Since 1982, the state officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups (taingyintha) and eight ‘national races’ (Bamar, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan), with the Bamar (or Burman in English) majority comprising about 60 to 70 per cent of the population. These categories were also used in the contentious 2014 national census, where people were prohibited from self-identifying as Rohingya (Ferguson, 2015; Kyaw Zeyar Win, 2018). According to figures released after the 2014 census, an estimated 88 per cent of the Myanmar population is Buddhist, with Christians and Muslims comprising about 6 per cent and 4 per cent, 0.8 per cent animist and 0.5 per cent Hindu (Thawnghmung and Robinson, 2017).

The term ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) is commonly used to refer to ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, though some of them prefer the terms ‘ethnic resistance’ or ‘ethnic revolutionary’ organizations to emphasize their goal of resisting or overthrowing the Myanmar military (see Thiha 2023 on this terminology).

As detailed subsequently, some data are included from later visits between 2017 and 2019 and from online interactions, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020.

The role of ‘government-organized NGOs’, or GONGOs, will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Among my respondents who had been political prisoners in the past, some continued to openly resist the military, while others chose more covert ways to operate after their release.

As explained in Chapter 1, the British colonial administration and later military governments encouraged people to artificially identify with a single ethnic group.

Notable exceptions at the time included a number of in-depth studies on ethnic nationalities in the border areas (Smith, 1991; South, 2004, 2008ab; Gravers, 2007; Walton, 2008; Kramer, 2011) and on the Buddhist sangha, or community of monks and nuns (Schober, 2011; Walton, 2012a, 2015b, 2016), as well as several seminal books discussing life in authoritarian Myanmar more generally (Lintner, 1990; Fink, 2009). However, studies on local experiences in and with civil society were relatively scarce, with the exception of a few individual studies (Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2004, 2007abc, 2008; Lorch, 2007, 2008; Malseed, 2009) and publications on related issues such as the rule of law (Cheesman, 2015 and earlier articles) and the role of the media (Brooten, 2004, 2006).

Karen, Kachin, Chin and other groups (including Anglo-Burmese) made up the majority (Charney, 2009: 54; Steinberg, 2010: 29).

Also spelled as ‘Saya San’. Saya (sayama for women) means teacher in Burmese.

The term ‘nationalism’ is commonly used not only to refer to the Burman majority, but also to describe ethnic minority groups’ prioritization of, and pride in, their own ethnic group. See, for example, South (2003).

The Mon and Arakanese were excluded from the meeting, because they were considered to fall under Ministerial Burma which was under direct British control (Walton, 2008: 902). Karen observers also attended but did not participate in the meeting (TNI, 2017).

Sao Shwe Thaike, a prominent Shan leader, became the first president. The role of president rotated among the ethnic nationalities in order to ‘placate’ them (Steinberg, 2010: 57).

In 1989, the CPB split into four armed organizations: Burma National United Party and Army (which later became the United Wa State Army [UWSA]), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army in East Shan State, and the New Democratic Army(-Kachin) (Lintner, 2019).

The Myanmar army generally refers to itself as Tatmadaw, or ‘Royal Armed Forces’, while critics refer to it as ‘the regime’ or ‘the junta’. Since the 2021 military coup, critics have argued that the term tatmadaw should no longer be used, due to its controversial honorary and imperialist connotations (Ye Myo Hein, 2022). The term sit-tat, simply meaning armed forces, is becoming increasingly common.

Also referred to as ‘Bogyoke Government’, after General (bogyoke) Ne Win.

Interestingly, Burma also delivered the third Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, during this period.

In the 2008 constitution, the term ‘divisions’ has been replaced by ‘regions’.

In an apparent public relations exercise, the SLORC changed its name to SPDC in November 1997.

While unacceptable to the NLD, this was not in fact a surprise to most observers, who had noted that the army had already backtracked before the elections by proclaiming that a new constitution was to be drafted before power could be transferred (Tonkin, 2007).

The country would be without a constitution until 2008.

