of adequate affordable housing and inadequate support to meet unregulated rental costs’.78 These are structural issues with the delivery of public housing policies which lead to further issues of overcrowding in accommodation and adversely impact the habitability of the housing in question. Furthermore, homelessness remains a significant issue in the UK, where ‘families experiencing homelessness are left in temporary accommodation for long periods of time’.79 Specific groups still suffer far more acutely from a lack of adequate housing, with the evidence providing the insight that the ‘accessibility of culturally appropriate housing for Gypsy and Traveller people persists as an inadequately address[ed] issue’.80

In relation to Scotland specifically, the Committee highlighted the chronic shortage of social housing particularly for the most disadvantaged and marginalized, such as persons with disabilities.81 The UNCRC has urged Scotland, as well as other parts of the UK, to strictly implement the legal prohibition of prolonged placement of children in temporary accommodation by public authorities, to reduce homelessness and to ensure that children have access to adequate housing that provides physical safety, adequate space, protection against threats to health and structural hazards, (including cold, damp, heat and pollution and accessibility for children with disabilities), and to introduce a statutory duty for local authorities to provide safe and adequate sites for travellers.82 In relation to NI, the CESCR echoed the findings of the UN Special Rapporteur and encouraged the NI Assembly to ‘intensify its efforts to address the challenges to overcoming persistent inequalities for Catholic families in North Belfast, including through meaningful participation by all actors in decision-making processes related to housing’.83

In 2019 the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance identified key state failings in the right to adequate housing for different minority groups. For example, the Special Rapporteur’s UK report noted that children from Pakistani or Bangladeshi households (28.6 per cent) and Black households (24.2 per cent) were more likely to live in substandard accommodation than those in White households (18.6 per cent).84 The report noted that the Race Disparity Audit found that in England in 2015–2017, Black African and Black Caribbean households were the ethnic groups most likely to rent social housing (47 per cent and 45 per cent respectively).85 The Special Rapporteur also drew attention to the 2013 Scottish Parliament Equalities Committee report, which set out that Gypsies and Travellers lived in ‘horrendous conditions’. For example, the Committee observed that families paying rent to their local council were ‘expected to bathe young children in freezing cold amenity blocks with extortionate heating costs’. It also observed unacceptable conditions in some settlements, including ‘a putrid overflowing septic tank’, and wrote ‘that elderly and disabled people might have to go outside to a toilet block in the middle of a cold, winter’s night’. The Special Rapporteur’s own consultations with Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities revealed that access to adequate housing solutions that respect ancestral nomadic traditions remains a major challenge across the UK, especially in Wales.86 The UN Special Rapporteur on Poverty also identified key state failings in relation to housing stating: ‘In England, homelessness rose 60 per cent between 2011 and 2017 and rough sleeping rose 165 per cent from 2010 to 2018.’87

In our study, practitioners highlighted issues with access to justice mechanisms where people do not receive adequate advice or representation in adversarial eviction processes (where often the landlord is represented and the tenant is not). Practitioners also raised concerns with regard to the adequacy of housing standards and insufficient legal rights to ensure adequate heating and ventilation in order to address issues like mould and damp or to ensure habitability of housing – several practitioners noted those in housing need relying on charity to provide gas, electricity, furniture and white goods. Concerns were raised about the lack of accountability in the private sector, including both poor standards of housing and processes of eviction without due process. There are significant barriers faced by different groups – for example, a practitioner reported that the minority Catholic population in north Belfast still constitutes 94 per cent of those in housing need (NI, Esther, Housing activist, NGO for human rights). Likewise, research in Scotland highlighted the implications of the hostile immigration environment, where those seeking asylum are faced with precarious housing conditions (including eviction without notice and unrealistic demands on tenants remaining in accommodation, unable to stay overnight with friends or family and unable to have visitors stay with them). There is sufficient evidence to suggest that even if there are examples of good practice in the provision of adequate housing, the UK is not meeting its international obligation to provide for the right to housing in a manner that is compliant with its international human rights obligations.

The right to social security

Article 9 ICESCR (the right to social security) encompasses the right to

access and maintain benefits, whether in cash or in kind, without discrimination in order to secure protection, inter alia, from (a) lack of work-related income caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, old age, or death of a family member; (b) unaffordable access to health care; (c) insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult dependents.88

The right to social security is of ‘central importance in guaranteeing human dignity for all persons when they are faced with circumstances that deprive them of their capacity to fully realise their Covenant rights’.89 General Comment No. 19 gives a comprehensive overview of what is required to respect, protect and fulfil the right to social security.90

Availability

The right to social security requires the state to introduce a scheme, or a variety of schemes, which are available and in place to ensure that benefits are provided for the relevant social risks that people face in their everyday lives. This includes protection in the areas of: (a) lack of work-related income caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, old age or death of a family member; (b) unaffordable access to healthcare; or (c) insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult dependants.

Adequacy

The right to social security must include the distribution of benefits, whether in cash or in kind, which are adequate in terms of amount and duration in order that everyone may realize their rights to family protection and assistance, an adequate standard of living and adequate access to healthcare. This means that the level at which benefits are set should be enough to ensure a life of dignity.

Affordability

If a social security scheme requires people to make financial contributions, then those contributions should be communicated to people in advance of a scheme being set up. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with making contributions must be affordable for all and must not compromise the enjoyment of other rights, such as access to housing, food, healthcare or education. Normally there will always be a need to have a noncontributory scheme so that those who cannot generate income through employment will still have access to a social security system to protect them.

Accessibility

All persons should be covered by the social security system, especially individuals belonging to the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups, without discrimination on any of the grounds of race, colour, sex, age, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental disability, health status, sexual orientation, or civil, political, social or other status. Social security services must allow for physical access for those who require it. They should not be provided in a way that excludes certain groups.

In meeting the MCO of the right to social security, the CESCR has outlined specific core obligations as follows:

  • To ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential healthcare, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs and the most basic forms of education. If a state party cannot provide this minimum level for all risks and contingencies within its MAR, the Committee recommends that the state party, after a wide process of consultation, should select a core group of social risks and contingencies.

  • To ensure the right of access to social security systems or schemes on a nondiscriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.

  • To respect existing social security schemes and protect them from unreasonable interference.

  • To adopt and implement a national social security strategy and plan of action.

  • To take targeted steps to implement social security schemes, particularly those that protect disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.

  • To monitor the extent of the realization of the right to social security.91

UK compliance with the right to social security

The UK provides social security under various statutory schemes, which the UK government has long argued meets the state’s obligations in international law to provide for the right.92 However, as laid out previously, merely providing a scheme is not enough in and of itself to ensure compliance with the right. The right to social security requires that any scheme provided is available, accessible, affordable and adequate. States must take account of and meet the interlinked duties of progressive realization laid out at the beginning of this chapter. Taking account of this broader set of requirements to satisfy the UK’s obligations on the right to social security, the CESCR through its treaty monitoring role has consistently raised concerns that the UK is not complying with the right to social security. In its 2016 review, the CESCR raised concerns in relation to:

The various changes in the entitlements to, and cuts in, social benefits introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, such as the reduction of the household benefit cap, the removal of the spare-room subsidy (bedroom tax), the four-year freeze on certain benefits and the reduction in child tax credits. The Committee is particularly concerned about the adverse impact of these changes and cuts on the enjoyment of the rights to social security and to an adequate standard of living by disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, including women, children, persons with disabilities, low-income families and families with two or more children. The Committee is also concerned about the extent to which the State party has made use of sanctions in relation to social security benefits and the absence of due process and access to justice for those affected by the use of sanctions.93

The 2016 CESCRs concluding observations on the UK outlined some steps it can take to ensure closer compliance with the right to social security, which demonstrates the types of actions the CESCR is seeking. For example, in relation to working conditions in the UK, the CESCR stated: ‘Ensure that the labour and social security rights of persons in part-time work, precarious self-employment, temporary employment and “zero-hour contracts” are fully guaranteed in law and in practice.’94 More specifically in relation to social security, the CESCR called on the UK to:

  • review the entitlement conditions and reverse the cuts in social security benefits introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2015;

  • restore the link between the rates of state benefits and the costs of living, and guarantee that all social benefits provide a level of benefit sufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living, including access to healthcare, adequate housing and food;

  • review the use of sanctions in relation to social security benefits and ensure that they are used proportionately and are subject to prompt and independent dispute resolution mechanisms;

  • provide in its next report disaggregated data on the impact of the reforms to social security on women, children, persons with disabilities, low-income families and families with two or more children.95

In addition, the European Committee on Social Rights has concluded that the UK is not in conformity with the right to social security as required by the European Social Charter, which requires states to establish, maintain and progressively improve their social security system.96 The Committee concluded in January 2018 that the level of statutory sick pay and long-term incapacity benefits are inadequate, as are the minimum levels of employment support allowance and unemployment benefits.97 Thus, drawing from international monitoring would suggest that currently the UK is not meeting its international obligations in relation to social security provision.

