necessary; replacing some of the existing narratives of post-industrial capitalism, and its operating principles, with an alternative set of narratives and principles. Figuratively speaking, rather than trimming a hedge or tree – a process of curbing excess through intervention – this view on sustainability encourages that we should sow, and grow, alternative seeds (operating principles) that will yield alternative organisms (systems). Based on these sketches, the chapter argues that while express linkages between corporate governance and sustainability are a relatively
need to retain top talent. Will post-corona capitalism focus on shareholder value or on the public responsibility of companies? Corporate governance in different models and phases of capitalism We can explain the competing rationales behind this controversy by linking them to various themes in Comparative Political Economy; namely, the discussions on financialization and on corporate governance in different types of capitalism ( Clift, 2014 : 230–56; Menz, 2017 : 146–77; Vermeiren 2021 : 118–46). The process of financialization of capitalism has unfolded
offer to discussions on the future of work, while also highlighting how organizations like dOrg innovate long-standing cooperative governance structures. Through a case study of this transnational collective, I describe how its governance structure innovates upon, and departs from, Rothschild and Whitt’s (1989 , pp 62–63) two ideal types of organization – the bureaucratic organization and the collectivist-democratic organization. I then go on to demonstrate how dOrg addresses agency problems by way of what I call corporate governance-by-design ( Mannan, 2018 , p
do this, I will use the simple model of a firm adapting its corporate structure to the opportunities offered by the evolving legal rules in an international economy. This will lead us to a reassessment of the necessity to differentiate firms from corporations and to insist on the importance of the rules of corporate governance and of accounting in a globalized world. *** Although the legal features of business corporations are hardly considered in classical economics, the use of business corporations to legally structure real-life large firms is universal
’, PoliticsHome , [online] 22 September, Available from: https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/serco-contract-tracing-concentrix [Accessed 26 February 2024]. Staton, B. (2019) ‘Outsourcing of duty solicitors suffers call centre ‘meltdown’’, The Financial Times , [online] 29 August, Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/9e39d590-ca6b-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f [Accessed 28 February 2024]. Issues in corporate governance The internal governance of the service provider can exacerbate problems in incomplete outsourcing contracts and incumbency situations
), when companies do choose to prioritize value extraction for their shareholders, there is currently little in the UK’s default legal provisions that prevents them from doing so. Coupled with a permissive wider regulatory environment and corporate governance framework (see further Chapter Two ), this legal design can act as enabler of a financialized corporate governance model. But in a public outsourcing context, financialized corporate governance has the concrete effect of widely misaligning the incentives of public and private partners (again, see the discussion
This important volume steps beyond conventional legal approaches to sustainability to provide fresh insights into perhaps one of the most critical global challenges of our time.
Offering analysis of sustainability at land and sea alongside trade, labour and corporate governance perspectives, this book articulates important debates about the role of law. From impacts on local societies to domestic sustainable development policies and major international goals, it considers multiple jurisdictional levels.
With original, interdisciplinary research from experts in their legal fields, this is a rounded assessment of the complex interplay of law and sustainability—both as it is now and as it should be in the future.
and managers can once again be characterised, partnership-style, as ‘fit[ting] the definition of a pure agency relationship’. 69 Contractual theory thus defines corporate governance as a simple ‘agency problem’: how do we align the interests of managers (the agents) with those of shareholders (the principals) so that the former pursue the exclusive interests of the latter? What is the purpose of this contorted and, at times, bizarre theorising? The answer is that conceptualising the corporation in this way is thought to deal with the tricky questions about
on the euro-crisis and the decline of Social Europe (Busch et al, 2013; Degryse et al, 2013; Hacker, 2013; Hillebrand, 2013; Crespy and Menz, 2015; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2015; Romano and Punziano, 2015) and, more broadly, to the study of the constitutionalisation of neoliberalism (Gill, 1998; Brenner et al, 2014; Gill and Cutler, 2014; May, 2014). The chapter draws on empirical evidence capturing the type and extent of regulatory changes in the fields of industrial relations, corporate governance and the coordination of macro-economic policy in the EU