The controversy surrounding her Nobel Peace Prize and her response to the Rohingya crisis will be covered later in the book.

Some authors have objected to the internationally used term ‘Saffron Revolution’ (Fink, 2009: 102; Holliday, 2011: 25; Aung-Thwin, 2013). One reason is the fact that the monks mostly wore maroon, not saffron robes. More importantly, however, it has been questioned whether it is appropriate to refer to monastic activities with Western terms such as ‘revolution’, which might misportray the original intentions of the monks.

By 2008, Myanmar had the largest number of political prisoners thus far, estimated somewhere between 1,700 (Taylor, 2009: 424) and 2,200 (Holliday, 2011: 64). The definition (and therefore calculation) of ‘political prisoners’ remains contested, especially given the generally malfunctioning legal system (see Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) [AAPP(B)], 2011 and Cheesman, 2015). Since the 2021 military coup, the number of political prisoners (of which the AAPP keeps an online record) far exceeds this previous peak.

In 2022, it was estimated that 5 per cent of political prisoners arrested after the 2021 coup have been permanently disabled due to torture (Irrawaddy, 2022).

The most prominent opposition parties were the National Democratic Force, consisting of former NLD-members who disagreed with the election boycott, and a number of ethnic minority parties, of which the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) was the largest.

The second largest parties were the NUP and the SNDP with 5 per cent each, and the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (which later transformed into the Arakan National Party) with 3 per cent of the votes (TNI, 2010).

Several international garment companies such as H&M and Adidas started operating in Myanmar during these years, and the first KFC opened in 2015 (Campbell, 2023: 12). International development banks also entered, as discussed in Chapter 7.

Estimates of the total number of EAOs range somewhere between 20 and 40. The largest one is the UWSA with around 30,000 soldiers.

When the constitution was ‘approved’ in 2008, it did not result in further disarmament (Steinberg, 2010: 44).

Other signatories were smaller parties or splinter factions plus the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (introduced in the next chapter), a group of Burman student activists with its own armed wing. For an overview, see Stokke et al (2022).

See Kanbawza Win in Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2007b: 38): ‘[I]f we put two Myanmar in a cell they will form three political parties.’

Apart from prominent Buddhist nationalist groups, students were also active in the anti-colonial movement. In the 1920s and 1930s, university students actively opposed British rule, particularly in Rangoon (Charney, 2009: 34).

The government-organized peasants’ organization and workers’ organization claimed nearly 8 million and over 5 million members, respectively, out of a population of about 25–30 million (Taylor, 2009: 326, 360).

Several elected representatives of the NLD and ethnic nationalities parties also fled the country and formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma.

Min Ko Naing (meaning ‘conqueror of king[s]’), whose real name is Paw Oo Tun, has remained one of the best known Burmese dissidents since the 1980s.

‘Liberated Area’ refers to certain ethnic areas in Myanmar that were under de facto insurgent control when these movements were started. Although some of the organizations mentioned were initially based in these areas, eventually they acted predominantly from abroad.

These groups mostly resided in neighbouring countries such as Thailand; a list of solidarity groups established in Western countries is provided in Chapter 3.

Another influential media outlet, Myanmar Now, was founded in 2015. For more insights on the role of independent media in contemporary Myanmar, see the work of Lisa Brooten (2004, 2006) and especially the edited volume by Brooten et al (2019).

The relationship between EAOs and their affiliated CSOs differs widely between groups. Some EAOs are professionally run military forces with high levels of legitimacy among local constituencies, whereas others operate more like private business ventures with limited grassroots support (Thawnghmung and Saw Eh Htoo, 2022; Vrieze, 2023).

For a detailed discussion of the evolution of these laws and civil society advocacy, see Doi Ra and Khu Khu Ju (2021).

The number 969 stands for ‘the nine qualities of Buddha, the six qualities of Buddha’s teaching, and the nine qualities of monastic community’ (Min Zin, 2015: 382).