The UK is undergoing a CESCR review at the time of writing, with evidence submitted to the Committee from a range of civic society, including Scotland’s National Human Rights Institution (NHRI).98 The concluding observations and recommendations remain outstanding at the time of writing. However, the evidence submitted gives a strong insight into the plethora of issues that remain in relation to the UK’s approach to social security. According to Just Fair’s collective evidence on social security in England and Wales, ‘[s]ocial security is not adequate: both in terms of the underlying level not being enough to meet essential needs, and the failure to update provision to keep parity with inflation and rises in cost-of-living’.99 The report goes on to discuss a wealth of issues, from the regressive measures of removing the £20 uplift to Universal Credit, to the significant impact of the benefit cap freeze alongside rising prices during a stubborn cost-of-living crisis. Further still, it has been shown that a lack of rights-compliant social security provisions has a direct impact on areas like ‘in-work’ poverty, which rose 13 per cent between 1996/1997 and 2019/2020. Due to the importance of adequate social security in alleviating poverty, this has led to an increase of children in poverty in the UK, with Just Fair reporting that in some areas of the UK ‘the number of children in in-work poverty has risen by 91 per cent since 2014/15’.100

It is also increasingly clear that those hit hardest by the inadequacy of the system are often from ethnic-minority backgrounds, raising the discriminatory impacts of social security policy and provision. Significant issues with the overall operability of the system have also been shown, with Just Fair’s report identifying further issues of: insufficient capacity to minimize administrative delays, which creates cycles of debt and hardship; the five-week delay for first Universal Credit payments pushing people into debt; the need for further access to adequate advice and an emergency response scheme to help with essential living costs; and the inadequacy of disability benefits to meet the additional costs of living with an impairment.101 These represent bleak circumstances for many and are merely a selective insight into the extent of issues with social security provision in the UK. This would suggest that significant action is needed by the state to meet its requirements under Article 9 ICESCR.

The right to fuel: an emerging economic, social and cultural right

In our empirical research, we focused on the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11 ICESCR) and, although not explicitly protected under this right, the concept of the right to fuel was identified as a key component of our research, alongside housing, food and social security. Inherent to the realization of many ESC rights,102 a right to fuel itself is not made explicit in international human rights law. This means that it is first important to assess the grounding for such a right in the international human rights system. There are brief treaty provisions alluding to its existence which can provide some direct insights. For example, Article 11(1) of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights provides that ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services’, including energy services.103 More pertinently, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) also raises the need for electricity access for adequate living conditions in rural areas104 to combat a range of violations for women living in rural poverty.105 These provisions provide some footing from which to build; however, when compared to the explicit nature of other human rights, the guidance from treaties themselves is undoubtedly limited. They do not provide an explicit framework for how a right to fuel could be formulated, enacted or enforced in line with a human rights-based approach. Nonetheless, treaty bodies refer to the right to fuel and energy interchangeably, indicating there is a normative right engaged under the treaty. For example, the CESCR and the UN Special Rapporteur have called on efforts to tackle fuel poverty.106 The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty has identified that families are forced to make a choice between heating their homes and feeding their children.107 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food have recognized the importance of fuel for cooking108 and fuel for transport109 respectively in connection with the right to food. Several treaty bodies and UN Special Rapporteurs have engaged with ‘energy poverty’110 and discuss energy as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living,111 the right to health112 and the right to housing.113

Similar trends are developing comparatively. A wide range of countries from Spain, France and Greece to Colombia, South Africa, India, Pakistan and the Philippines recognize or are moving towards recognition of the right to energy/electricity.114 In 2015, the Colombian Supreme Court concluded that while the ‘right to electricity [was] not an autonomous right’, it did find that the Colombian Constitution could be read as providing ‘a right to receive electricity’ through guarantees to a right to life and a right to health.115 With further direct reference to ESC rights obligations, the Colombian court has also ordered reconnections of households to minimum ‘subsistence’ (minimio vital) amounts of electricity supply to ensure that particularly disadvantaged groups, such as children and the elderly, have access to basic energy services.116

The South African Constitutional Court has also provided protection for the provision of electricity. In recognizing its central importance to the realization of rights guaranteed by the South African Constitution, the court opined that ‘electricity is one of the most common and important basic municipal services [and] virtually indispensable, particularly in urban society’; its provision is ‘a cardinal functions, if not the most important functions, of every municipal government’.117 Municipalities in South Africa have the constitutional duty to develop a service capacity that can ‘meet the basic needs of all inhabitants of South Africa’ and secure access in manner that is:

  1. (a)equitable and accessible;
  2. (b)conducive to:
    • the prudent, economic, efficient and effective use of available resources, and

    • the improvement of standards of quality over time;

  3. (c)financially sustainable;
  4. (d)environmentally sustainable; and
  5. (e)regularly reviewed with a view to upgrading, extension and improvement.118

Identifying the right to fuel

This section will consider the theoretical basis for a right to fuel. This can be carried out in a range of ways and from differing perspectives.119 Hesselman’s exploration of international, regional and national laws in relation to energy access concludes that fuel and energy are integral to realizing the right to an adequate standard of living.120 Her work suggests that there is a clear legal basis from which to understand and build a human rights approach to energy access, in which, we argue, fuel plays an integral part.

The iterative approach to developing and defining, or uncovering, the right to fuel echoes the first steps taken towards recognizing a right to water and sanitation,121 leading to the subsequent adoption of General Comment No. 15.122 This, we propose, would suggest the right to fuel is a derivative right ‘by way of the existence of duties (or other Hohfeldian rights-correlatives) in others’.123 A similar exploration of the basis for a right to electricity has been carried out by Lofquist, where the conclusion is drawn that like fuel, a right to electricity exists as a derived right from the right to an adequate standard of living.124 Lofquist concludes: ‘We should therefore understand electricity as a derived right. A right to electricity is often necessary to protect our basic rights, for example, to life and to such material things as adequate housing, healthcare, and education. Still, it is life, housing, health care and education that are essential, not electricity.’125 With a similar line of reasoning, a right to fuel is better understood in the human rights framework as a derived right from its essential nature to the realization of a plethora of ESC rights and, in cases of more extreme deprivation, some CP rights. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) responsible for monitoring the ICCPR provides that ‘the duty to protect life also implies that states parties should take appropriate measures to address the general condition in society that may give rise to direct threats to life or prevent individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity’.126 The HRC continues to provide the following:

The measures called for addressing adequate conditions for protecting the right to life include, where necessary, measures designed to ensure access without delay by individuals to essential goods and services such as food, water, shelter, health-care, electricity and sanitation, and other measures designed to promote and facilitate adequate general conditions such as the bolstering of effective emergency health services, emergency response operations (including fire-fighters, ambulances and police forces) and social housing programs’.127

