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Drawing on unique access to prominent policy makers including ministers, senior civil servants, local authority directors, and the leaders of children’s sector NGOs, Purcell re-examines two decades of children’s services reform under both Labour and Conservative-led governments.
He closely examines the origins of Labour’s Every Child Matters programme, the Munro review and more recent Conservative reforms affecting child and family social workers to reassess the impact of high profile child abuse cases, including Victoria Climbié and Baby P, and reveal the party political drivers of successive reform.
This chapter identifies two overarching narratives on children’s services reform in previous research and makes the case for more in-depth research drawing on public policy theory and data collected through elite interviews. Firstly, policy reforms are often seen to follow high profile child abuse inquiries and associated media generated scandals. Secondly, the collapse of the post-war social-democratic consensus, and the subsequent dominance of neo-liberal economic and social policies, has also been highlighted as a key driver of reform. It is argued that neither of these perspectives takes full account of party-political differences and ideological tensions in English child welfare policy, or the role of individual policy actors or organisations in driving reform. Drawing on competing theories of the British policy-making process it is argued the roles played by politicians, civil servants and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) need to be considered. Details of the research process including those interviewed is provided.
This chapter discusses the development of children’s policy during the early years of the Labour Government focusing on the reform priorities of the Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Chancellor Gordon Brown. Blair’s key children’s policy priorities were education reform and tackling ‘problem’ young people. Alongside this the Brown led Treasury pursued a ‘progressive universal’ approach to reducing child poverty involving reform of tax and benefits and investment in public services. It is argued that the Treasury’s control over the departmental spending review process provided it with a more effective lever to influence policy-making in Whitehall departments compared to No 10. It is also argued that the Treasury turned to representatives of children’s sector NGOs to bolster the case for tackling child poverty within government and to act as an alternative source of policy expertise to departmental civil servants and local statutory agencies perceived to be resistant to reform. It was during this period that the Treasury’s flagship Sure Start programme was initiated.
The Labour Government framed structural reforms to English local government, initially proposed in the Every Child Matters Green Paper published in September 2003, as a direct response to the findings and recommendations of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry chaired by Lord Laming. This narrative is challenged in this chapter and the next. In this chapter it is argued that politically pre-determined proposals for structural reform reflected concern amongst the Labour leadership and senior ministers regarding the perceived slow pace of delivery for key government initiatives. The case for structural reform to improve the integration of statutory children’s services agencies was first made following an inter-departmental review of policy on young people in 2000, chaired by the then Home Office Minister Paul Boateng. On the day that the Inquiry was published in January 2003, the Secretary of State for Health Alan Milburn launched a children’s trust pilot programme to promote the commissioning of children’s services from a more diverse range of providers including those in the private and voluntary sectors. This was framed as a direct response to Lord Laming’s report even though the Inquiry had not considered any such proposal.
This chapter highlights the political drivers of Labour’s structural reforms to English local government through an examination of the Every Child Matters Green Paper and the subsequent passage of the Children Act 2004. It is argued that the initiation of the Green Paper chaired by Paul Boateng, then Chief Secretary to the Treasury, was not a response to the Victoria Climbié Inquiry. Safeguarding and child protection policies did not receive the explicit prioritisation that Lord Laming had called for. Labour’s structural reforms were designed to address concerns relating to the delivery of a broader range of policy priorities incorporating health, education and crime and anti-social behaviour. Moreover, social services and social work were largely overlooked under the new structural arrangements with the focus being primarily on the early intervention and preventative responsibilities of universal services including schools and health service providers. The chapter also discusses the involvement of children’s sector NGOs in the development of Labour’s reforms and how opposition to structural reform was ultimately ignored.
This chapter discusses the implementation of Labour’s ‘Change for Children’ programme following the passage of the Children Act 2004 during Blair’s final years as Prime Minister. Under the new structural arrangements every English local authority was required to merge education and children’s social care services to create a single children’s services department under the leadership of a Director of Children’s Services. However, it is argued that tensions between No 10 and the Treasury over social policy and public service reform in this period served to constrain the implementation of the new arrangements. Firstly, Blair’s prioritisation of greater school autonomy pulled against the focus on the integration of children’s services and accountability to children’s services and children’s trusts. Secondly, Blair’s perspective on youth services and the prioritisation of policies to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, ran counter to the principle of early intervention and the provision of positive activities for young people under the ECM framework.
This chapter discusses the development of children’s policy in the final years of the Labour Government after Gordon Brown became Prime Minister and his close ally Ed Balls was appointed Secretary of State in the renamed Department for Children, Schools and Families. The subsequent publication of the Children’s Plan effectively marked a relaunch of the ECM reform programme placing it on equal footing with the Department’s more established education policy agenda. Furthermore, Blair’s authoritarian perspective on crime and anti-social behaviour was superseded by a stronger focus on early intervention and the provision of positive activities for young people. However, competition from a resurgent Conservative Party under the leadership of David Cameron placed new pressures on the Labour Government in the run-up to the 2010 general election. Moreover, it is argued that Cameron’s used the Baby P scandal of late 2008 to highlight Labour’s neglect of child protection and social work and promote the Conservatives’ ‘Broken Britain’ narrative on social policy.
This chapter focuses on the overarching economic and social policy priorities set by the leaders of the Coalition and Conservative-led Governments. The prioritisation of deficit reduction, to be achieved primarily through severe cuts to public spending, had major implications for all areas of social policy. The chapter considers how, in this context, promises made by the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron to improve social justice, and by the Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg to address social mobility, were not adhered to. This includes a discussion of Coalition and Conservative policies on welfare reform that had major implications for children and families. The chapter also highlights the further downgrading of social policy after the EU referendum, as the task of delivering Brexit came to dominate the public policy agenda.
This chapter and the next consider the development of children’s services policy since 2010, including key changes introduced by the Conservative Secretary of State Michael Gove. From the outset it was clear that schools reform would be the overriding priority for the renamed ‘Department for Education’. Moreover, under Gove’s Academies and Free Schools programme the broad emphasis on child well-being and the integration of children’s services, under Labour’s ECM framework, was largely abandoned as schools were afforded greater autonomy from local authority children’s services. Furthermore, the prioritisation of schools’ reform meant that services such as children’s centres and youth services bore the brunt of spending cuts, notwithstanding the Prime Minister David Cameron’s proclaimed commitment to the refocusing of early intervention services. In this context, the DfE distanced itself from the restructuring and hollowing-out of early intervention services at the local level, and NGOs campaigning in this area were largely ignored.
This chapter discusses the development of the Coalition and Conservative Governments’ reform programme for child and family social work. Initially, the new Conservative children’s minister Tim Loughton sought to build on the work of the profession led Social Work Task Force (discussed in chapter 7), belatedly set-up under Labour after the Baby P case. This included the commissioning of the Munro Review of child protection. However, after two years Loughton was replaced as children’s minister and the Secretary of State Michael Gove initiated a new, more centrally driven, reform programme. Key policy developments included the reform of social work training, regulation and a new national ‘learning infrastructure’. Controversial plans to promote the increased outsourcing of child protection services to the private and voluntary sector were also pursued in the face of strong opposition from social work representatives.