Section 66 of the Telecommunications Law criminalizes defamation and is often used against those who publicly criticize the government or the military, for example through social media. In 2019, for example, the law was used against the founder of the Human Rights Human Dignity Festival for criticizing the strong constitutional role of the military on Facebook. His request for bail was denied despite his need for urgent medical treatment. He was eventually released in February 2020.

Interestingly, after the 2010 elections, five Rohingyas had served as national and regional representatives of the military-backed USDP (Simpson and Farrelly, 2020: 487).

The ICJ case is ongoing at the time of writing, and the label genocide remains contested, due to its legal implications. However, reports on violence against the Rohingya consistently find strong indications of genocidal intent (see, for example, Fortify Rights, 2015). See Matelski et al (2022) for a discussion on the documentation of human rights violations by non-state actors inside and outside Myanmar which feeds into this and other legal cases.

A smaller number of civil society actors (often educated abroad) self-identifies as agnostic or atheist.

Information in this section stems from interviews with the co-founders conducted in Thailand in January 2010, February 2011 and July 2011, and from public documents.

Cardinal Bo was later criticized for posing with the leader of the 2021 military coup, Min Aung Hlaing, in his capacity as Archbishop of Yangon at a Christmas event. At many other points, however, he has been openly critical of the post-2021 military leadership.

Smaller minority groups within ethnic areas, such as the Danu or the Pa-O in Shan State, were in some cases allowed to have self-administered zones but were less able to benefit from the post-ceasefire development opportunities for civil society than some of the ceasefire groups.

Under President Thein Sein, the NCA was signed by eight non-state armed groups, including the KNU. Two more groups signed later under NLD rule. Despite the increasingly acknowledged demands for a federal system, ethnicity-based territories seem unlikely to be established, as it would weaken the position of minorities-within-minority areas, such as the Pa-O in Shan State or the Rohingya in Rakhine State (Thawnghmung and Saw Eh Htoo, 2022).

Bertrand et al (2022) similarly describe how the state and the military made use of the peace process between 2011 and 2021 to strengthen their position and ‘neutralize’ ethnic nationality groups.

Information in this section stems from interviews with one of its members conducted in Thailand in 2010 and in Yangon in 2014, and observations in public events.

Phyo Zayar Thaw was hanged after receiving the death penalty in July 2022, along with Ko Jimmy, a prominent member of the 88 generation, and two lesser-known activists, all convicted under the anti-terrorism law for their resistance to the military coup. It was the first time in over 30 years that the government formally carried out death sentences.

Research in other (former) authoritarian contexts such as Indonesia and China points towards a similar increase in political and social space for civil society actors in the aftermath of natural disaster (Antlöv et al, 2006; Teets, 2009).

This section is based on an article published in the Journal of Burma Studies (Matelski and Nang Muay Noan, 2022).

In Myanmar, the category ‘youth’ is rather loosely applied to persons up to the age of about 35. Many of the political youth organizations, for example, consist of members in their 30s.

Woman from Mon state, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010 (ethnicity and geographical origin are identical unless otherwise stated). Thin Lei Win (2019) makes a similar argument with regard to the media.

Interview conducted in Mae Sot, June 2011.

Burma Center Netherlands (BCN), the organization where I volunteered between 2004 and 2006, was founded in 1993 in collaboration with the Amsterdam-based Transnational Institute (TNI), and initially advocated for economic sanctions. In 2015, BCN moved most of its activities to Myanmar. The centre was formally discontinued in November 2018, while TNI has continued its programme on Myanmar.

This section is based on an interview conducted in Mae Sot, June 2011; see also earlier section under ‘Generation and gender’.

Also spelled Hlaingthaya. While poverty is higher in the rural areas, inequality is higher within the urban areas of Myanmar (Warr, 2020).

Woman from Mon state, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

Man from Kachin state, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Muslim man from Yangon, 36 years old. Interviewed in Yangon, March 2011.

Observation during a public civil society meeting in Yangon, 2014.

Burman male representative of a Yangon-based organization. Interviewed in March 2014.