From this guidance, not only does the HRC emphasize the need for positive action in relation to protecting the CP right to life and once again undermine the poorly conceived, but once widely held understandings of negative and positive human rights duties, it also establishes electricity alongside other essential basic services explicitly or implicitly recognized as human rights within the ICESCR. The ECHR has also demonstrated willingness to protect CP rights due to deprivation caused by lack of access to fuel. A successful challenge of the right to life on the grounds of destitution, of which fuel was an aspect, was found in Nencheva v Bulgaria.128 In this case, the court found the State of Bulgaria had failed to act sufficiently in relation to a care home where its residents were facing destitution, without access to nutritious food, sufficient heating and general basic care. Fifteen children and young adults lost their lives in the state institution, despite warnings about the risks residents were facing. In its reasoning, the court laid out that due to the vulnerability of the children, their role in providing care, and knowledge of the conditions the institution was facing, there had been a clear breach of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life).129 While Nencheva provides the clearest example of violated ESC rights giving rise to a breach of Article 2, there are several other important cases in which the court has raised the impact poor heating (or a lack of it altogether) can have on patients of hospitals and inmates of state prisons.130 While these cases do not discuss fuel directly, or a right to it, the willingness of the court to associate heating as a core element of securing a person’s basic needs would suggest that in very serious cases of fuel poverty, where it is so severe that here is a risk to life, the court could find a violation of Article 2. As a different example, in the Netherlands, the Supreme Court recognized that Article 2 and Article 8 (the right to private and family life) require the state to undertake more ambitious climate action, with significant implications for national energy policies.131 As a result of the case, the government announced a €3 billion spending package to subsidize, among other things, renewable energy projects and home refits.132

Meaning and content of the right to fuel

Having discussed viewing fuel as a derivative right necessary for the realization of many ESC rights, our attention must now turn to defining what the core elements of such a right would be. As a derivative right without clear international guidance, these elements must be derived from elaborations of other rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living and health. The right to an adequate standard of living acts essentially as a precondition for a life lived with dignity and consists of the right to housing, food, clothing, water and sanitation.133 We can therefore assess the relationship between fuel and these rights to establish its basis in the international legal framework. Here we will focus on fuel and the right to adequate housing due to how the issue is defined and measured within the UK;134 however, it is important to recognize that a similar process could be carried out in relation to the right to health or the right to food.135

The right to adequate housing has been provided plenty of international guidance, with General Comment Nos. 4 and 7 setting out a comprehensive overview of the right.136 General Comment No. 4, for example, espouses the need for the availability of services in relation to adequate housing. The CESCR provides:

An adequate house must contain certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition. All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services.137

Here, General Comment No. 4 emphasizes the need for the ‘availability of services’, of which fuel will be an integral part. This language is echoed by the European Social Charter, which provides that adequate housing requires ‘all basic amenities, such as water, heating, waste disposal, sanitation facilities, [and] electricity’.138 Thus, availability forms our first key element. Affordability is another key component underpinning the right to fuel. General Comment No. 4 discusses the need for ‘personal or household financial costs associated with housing to be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised’.139 With most UK households heated by fuel, gas or electricity, its affordability will primarily dictate the overall affordability of maintaining an adequate home. Finally, General Comment No. 4 lays out the condition of habitability in meeting the right to adequate housing. Housing must have ‘adequate space and protection from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health’.140 In colder climates, access to fuel means access to heating, which is an essential tool in staving off the cold and the inevitable creep of damp which follows. This leads to the conclusion that fuel must be accessible to homes in a sufficient quantity to meet the condition of habitability, such as in particularly cold or more rural conditions.

The following key criteria can be understood as constituting the right to fuel:

  • Availability: Fuel must be made reliably available to all through the development of suitable infrastructure, facilities and delivery.

  • Accessibility: Fuel must be made accessible to all without discrimination, including for all included in disadvantaged or marginalized groups, in sufficient quantities so as to ensure the adequate habitability of their home.

  • Affordability: Fuel must be made affordable for all. Where fuel is unaffordable or prices rise suddenly, support mechanisms should be made available to those who are vulnerable to fuel poverty. The cost of fuel should be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised.

These elements of the right are clearly interlinked, but there is a further important element to consider which is not directly derived from an ESC right. Through its nexus with Goal 7 of the Sustainable Development Goals, which dictates access to ‘affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’,141 the right to fuel must also have an element of sustainability included. Again, delving into debates on energy rights and justice, it is clear that further action is required to ensure obligations around the provision of fuel do not present a choice between heating your home and reducing your carbon footprint.142

Sustainability: The availability of fuel should not come at the expense of sustainable development. Where there is a transition from fossil fuels to more renewable sources of energy, this must be carried out in a manner which does not undermine the availability, accessibility or affordability of fuel. In short, the cost of energy transitions cannot be footed by those least able to afford it.

Progressive realization of the right to fuel

As explored at the outset of this chapter, the nature of the progressive realization obligation requires a multitude of interlinked duties to be met, including that states respect, protect and fulfil the right to fuel. This means that states should progressively achieve the right to fuel to the maximum of their available resources. They must take steps to refrain from acting in a way that would undermine the right to fuel – that is, take any action that results in reducing the right (the duty to respect). For example, the state must not interfere with the production and distribution of fuel in a manner which would undermine the realization of the right. It must also take action to prevent others from interfering with enjoyment of the right, including private third parties that are responsible for the production and delivery of fuel in the UK (the duty to protect). This requires the UK to have appropriate regulatory mechanisms in place to ensure that private ownership of fuel production does not interfere with the realization of fuel as a human right. Finally, the state must facilitate, promote and provide the right to fuel by ensuring that the right can be enjoyed by all to the maximum of its available resources (the duty to fulfil). Fulfilling the right to fuel could take many forms, from the expansion of renewable infrastructure, to putting in place appropriate social security schemes to ensure that the worst consequences of global markets and private companies fuel price rises do not fall on those who can least afford it.

Furthermore, the UK must demonstrate how it is using the maximum of its available resources to deliver upon the right. Where the violation of an ESC right is evident throughout a state, there is an increased justificatory burden for the state to show that the violations took place despite its use of MAR. Evidently connected to budgetary decision making, the duty requires the UK government to adequately generate, allocate and spend resources to the maximum extent possible in order to ensure that people have access to and can afford fuel. This obligation generally requires the allocation of further financial resources from the central government. As the CESCR’s recent concluding observations on Belgium reiterate: ‘The Committee recommends that the State party take the measures necessary to ensure a minimum supply of energy, even when a meter is installed. It also recommends that the State party expand coverage for beneficiaries of the social tariff, by allocating more financial resources to the Gas and Electricity Fund.’143 The CRC too has raised the need for transparency of financial resources being allocated to deliver basic services for children in Greece in relation to energy.144 When considering these concluding observations and taking into account the many other instances where guidance has been provided on the MAR duty,145 it is clear that the generation, allocation and expenditure of a state’s resources should adequately account for the need to divert resources to ensuring the right to fuel is being progressively realized.

There is a further area to consider. The obligation to spend MAR within a state is often discussed purely in relation to financial resources. However, with a right to fuel, questions can be raised in relation to a state’s natural resources, and these being used to the maximum extent possible to ensure the realization of the right to fuel. De Schutter notes that ‘a State’s population has a right to enjoy a fair share of the financial and social benefits that natural resources can bring’.146 Also coined natural capital in wellbeing economics, natural resources can refer to a state’s environmental assets, biodiversity, soil and ecosystems. The use of natural resources, particularly in relation to the transition to renewable energy, should therefore also be considered when assessing whether a state has maximized all its resources to ensure the availability and affordability of fuel. The potential for renewable energy production in Scotland, as explored by the government and a plethora of private companies,147 provides a good example of the opportunities available for producing sustainable fuel at a better price for the population and consequently maximizing its use of resources beyond the confines of finance.

In short, the right to fuel can be progressed in a plethora of ways and should not be viewed restrictively as simply requiring an increase in fuel social security payments or regulation of energy companies. Progressive realization of the right to fuel should be directly focused on and captured within the many actions taken to ensure the accessibility, availability, affordability and sustainability of fuel for all now and in the future.

The MCO for the right to fuel might include access to sufficient fuel, without discrimination, to protect against dangerously cold weather conditions. When viewed through the lens of the right to food, it is evident there would be an MCO to ensure adequate fuel for cooking and adequate refrigeration. The CESCR in its concluding observations on Belgium did raise the need to ensure everyone has a ‘minimum supply of energy’, with concerns raised over energy services being switched off due to a lack of payment.148 While this is not an explicit mention of MCOs, it does provide a nod to the understanding that there is a minimum essential level of fuel required within a household in order for people to live a dignified life.

UK compliance with the right to fuel

Fuel poverty in the UK has been raised on several occasions by these monitoring mechanisms, with significant concerns raised over both the extent of fuel poverty and its impact. In 2009, the CESCR’s concluding observations on the UK laid bare the issue, stating that ‘poverty and fuel poverty, especially among children, remain widespread in the State party, despite the level of its economic development’.149 The CESCR also raised the need to ‘intensify the efforts to combat poverty, fuel poverty, and social exclusion, in particular with regard to the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups and in the most affected regions and city areas’.150 However, it is interesting that in 2016, when the CESCR delivered its next concluding observation on the UK, there was no reference to fuel poverty.151 While there was widespread acknowledgement of poverty, including its many manifestations and their ramifications for ESC rights realization, the CESCR overlooked the specific issue of fuel poverty. Fuel poverty was again raised in 2019 in relation to the privatization of energy companies and its impact on the affordability of fuel. Since the late 1980s, energy companies in the UK have been privatized. In fact, there have been no publicly owned energy companies in the UK since 1990. In 2019 Alston reported:

The United Kingdom was a pioneer in privatizing previously public services across a wide range of sectors. In 2018, the National Audit Office concluded that the private finance initiative model had proved to be more expensive and less efficient than public financing in providing hospitals, schools, and other public infrastructure. Studies of the results of privatization in sectors such as water, energy and public transportation suggest that prices have been raised excessively while access for low-income households has been restricted and capital investments have been inadequate.152

These comments came before the fuel poverty crisis developing in the UK.

Fuel poverty is driven by three key factors: a household’s income, its fuel costs, and its energy consumption, which is affected by the energy efficiency of the home.153 This means that when discussing fuel poverty, research can range from the inefficiency of the UK’s housing stock (for example, cladding and insulation) to the proportion of people’s income spent on heating their home to a safe standard. Fuel poverty is defined and measured differently across England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, partly because energy is a devolved area, meaning different legal and policy frameworks apply.154 This is not to say that wider UK policy is not the main driver for fuel poverty within each nation, with, for example, the inadequacy of social security payments playing a pivotal role. The use of different definitions and measures throughout the UK creates the problem of providing decisive figures relating to fuel poverty throughout the whole of the UK. Each nation is therefore dealt with in turn subsequently. Whatever figures are relied upon, the once rarely raised issue of fuel poverty in the UK has grown to be recognized widely as an epidemic afflicting millions of households across the UK’s nations. While not every case of fuel poverty would necessarily give rise to the violation of ESC rights, it certainly serves as a strong indication that the UK is not meeting its obligations. Where the government has brought in mitigation packages, such as Winter Fuel Payments, the Committee on Fuel Poverty has highlighted how much of the money spent on these policies is not reaching those who need it. The Committee in 2021 reported:

It is unacceptable that out of a current total budget of over £2.55 billion per year allocated to improving energy efficiency and assisting householders to pay their fuel bills, only about £0.4 billion per year is received by fuel poor households. It is also unacceptable that although there are current plans to increase the total budget to circa £3 billion per year, it is only proposed to allocate circa £0.6 billion per year to the fuel poor.155

Thus, while large figures of money can be pointed to as action on fuel poverty by the UK government, it is clear that those who need the most help are not always receiving it. This suggests that while steps are being taken, they are not adequately targeted, concrete and deliberate as would be required when using a human rights approach to tackling fuel poverty.

The evolution of changing definitions for fuel poverty in England has been well documented and need not be reiterated in full here.156 What is important to grasp is that, since Boardman’s 1991 book defined it as covering households whose fuel expenditure on all energy services exceeded 10 per cent of their income, the definition has moved several times,157 the most notable changes being the introduction of the Low Income High Costs (LIHC) measure in 2013158 and the recently introduced Low Income Low Energy Efficiency (LILEE) measure in 2021. Both use the English Housing Survey data to assess the extent of fuel poverty.159 It is an anonymized survey which adds to the difficulty in prioritizing or targeting resources for those most in need. The LIHC measure defined a household as fuel poor if the amount they would need to spend to keep their home at ‘an adequate standard of warmth’ was above the national median level and if they spent that amount, their leftover income would be below the poverty line.160 It was criticized on a range of grounds, from its complexity to the fact that it placed an emphasis on the energy efficiency of homes over the ability of people to afford basic energy.161 According to Middlemiss, it had the overall impact ‘to further entrench the idea that reform of the energy market and addressing income inequality are policy options that are outside the realms of possibility’.162 Importantly, the change in measure helped skew the reality faced by households in England: ‘[the] numbers of households officially recognised as experiencing fuel poverty were approximately halved by this change in measure’.163 This is further compounded by the fact that the fuel poverty targets in England are not based on alleviating families from fuel poverty, but are set on the households’ Energy Performance Certificates.164 The devolved governments in the UK have not adopted the same measures or targets. This reflects the difficulty in truly assessing the extent of the issue in England; however, recent data have been released in relation to the new LILEE measure and provide some insight.

The current LILEE measure defines a household as fuel poor if ‘they are living in a property with an energy efficiency rating of band D, E, F, or G’ and their ‘disposable income (income after housing costs and energy needs) would be below the poverty line’.165 It is thus a continuation of the approach of LIHC with a priority focus on energy efficiency over the percentage of income spent on fuel. According to this measure and the latest statistical data available, there is an estimated 3.16 million households living in fuel poverty in England.166 According to official statistics and trends, fuel poverty in England has declined steadily since 2010, despite austerity policies.167 Questioning official figures further, the government projected fuel poverty levels would fall to 12.5 per cent of households in 2022, despite the extortionate rise in energy prices. Instead, fuel poverty remained consistent with the previous three years. Unsurprisingly, these figures lie in direct conflict with those estimated using the original 10 per cent measure. Under this measure, the figure jumps to around 4.5 million households living in fuel poverty, and that does not yet take into account the 54 per cent price increase due to the lifting of the energy cap in 2022. Further clarity on the true scale of fuel poverty can be sought from assessing the fuel poverty gap.

The fuel poverty gap is a further measure that is used and is defined as the reduction in required spending which would take a household out of fuel poverty. It is thus more intimately tied to the proportion of income spent on fuel. According to official figures, the fuel poverty gap was expected to rise from £223 in 2020 to £258 in 2022; however, it reached £348 in 2022, and rose a further 20 per cent to £417 in 2023.168 The UK government’s assertion that fuel poverty is in decline in England while the fuel poverty gap has increased is indicative of the methodological challenges. There are also concerns that the strategies and policies brought in to reduce fuel poverty in England specifically, such as energy rebates, may be leading already low-income households into further debt.169 While the idea of support is welcome, more cynically, the way in which some of the targeted policies have been designed would suggest that the government is more focused on short-term reductions of fuel poverty figures over dealing with its underlying causes or long-term entrenchment within society.