The CBI emerged out of a training programme for Burmese staff set up by INGOs in the early 1990s to increase the competency of local NGOs and has been operating under the name CBI since 2001. The organization started offering trainings for local organizations in 2005 and consultancies in 2006. In 2010, it was transformed into a local NGO.

The Local Resource Centre was set up by the Australian Burnet Institute and other INGOs in 2008 to coordinate local and international relief efforts after Nargis. After 2010, it shifted focus to the ‘holistic development’ of local NGOs.

Paung Ku (meaning ‘bridge’ or ‘arch’) was set up in 2007 by an INGO consortium led by Save the Children. Its goals are to build capacity of and encourage networking among local CSOs, improve practice within the international development community and enhance advocacy towards policy actors.

Pyoe Pin (meaning ‘green shoots’) was a project of the British Department for International Development with additional Danish and Swedish funding started in 2007. It aimed to promote strategic partnership among governmental and non-governmental actors in order to bring about social and economic development.

Information based on an interview with one of the founders in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

This section is based on informal discussions with several respondents, including former trainees of Myanmar Egress, and a visit to the Egress office in Yangon in 2010. Some of the information was confirmed in later writings, including by co-founder Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2014). The organization’s founder, Nay Win Maung, died unexpectedly from a heart attack on 1 January 2012. For a detailed account of the activities of Myanmar Egress, see Lidauer (2012), Lall (2016), Mullen (2016), and Mon Mon Myat (2023).

Woman from Mon state, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

Tactics mentioned by several respondents from CSOs interviewed between 2010 and 2014.

Burman man from Yangon, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Man from Dawei, 28 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Muslim man from Yangon, 30 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Man from Karen state, 29 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Muslim man from Yangon, 33 years old. Interviewed in Yangon, February 2011.

Man from Karen State, 29 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Rakhine man from Yangon, 22 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

Woman from Mon State, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

Man from Kachin State, 35 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Muslim man from Yangon, 36 years old. Interviewed in Yangon, March 2011. This was a particularly outspoken respondent, who is indeed unafraid to criticize anything. He was among the first to speak out in defence of the Rohingya, and openly criticized the military, the elected government and the opposition before and after the 2021 military coup. Most of these outspoken respondents, who were determined to stay in the country, sadly had to flee in the course of 2022 as violence against dissidents intensified.

Man from Kachin State, 27 years old. Interviewed October 2010 in Chiang Mai.

Conversation between two respondents, November 2010 in Chiang Mai.

Muslim man from Yangon, 30 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Interview with one of the members in Yangon, March 2014.

See The Best Friend (2012) ‘We need more tourists like Garrett’, [online] 26 October, Available from: http://thebestfriendint.blogspot.com/2012/10/we-need-more-tourists-like-garrett.html [Accessed 18 May 2023].

Email discussion with Burman respondent, January 2014.

Retrieved from BCN’s website in 2015.

Personal conversation, 2010.

Unsigned letter dated 29 September 2010, retrieved from EBO’s website in 2015.

EBO letter dated 20 October 2010, retrieved from EBO’s website in 2015.

Muslim man from Yangon, 33 years old. Interviewed in Yangon, February 2011.

The Unlawful Association Act of 1908 provides for prison sentences for formal or informal association with unlawful organizations and is frequently used to sentence dissidents.

See Burma Partnership/Ten Alliances (2010) ‘Burma’s Ten Alliances call for “People’s Elections” on 27 May’, [online] 12 May, Available from:https://burmapartnership.net/2010/05/burmas-ten-alliances-call-for-peoples-elections-on-27-may/ / [Accessed 18 May 2023].

Matha ko hpauda yaik teh, according to this respondent, is a common saying in Mandalay, meaning ‘to beautify a corpse’.

See Burma Partnership/Ten Alliances (2010), ‘Burma’s Movement for Democracy and Ethnic Rights Launches Global Campaign Against 2010 Elections’, [online] 19 March, Available from: https://burmapartnership.net/2010/03/burmas-movement-for-democracy-and-ethnic-rights-launches-global-campaign-on-2010-elections/ [Accessed 18 May 2023].

See Note 1.

One of them referred to themselves as ‘We, the united voice of people, communities, and organizations from Burma and around the globe.’ See Burma Campaign UK/ALTSEAN-Burma et al. (2009), ‘Calling for Genuine Political Reconciliation Before Elections in Burma’, [online] 10 December 2009, Available at: http://burmacampaign.org.uk/collective-statement-on-2010-elections [Accessed 18 May 2023].

‘Examining the wider reality of Burma’s elections: perspectives from stakeholders on the ground’, 2 November 2010, Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, Bangkok. A representative of the Karen Women’s Action Group was among the other speakers.

A 17-minute documentary with this title produced by Burma Partnership can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=agq2_kI0HqE [Accessed 18 May 2023].

As conveyed by a woman from Mon State, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

Rakhine man from Yangon, 22 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, November 2010.

Woman from Shan State, 31 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Man from Kachin State, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Man from Kachin State, 35 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Interview conducted in Thailand in 2011.

See Note 6.

In this quote, border-based groups are equated to the democracy movement. This shows that the boundaries of the movement were rather fluid. Most (but not all) of the participants in this training indeed came from an ethnic nationality organization on the Thai border.

See Note 6.

Muslim man from Yangon, 33 years old. Interviewed in Yangon, February 2011.

In a concept paper, the objectives of the campaign were phrased as follows: (1) for more governments to support a Commission of Inquiry; (2) for those governments that already expressed support to take concrete steps to bring about the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry; (3) for a UN resolution to include language establishing a Commission of Inquiry; (4) for governments that will not support a Commission of Inquiry to refrain from obstructing its establishment; (5) to promote greater understanding and/or support among civil society, the public and non-state armed groups for a Commission of Inquiry; and (6) for media to amplify the call for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry.

Interview conducted in Thailand, July 2011.

Burman man from Yangon, 27 years old. Interviewed in Chiang Mai, October 2010.

Part of this chapter was previously published in Kosem, S. (2016) Border twists and Burma trajectories: perceptions, reforms, and adaptations, Chiang Mai: Chiang Mai University, Center for ASEAN Studies. Reproduced here with the permission of the copyright holder.

See Purcell’s (1999: 70–6) discussion of David Korten on four ‘generations’ of NGO strategies described earlier.

Japan, which is one of the largest providers of development assistance to Myanmar, may be considered either Western, Eastern or Asian, depending on one’s definition. As detailed in this chapter, its assistance has been distributed primarily through (inter)governmental agencies. However, see Watanabe (2014) for a notable exception.

In 2012, Petrie returned to the country at the invitation of the Myanmar government to lead the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, described later in the chapter.

The sentences were later converted to prison terms, and the men were released as part of an amnesty in 2005.

According to figures cited by International Crisis Group (ICG, 2008), the average assistance to comparatively poor countries in 2006 was $58 per person, and even other countries with repressive governments received between $21 (Zimbabwe) and $63 (Laos) per person.

As evidenced by the title of a press conference by General Khin Nyunt in 1997: ‘Some Western powers have been aiding and abetting terrorism committed by certain organizations operating under the guise of democracy and human rights by giving them assistance in both cash and kind’ (quoted in Callahan, 2010: 64).

In line with many other Western countries, the Netherlands opened a business mission in 2013 and a full embassy in Yangon in 2016.

In 2012, the World Bank foresaw a ‘triple transition’ in Myanmar: from military rule to democracy, from conflict to peace, and from a centrally managed to a market economy (in McConnachie, 2022).

They issued an open letter to the Norwegian ambassador expressing disappointment with the lack of adequate civil society consultation. See Eurasia Review (2012), ‘Burma: Open Letter to Norway Ambassador Nordgaard on MPSI Consultation’, [online] 30 August, Available from: https://www.eurasiareview.com/30082012-burma-open-letter-to-norway-ambassador-nordgaard-on-mpsi-consultation [Accessed 18 May 2023].