Across the UK’s four nations, Scotland faces the most challenges in ensuring the availability, accessibility and affordability of fuel for all. Cold weather conditions require increased spending on heating homes. The cost of heating rural households across the highlands and islands of Scotland add further to the mounting concern about how to heat Scotland’s homes as fuel prices continue to rise.170 Up to 2019, Scotland used Boardman’s original 10 per cent measure to ascertain the extent of fuel poverty throughout the population. For many years under this measure, Scotland’s fuel poverty steadily increased to a peak of 39 per cent of the population in 2011 before beginning to fall to around 25 per cent in 2018.171 The failure to alleviate fuel poverty in Scotland, despite devolved powers, targets and strategies, led to the establishment of two working groups tasked with assessing the definition of fuel poverty in Scotland, with England having recently adopted the LIHC measure, as well as designing policy responses for its alleviation.172 This led to the unanimous passing of the Fuel Poverty (Targets, Definition and Strategy) (Scotland) Act in 2019, which brought in an updated measure for fuel poverty.

Under the Fuel Poverty Act, a household is considered fuel poor if after housing costs have been deducted, more than 10 per cent (20 per cent for extreme fuel poverty) of its net income is required to pay for its reasonable fuel needs and if after further adjustments are made to deduct childcare costs and any benefits received for a disability or care need, its remaining income is insufficient to maintain an acceptable standard of living, which is defined as being at least 90 per cent of the UK Minimum Income Standard (MIS).

There are several notable aspects of the new definition. First, the measure clearly differs from that adopted in England and continues to have a primary focus on expenditure on fuel over energy efficiency. This means that the measure used is much more sensitive to changes in energy prices as these have a direct impact on the proportion of income spent on fuel within a household. As the primary cause of increasing fuel poverty is currently related to fuel prices, this measure would seem better suited to capturing the full extent of the problem. Additionally, the measure discusses the need for income for an ‘adequate standard of living’. While a right to fuel is not explicitly recognized in Scotland, this measure makes the connection between adequate fuel and an adequate standard of living, and could be built upon to reflect the standards set by the right to an adequate standard of living as espoused by the UDHR and the ICESCR.

Despite some positives in Scotland in relation to the new measure, current statistics and forecasts do not make for easy reading. Official statistics from the Scottish House Condition Survey only give an indication as to fuel poverty in 2019 and fail to capture the recent changes to the fuel price cap in 2021 and April 2022. Still, in 2019 fuel poverty under Scotland’s new measure affected 613,000 households – around 24.6 per cent of all households in Scotland.173 Without official figures, it is difficult to fully understand the full extent of the problem, but Energy Action Scotland, a leading fuel poverty charity, has estimated that the fuel price rise will lead to a further 211,000 households suffering from fuel poverty. This means that fuel poverty could exceed 40 per cent of all households in Scotland, with over 50 per cent of households in fuel poverty in the Western Isles.174 With the impact of fuel poverty on a range of factors that are important to basic standards of living, these figures are truly devastating and suggest widespread violations of ESC rights. Despite the actions taken by the Scottish government to alleviate fuel poverty and reduce its persistence, the figure reported would strongly indicate that further targeted action and resources are required.

Wales too suffers from high levels of fuel poverty. In Wales, fuel poverty is measured in relation to whether a household must spend more than 10 per cent of its income on maintaining a satisfactory heating regime.175 It is a simple measure, but continues to provide a focus on income and is thus likely to capture many of the difficulties caused by rising fuel prices. However, the Welsh measure does not have an income cap built into it, meaning that some high-earning households can be captured inadvertently.176 This is the benefit of the Scottish measure using the MIS as a baseline. Under the Welsh measure, there was a peak of fuel poverty in 2008 according to official data, with just over 25 per cent of all households in Wales living in fuel poverty. This had reduced to 12 per cent (or 155,000 households) in the last round of official data in 2018. However, as with the other nations, these figures do not capture the reality faced by thousands more households in 2022. The Welsh government has recently released updated estimates which provide further insight. As of October 2021, 196,000 households in Wales (14 per cent of all households) were living in fuel poverty, with 38,000 in severe fuel poverty (spending 20 per cent of their income on fuel). Furthermore, the April 2022 price increase left charities warning that this figure could rise hugely to up to 45 per cent of all households and 8 per cent in severe fuel poverty. The extent of these estimates is disturbing given the knock-on impact it can have on the realization of ESC rights generally, but also on enabling people to live a life with basic human dignity. The only silver lining being the figures likely represent an accurate depiction of the difficulties faced by households in Wales in relation to fuel price rises and thus the government’s task in its alleviation is better understood.

In NI, a household is considered to be in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory level of heating (21°C in the main living area and 18°C in other occupied rooms), it is required to spend in excess of 10 per cent of its household income on all fuel use, and a household is considered to be in severe fuel poverty if it needs to spend more than 15 per cent of income on all fuel use.177 At the time of carrying out this research, the latest figures in 2024 were reliant upon data collected in 2016, meaning that the data may not capture the full extent to which people suffer from fuel poverty in NI today, particularly since the cost-of-living crisis has worsened since the COVID-19 pandemic. The data collected in 2016 by the House Condition Survey found that 22 per cent of households in NI were classified as fuel poor under the NI measure.178 This figure has also been used by the NI Department for Communities and is therefore well recognized as a baseline of fuel poverty in NI. However, as we have found in all other parts of the UK, the real figure is likely to be higher, with recent price rises for fuel alongside other financial pressures. The National Energy Action charity has suggested that as of 2022, up to 45 per cent of all homes in NI could be considered to be in fuel poverty.179 In recent years, the NI government has made some efforts to alleviate the impact of fuel poverty on the most vulnerable through policies such as the Emergency Fuel Payment Scheme. This scheme was aimed at supporting up to 20,000 households with the cost of energy through the provision of one-off support in the form of up to £100 worth of electricity, gas or oil to 20,000 households across NI that were experiencing an emergency fuel crisis during the winter of 2021/2022. However, without up-to-date data on fuel poverty, it is difficult to know whether the scheme was effective in its aim of ensuring those households who needed it most were adequately supported throughout the winter.

Conclusions

This chapter provides an overview of the SR legal framework for the purposes of informing the discussions in the following chapters. The UK’s international obligations include compliance with ESC rights. The rights to housing, food, social security and fuel are not currently protected within the domestic framework and there is an accountability gap when violations occur. The normative content of these rights involves continuing processes of interpretation across UN governance structures, including treaty interpretation by the CESCR as well as UN Special Rapporteurs engaged across ESC rights. In addition, there is a significant degree of subsidiarity indicating that it is for states themselves to address indeterminacy using the normative framework as skeletal foundation. The normative framework suggests that there must be efforts to ensure that service provision for social rights is made available across the state and across different demographics within the state (using up-to-date disaggregated data to determine varying need). Likewise, we know that social rights provision should be culturally inclusive, enabling people to live, cook, eat and enjoy home life in ways that respect cultural traditions and practices. We know that rights should not be treated as separate objectives, but should be treated holistically so that the provision of one right supports, and balances, the provision of another. We know that structures, processes and outcomes should be designed to ensure a level of quality in services and national strategies that aim to monitor and improve provision. Likewise, we know that service provision should be non-discriminatory and seek to address historical structural injustices through substantive equality. We also know that social rights provision should prioritize those most in need, should use equitable and efficient ways of delivering resources, and that any process of privatization, automation or outsourcing should not detract from the quality of the service provided. And when provision falls short of these general principles on availability, adequacy, accessibility and quality, there should be mechanisms in place to scrutinize and interrogate provision and ensure that remedies are available to address any violations. The domestic incorporation, or legalization, of ESC rights is not about enforcing absolute rights; rather, it is about creating an accountability framework to assess whether normative standards are upheld and whether processes of service provision relating to social rights are performed in a way that is reasonable and justifiable.

This legal analysis also provides a lens through which to understand our empirical data. Importantly, there are a number of themes that emerge in the legal data that re-emerge in the qualitative interviews with practitioners. International human rights law creates a framework that recognizes the indivisibility of rights – in other words, that the enjoyment of one right is entirely dependent on the enjoyment of others or, alternatively, that the absence of one right or gaps in its fulfilment undermines the broader set of rights. The domestic legal system siloes legal needs into separate categories, or justice pathways, rather than treating them as indivisible human needs and human rights. For example, our empirical research identifies that when something goes wrong in one area of life, there is a ‘spiral’ or ‘cluster’ of issues that appear and when this ‘snowball effect’ occurs, you ‘just keep going around in circles and you can’t quite get off the train’. One practitioner explained, in relation to a client she was supporting, that there are

clusters of problems, because [name redacted] lost her job … she had to claim Universal Credit. Her job was about making ends meet, so she was able to pay her rent. She was able to feed herself, you know, basic heat and electricity … So whenever she lost that income, she became destitute. I have had to give her money to get the bus to her relative’s house. And because of this housing issue … she’s had to go from relative to relative. She doesn’t have the money to pay for transport, pay for electricity, pay for food. She said to me I have been out my home for the last eight weeks, it has worn me down so much that I am now not mentally able to look for a new job. And of course she isn’t, because she doesn’t have a house.

This insight from the empirical data highlights the interrelated dimension of the human rights framework and the importance of acknowledging the indivisibility of rights. It also highlights the importance of a legal recognition of the rights and value that human rights offer in terms of addressing social injustice. The absence of human rights from the domestic system means that the siloed access to justice framework is ill-equipped to respond to indivisibility. In addition, the absence of meaning and content of rights, the elaboration of what rights mean in practice, is also missing from those cases that do come before an adjudicator. This creates a system in which the burden of seeking justice is placed on the individual, who is already most likely facing a multitude of issues and cannot make a claim with reference to human rights as legal obligations, meaning that much of the evidence related to the social rights claim is not engaged under whichever route to justice is sought. We turn now to our empirical data generated via four UK-wide case studies that provide insights into the everyday reality of this justice gap in practice.

1

This erroneous sidelining of ESC rights is outdated and the remnants of a ‘legal fiction’ as found in Mónica Feria Tinta, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions’ (2007) 29(2) Human Rights Quarterly, pp 431–459, p 432. For a full discussion on the misunderstood separation of rights into separate categories, see Katie Boyle, Economic and Social Rights Law, Incorporation, Justiciability, and Principles of Adjudication (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).

2

The rights protected in international law fall under international treaties such as the UN (General Assembly), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, 3; the Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), 3 May 1996, ETS 163; UN (General Assembly), Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, 3; UN (General Assembly), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, 13; UN (General Assembly), Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 195; and UN (General Assembly), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), A/RES/61/105 of 24 January 2007, 76th plenary meeting; issued in GAOR, 61st sess., Suppl. No. 49, ‘Annex: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, 2–29.

3

The UK has signed up to a number of international treaties which espouse the need to progressively realize rights, including the ICESCR, the UNCRPD and the UNCRC. See (n 2) for full details.

4

ICESCR (n 2), art 2(1).

5

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1 of the Covenant)’ (1990) E/1991/23; UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Note Verbale Dated 5 December 1986 from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the Centre for Human Rights’ (‘Limburg Principles’) (1987) E/CN.4/1987/17; and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997).

6

CESCR General Comment No. 3 (n 5).

7

Ibid, [2].

8

Ibid.

9

This is the test adopted by the UN Committee on ESC Rights under the Optional Protocol. See UN General Assembly, ‘Optional Protocol to the ICESCR’, A/RES/63/117 of 10 December 2008.

10

This categorization was first developed by Asbjørn Eide in 1989 and was then later adopted in General Comment No. 12. See Asbjørn Eide, ‘Realisation of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach’ (1989) 10(1) Human Rights Law Journal 35; and UN CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant)’ (1999) E/C.12/1999/5, [15].

11

See the discussion in Olivier de Schutter, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, 2nd edn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014).

12

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant)’ (1991) E/1992/23, [14].

13

Rory O’Connell, Aoife Nolan, Colin Harvey, Mira Dutschke and Eoin Rooney, Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and Resources (Abingdon, Routledge, 2016); see also Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the ICESCR’ (1987) 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly, pp 156–229.

14

Philip Alston and Nikki Reisch, Tax, Inequality, and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

15

O’Connell et al (n 13), at 76; see also Alston and Quinn (n 13).

16

The Danish Institute of Human Rights provides more detail on using the AAAQ framework as a toolbox from which to guide states into practical action. See the Danish Institute for Human Rights, The Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Quality (AAAQ) Toolbox: Realising Social, Economic and Cultural Rights through Facts Based Planning, Monitoring and Dialogue (2015).

17

Olivier de Schutter, The Rights-Based Welfare State: Public Budgets and Economic and Social Rights (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018). See also the concept of resources as developed by Joseph E. Stiglitz et al, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Paris: Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission, 2009).

18

O’Connell et al (n 13).

19

For an international perspective on human rights and resources, see OHCHR with the International Budget Partnership, Realising Human Rights through Government Budgets (New York and Geneva: OHCHR, 2017). For a gender perspective explored in the UK, see the work of the Women’s Budget Group, the Scottish Women’s Budget Group, the Wales Women’s Budget Group and the Northern Ireland Women’s Budget Group under the Women’s Resources and Development Agency.

20

Magdalena Sepúlveda, ‘Ensuring Inclusion and Combatting Discrimination in Social Protection Programmes: The Role of Human Rights Standards’ (2017) 70(4) International Social Security Review, pp 13–43, p 37.

21

Sepúlveda (n 20), p 36.

22

Geraldine van Bueren, ‘Of Floors and Ceilings: Minimum Core Obligations and Children’ in Daniel Brand and Sage Russell (eds), Exploring the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspective (Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2002).

23

Amrei Müller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9(4) Human Rights Law Review, pp 557–601, p 601.

24

UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), E/C.12/1999/10, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 8 December 1999, para 57; UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), E/C.12/2000/4, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 11 August 2000; UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), E/C.12/2002/11, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 20 January 2003, para 37; UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefitfrom the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author (Art. 15, Para. 1 (c) of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/17, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 12 January 2006, para 39; UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work (Art. 6 of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/18, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 6 February 2006, para 31; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 19: The right to social security (Art. 9 of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, para 59.

25

For a philosophical overview of the tensions which exist in application of the MCO, see John Tasioulas, Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in the Here and Now (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017).

26

David Bilchitz, ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19(1) South African Journal on Human Rights, pp 1–26, p 15.

27

Katharine Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 33(1) Yale Journal of International Law 113.

28

CESCR General Comment No. 12 (n 10), [7]. See also the views of Oxford University’s Bonavero Institute in Manuel Cepeda et al, The Development and Application of the Concept of the Progressive Realisation of Human Rights: Report to the Scottish National Taskforce for Human Rights Leadership (Oxford: Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, 2021).

29

Katie Boyle, ‘Constitutionalising a Social Minimum as a Minimum Core’ in Toomas Kotkas et al (eds), Specifying and Securing a Social Minimum in the Battle against Poverty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019).

30

Aidan Flegg, ‘Minimum Core Obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Scottish Perspective’ (2021) 25(2) Edinburgh Law Review, pp 238–245.

31

O’Connell et al (n 13), p 70.

32

Ibid.

33

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [59].

34

CESCR General Comment No. 3 (n 5), [9].

35

Letter from CESCR Chairperson to State Parties, CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW (16 May 2012).

36

Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Austerity in the Midst of a Pandemic: Pursuing Accountability through the Socio-economic Rights Doctrine of Non-retrogression’ (2021) 37(2) South African Journal on Human Rights, pp 181–204.

37

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [17]; Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

38

Kent Roach, Remedies for Human Rights Violations: A Two-Track Approach to Supra-National and National Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp 2–5.

39

Jawara v The Gambia (2000) ACHPR 147/95 and 149/96, [32].

40

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [6].

41

Jean Ziegler, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’ [2008] A/HRC/7/5/Add.2, [17].

42

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [4].