The Joint Peace Fund still exists at the time of writing but has sized down. The initiative started with 11 donors and the current website mentions eight (Canada, the European Union and six European countries); see https://www.jointpeacefund.org [Accessed 18 May 2023].

In April 2020, UNHCR estimated the official number of refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar at 859,000 in Bangladesh, 178,990 in Malaysia and 93,227 in Thailand (McConnachie, 2022: 664). These numbers are likely an underestimate of the total number of refugees and have gone up significantly since the 2021 military coup.

These events, perhaps not entirely coincidently, took place around the very sensitive 2014 census process which was expected to influence the official population numbers in Rakhine State (Ferguson, 2015).

Personal observation at ICC meeting in The Hague, December 2022.

These various perspectives were reflected in the naming and framing of the situation, which was referred to alternately as Rakhine problem, Rohingya question (or, in nationalist terms, Bengali question), Rohingya crisis, or genocide.

Muslim man from Yangon, 33 years old. Interviewed in Yangon, February 2011.

Interviewed in The Hague, February 2015.

Personal observation, reported in Matelski (2015, 2016).

The page of the Paung Ku Platform has since changed to https://www.pkforum.org [Accessed 18 May 2023].

The NLD won 83 per cent of the seats in parliament, whereas the military’s USDP won only 7 per cent.

Daily briefings on casualties and arrests since the coup can be found on www.aappb.org [accessed 18 May 2023]. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), which has emerged as the main source of numbers on post-coup violence, estimates the actual number of deaths to be twice as high as reported, since they only count those cases they can fully identify and corroborate (APHR, 2022). Min Zaw Oo and Tønnesson (2023) put the number of post-coup civilian casualties by mid-2023 at over 6,000.

Amnesties to date were issued in February, April and October 2021, in November 2022, and in April and May 2023. A number of released political prisoners were instantly re-arrested.

Webinar ‘The Myanmar crisis: is there light at the end of the tunnel?’ organized by Forum-Asia, Progressive Voice and ALTSEAN-Burma, 3 November 2022. The number of airstrikes by the military in the first two years since the 2021 coup is estimated to be over 1,400, according to Mizzima (2023).

See also other articles in volume 27(1) of the Journal of Burma Studies issued in 2023, which is dedicated to the gender dynamics in anti-coup resistance and in Myanmar society more generally.

A full list of ministers appointed by the NUG is available at https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/ [Accessed 18 May 2023].

One of the largest international fundraising initiatives is Mutual Aid Myanmar (www.mutualaidmyanmar.org), an initiative by Tun Myint, a US-based academic from Myanmar, together with the American academic James Scott and the Thai academic Chayan Vaddhanaphuti. As of mid-2023, they report having sent $833,000 to over 16,000 CDM participants in Myanmar.

One month earlier, his brother had been killed after his affiliation as advisor to the NUG became known.

Secession is another aspiration among some of the ethnic nationalities, though it has not received much attention in post-coup reporting.

See 638 Civil Society Organizations (2022) ‘Letter to the UN Secretary General: Regarding UN Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Other Entities Engagement with the Military Junta’, Progressive Voice, [online] 23 September, Available from: https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2022/09/23/un-agencies-funds-programmes-and-other-entities-engagement-with-the-military-junta/ [Accessed 18 May 2023].

See https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/ [Accessed 18 May 2023].

See Twitter message by ‘FreeKachin’, 26 July 2022. Available from: https://twitter.com/FreeKachin/status/1551750179811987458 [Accessed 18 May 2023].

Online report launch “Seeking Effective Assistance for a Future: Reflections of Local Advocacy Organisations in Myanmar”, Pandita Development Institute, 26 October 2022.

A side campaign has been started on social media against the existence of ‘manels’: (near) all-male panels of experts, whether Burmese or foreign, that continue to dominate discussions on Myanmar.