43

Ibid, [6].

44

UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO), Rome Declaration on Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action (Quebec City: UNFAO, 1996), [1].

45

Ibid, [5].

46

OHCHR, The Right to Adequate Food: Factsheet No. 34 (New York and Geneva: OHCHR, 2011).

47

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023: Special Edition’ (DESA, 2023), Goal 2.

48

UNFAO, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (Quebec City: UNFAO, 2004).

49

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [13].

50

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12).

51

OHCHR (n 46).

52

CESCR General Comment No. 3 (n 5).

53

CESCR General Comment No. 12 (n 10), [6].

54

Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, National Food Strategy: Independent Review – The Plan (London: DEFRA, 2021).

55

Just Fair Consortium, Going Hungry? The Human Right to Food in the UK (London: Just Fair, 2014). See also Nourish Scotland, Report to UN CESCR: The Right to Food (58th Sess.) (Edinburgh: Nourish Scotland, 2016).

56

Glen Bramley et al, State of Hunger: Building the Evidence on Poverty, Destitution, and Food Insecurity in the UK (Salisbury: Trussell Trust, 2021).

57

Hannah Lambrie-Mumford, Hungry Britain: The Rise of Food Charity (Bristol: Policy Press, 2017).

58

UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), ‘Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ (2019) A/HRC/41/39/Add.1.

59

Tomaso Ferrando and Kath Dalmeny, A UK right to food law could tackle food poverty and environmental degradation (Policy Briefing 63) (Bristol: Policy Press, 2018). See also Anna Taylor and Rachel Loopstra, Too Poor to Eat: Food Insecurity in the UK (London: Food Foundation, 2016).

60

UN CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6.

61

Ibid, [41].

62

UN CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (2016) CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, [67].

63

UNHRC (n 58).

64

See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Nothing Left in the Cupboards: Austerity, Welfare Cuts, and the Right to Food in the UK (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2019). See also Food Foundation, A Crisis within a Crisis: The Impact of Covid-19 on Household Food Security (London: Food Foundation, 2021).

65

Letter from Special Rapporteur to the OHCHR, AL/GBR/8/2020 (5 August 2020).

66

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12); and UN CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)): Forced Evictions’ (1997) E/1998/22.

67

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [7].

68

Leilani Farha, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination in This Context’ [2017] A/HRC/34/51.

69

Leilani Farha, ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of the Right to Adequate Housing’ [2019] A/HRC/43/43.

70

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [13].

71

CESCR General Comment No. 7 (n 66).

72

The Belgian Constitution provides a right to decent accommodation. The Finnish Constitution imposes a duty on public authorities to promote the right of everyone to housing and the opportunity to arrange their own housing. The Swedish Constitution provides that ‘public institutions shall secure the right to employment, housing and education, and shall promote social care and social security, as well as favourable conditions for good health’. In Switzerland, the Constitution encourages the development of suitable housing to ensure that any person seeking accommodation for themselves, or their families can find suitable accommodation and that housing schemes should account in particular for the interests of families, elderly persons, persons on low incomes and persons with disabilities. In Spain citizens are entitled to decent and adequate housing. In Ukraine the right to housing includes providing those in receipt of social protection with housing free of charge or at a price that is affordable for them, in accordance with the law. The Portuguese Constitution states that everyone shall possess the right for themselves and their family to have an adequately sized dwelling that provides them with hygienic and comfortable conditions and preserves personal and family privacy. In Poland public authorities are under a constitutional duty to pursue policies conducive to satisfying the housing needs of citizens, in particular combating homelessness, promoting the development of low-income housing and supporting activities aimed at the acquisition of a home by each citizen. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Constitution provides that authorities should provide sufficient living accommodation.

73

Raquel Rolnik, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination in This Context’ [2013] A/HRC/25/54/Add.2.

74

UN International Human Rights Instruments (IHRI), ‘Common Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ [2014] HRI/CORE/GBR/2014; and CESCR (n 60), [122]–[123].

75

CESCR (n 60), [49].

76

CESCR (n 60).

77

Ibid, [51].

78

Just Fair, Submission to UN CESCR: Pre-sessional Working Group Submission on Behalf of Civil Society in England and Wales (London: Just Fair, 2023), p 12.

79

Ibid, p 13.

80

Ibid.

81

CESCR (n 62).

82

Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (2016) CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, [71(e)].

83

CESCR (n 62), [50].

84

Tendayi Achiume, ‘Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance’ (2019) A/HRC/41/54/Add.2, [22].

85

Ibid.

86

Ibid.

87

National Audit Office, Homelessness: Report – Value for Money (London: Department for Levelling up, Housing & Communities, 2017), p 14. See also Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Rough Sleeping Statistics, Autumn 2018, England (Revised) (London: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2019).

88

UN CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant)’ (2008) E/C.12/GC/19, [2].

89

Ibid, [1].

90

CESCR General Comment No. 19 (n 88).

91

Ibid.

92

IHRI (n 74); and CESCR (n 60), [122]–[123].

93

CESCR (n 60), [40].

94

Ibid, [32].

95

CESCR (n 60), [41].

96

European Social Charter (n 2), art 12(1)–(3).

97

European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter: Conclusions XXI-2 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2018).

98

For example, Just Fair (n 78). See also Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC), ‘Submission to the UN’s CESCR: Pre-sessional Working Group’ (Scottish Human Rights Commission, 2022); and HRW, ‘Submission to the CESCR: Review of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

99

Just Fair (n 78).

100

Ibid.

101

Ibid.

102

For the connection between fuel poverty and the human right to health, see Marmont Review Team, The Health Impacts of Cold Homes and Fuel Poverty (London: Friends of the Earth, 2011); and Michael Marmont et al, Health Enquiry in England: The Marmont Review 10 Years on (London: Health Foundation, 2020), pp 84–85.

103

Organization of American States (OAS), Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’) (1999) A-52, art 11.

104

CEDAW (n 2) discusses the need for electricity in relation to rural women. Article 14(2)(h) states that women should ‘enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communication’.

105

The Committee has commented further on a ‘right to electricity’ by stating that rural women have ‘various energy needs’ for cooking, heating, cooling and transportation which require to be met. CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 34 on the Rights of Rural Women’ (2016) CEDAW/C/GC/34.

106

CESCR, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant’ (2009) E/C.12/GBR/CO/5. See also Leilani Farha, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination’ [2020] A/HRC/43/43/Add.2.

107

Olivier de Schutter, ‘Visit to Spain – Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ [2020] A/HRC/44/40/Add.2.

108

CRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of Timor-Leste’ (2015) CRC/C/TLS/CO/2–3.

109

Jean Ziegler, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’ [2007] A/HRC/7/5/Add.3.

110

CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Germany’ (2018) E/C.12/DEU/CO/6.

111

CEDAW, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Kyrgyzstan’ (2021) CEDAW/C/KGZ/CO/5. See also HRC (n 58); and CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Belgium’ (2020) E/C.12/BEL/CO/5.

112

CRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Kyrgyzstan’ (2014) CRC/C/KGZ/CO/3–4.

113

CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’ (2015) E/C.12/VEN/CO/3.

114

Marlies Hesselman, ‘Energy Poverty and Household Access to Energy Services in International, Regional and National Law’ in Martha M. Roggenkamp et al (eds), Energy Law, Climate Change and the Environment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2021). See also Panos Merkouris, ‘Disaster Management in EU Law: Solidarity among Individuals and among States’ in Marlies Hesselman et al (eds), Socio-economic Human Rights in Essential Public Services Provision (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).

115

Constitutional Court of Colombia, María Yamilde Martínez Córdoba v las Empresas Municipales de Cali EMCALI Empresa Industrial y Comercial del Estado. E.S.P. (Sentencia T-761/15), 11 December 2015. See also a discussion on the case in Marlies Hesselman, ‘Right to Energy’ in Christina Binder (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Human Rights (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2022).

116

Córdoba (n 115), [4.1].

117

Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others [2009] ZACC 30, [34]–[39], [47].

118

Joseph (n 117). See also Hesselman (n 114).

119

For example, many explorations of the nexus between fuel/energy and human rights use environmental law as a basis. See Damilola S. Olawuyi, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Carbon Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Ross Gillard et al, ‘Advancing an Energy Justice Perspective of Fuel Poverty: Household Vulnerability and Domestic Retrofit Policy in the United Kingdom’ (2017) 29 Energy Research & Social Justice, pp 53–61; Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’ (1997) 66(2) Fordham Law Review, pp 273–300; Amartya Sen, ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’ (2005) 6(2) Journal of Human Development, pp 151–166; Giovanni Frigo et al, ‘Energy and the Good Life: Capabilities as the Foundation of the Right to Access Energy Services’ (2021) 22(2) Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, pp 218–248.

120

Hesselman (n 114). See also Marlies Hesselman et al, ‘Energy Poverty in the COVID-19 Era: Mapping Global Responses in Light of Momentum for the Right to Energy’ (2021) 81 Energy Research & Social Science, pp 1–11.

121

For an overview of the development of the right to water and a recent discussion of the basis for derivative rights, see Dovilė Stankevičiūtė, ‘The Legal Ground for the Right to Water: Between a Derivative and an Independent Human Right’ (2019) 2(20) Law Review, pp 26–43; and Jaakko Kuosmanen, ‘Repackaging Human Rights: On the Justification and the Function of the Right to Development’ (2015) 11(3) Journal of Global Ethics, pp 303–320.

122

CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Art. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)’ (2003) E/C.12/2002/11 states that the ‘human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realisation of other human rights’.

123

Lawrence C. Becker, ‘Three Types of Rights’ (1980) 13 Georgia Law Review, pp 1197–1220, p 1200.

124

Lars Lofquist, ‘Is There a Universal Human Right to Electricity?’ (2020) 24(6) International Journal of Human Rights, pp 711–723.

125

Ibid, at 721. See also Stephen Tully, ‘Access to Electricity as a Human Right’ (2006) 24(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, pp 557–587.

126

HRC, ‘General Comment No. 36: Art. 6 (Right to Life)’ (2019) CCPR/C/GC/36, [26].

127

HRC General Comment No. 36 (n 126) (emphasis added).

128

Nencheva and Others v Bulgaria [2013] ECHR 554.

129

Ibid.

130

Câmpeanu v Romania, Application No. 47848/08 ECHR 2014. See also Muršić v Croatia, Application No. 7334/13 ECHR 2016.

131

Uganda Foundation v State of the Netherlands [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689, [2.1]. See also Margaretha Wewerinkle-Singh, ‘A Human Rights Approach to Energy: Realising the Rights of Billions within Ecological Limits’ (2021) 31(1) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp 16–26.

132

Uganda (n 131).

133

Asbjørn Eide, ‘Adequate Standard of Living’ in Daniel Moeckli et al (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

134

Andrew Burlinson et al, ‘The Elephant in the Energy Room: Establishing the Nexus between Housing Poverty and Fuel Poverty’ (2018) 72(c) Energy Economics, pp 135–144.

135

Ben Christman and Hannah Russell, ‘Readjusting the Political Thermostat: Fuel Poverty and Human Rights in the UK’ (2016) 2(2) Journal of Human Rights in the Commonwealth, pp 14–31.

136

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12) and CESCR General Comment No. 7 (n 66).

137

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [8(b)].

138

European Social Charter (n 2), art 31.

139

CESCR General Comment No. 4 (n 12), [8(c)].

140

Ibid, [8(d)].

141

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (n 47), [Goal 2].

142

See Jan Rosenow et al, ‘Fuel Poverty and Energy Efficiency Obligations: A Critical Assessment of the Supplier Obligation in the UK’ [2013] Energy Policy, pp 1194–1203 for a discussion on the tension in alleviating fuel poverty.

143

CESCR (n 111).

144

CRC, ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the State Report on Implementation of the CRC’ (2012) CRC/C/GRC/CO/2–3.

145

Farha (n 68).

146

De Schutter (n 17).

147

Scottish Affairs Committee, Renewable Energy in Scotland Report (London: House of Commons, 2021).

148

CESCR (n 111).

149

CESCR (n 62), [28].

150

Ibid.

151

CESCR (n 60).

152

UNHRC (n 58).

153

Suzanna Hinson, Paul Bolton and Steven Kennedy, Fuel Poverty in the UK (London: House of Commons Library, 2024).

154

Ibid.

155

Committee on Fuel Poverty, Annual Report (London: Committee on Fuel Poverty, 2021).

156

Richard Moore, ‘Definitions of Fuel Poverty: Implications for Policy’ [2012] Energy Policy, pp 19–26.

157

Brenda Boardman, Fuel Poverty: From Cold Homes to Affordable Warmth (London: Belhaven Press, 1991).

158

For further information on research examining and proposing the LIHC measure for fuel poverty, see John Hills, Getting the Measure of Fuel Poverty (London: Hills Fuel Poverty Review, 2012).

159

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook (LILEE) (London: Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, 2023).

160

Hinson et al (n 153).

161

Lucie Middlemiss and Ross Gillard, ‘Fuel Poverty from the Bottom-up: Characterising Household Energy Vulnerability through Lived Experience of the Fuel Poor’ (2015) 6 Energy Research & Social Science, pp 164–154; and Moore (n 156).

162

Lucie Middlemiss, ‘A Critical Analysis of the New Politics of Fuel Poverty in England’ (2017) 37(3) Critical Social Policy, pp 425–443, p 426.

163

Middlemiss (n 162).

164

Energy Performance of Buildings (Certificates and Inspections) (England and Wales) Regulations (2007).

165

Hinson et al (n 153).

166

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, Fuel Poverty Statistics (London: Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, 2021).

167

Ibid.

168

Ibid.

169

Rachel A. LaFortune, ‘UK Energy Price Hike Threatens to Worsen Poverty Crisis’ [2022] Human Rights Watch, 9 February.

170

For issues specific to Scotland, see Scottish Fuel Poverty Strategic Working Group, A Scotland without Fuel Poverty Is a Fairer Scotland: Report (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2016).

171

Hinson et al (n 153).

172

Initially, there was the Fuel Poverty Forum that advised the government on fuel poverty. This developed into the Scottish Fuel Poverty Advisory Panel.

173

Hinson et al (n 153).

174

Energy Action Scotland has produced a range of publications, including reports and briefings, demonstrating the extent of fuel poverty in Scotland generally, but also with a focus on rural areas. See also Mark Shucksmith et al, ‘Costs of Living Crisis Will Push More into Rural Poverty’, Centre for Rural Economy, 1 April 2022, https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/cre/2022/04/01/cost-of-living-crisis-will-push-more-into-rural-poverty/#:~:text=Mark%20Shucksmith%2C%20Polly%20Chapman%2C%20Jayne,by%20increases%20in%20energy%20costs

175

A ‘satisfactory heating regime’ is 23°C in the living room and 18°C in other rooms, required for 16 hours in a 24-hour period in households with older (a person aged 60 and over) or disabled (a person living with a long-term limiting illness or who is disabled) people. For all other households, 21°C in the living room and 18˚C in other rooms is required for nine hours in every 24-hour period on weekdays, and 16 hours in a 24-hour period on weekends.

176

National Energy Action, ‘Fuel Poverty Statistics Explainer’ (2021), https://www.nea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Fuel-Poverty-explainer.pdf

177

Jack Hulme and Claire Summers, Measuring Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland (Watford: Building Research Establishment, 2016).

178

Building Research Establishment, Estimates of Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland in 2019 (Watford: Building Research Establishment, 2016).

179

National Energy Action, ‘How Is Fuel Poverty Defined in Northern Ireland?’, 2023, https://www.nea.org.uk/fuel-poverty-map/fuel-poverty-in-ni