Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state.
Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police.
Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.
America has been at war for most of the 20th and 21st centuries and during that time has progressively moved towards a vicarious form of warfare, where key tasks are delegated to proxies, the military’s exposure to danger is limited, and special forces and covert instruments are on the increase. Important strategic decisions are taken with minimal scrutiny or public engagement.
This compelling account charts the historical emergence of this distinctive tradition of war and explains the factors driving its contemporary prominence. It contrasts the tactical advantages of vicarious warfare with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.
95 5 Corruption in Afghanistan: External intervention and institutional legacy Introduction The first part of this chapter sets the scene by describing the role of external intervention in Afghanistan post-2001. Intervention consists of international liberal and security interventionist policies. The liberal peace thesis was dictated by COIN and short-term peace to pursue US foreign policy and coalition support of eradicating the Taliban from power. It is argued that the trade-off as part of political bargaining has resulted in Northern Alliance warlords
-Taliban Afghan combatants, namely the Tajik- led Northern Alliance, to fight the Taliban. These phases of regime changes and favouring of previous powerful groups, as assessed in Chapter 5, have resulted in political and warlord alliances, and many warlords and Tajik officers were brought back as senior politicians or senior police and military staff. As a consequence of inducement and coercion spoiler management, patronage from trail elites, the new patronage-based systems with the Karzai family and Northern Alliance warlords (due to favouritism from the Bonn Agreement
complex when Iranian President Khatami visited India. The trip was consequential, as both countries agreed that their strategic outlook was in harmony with each other and needed to be further boosted through strong economic engagement and defence ties ( Alam, 2004 ). This proximity between India and Iran was built upon a similar strategic viewpoint over Afghanistan. India had always been averse to Pakistani influence within Kabul and built strong connections within elements of the Northern Alliance, which were, in turn, also close to Iran ( Ramana, 2012 ). These
corrupt mujahedeen insurgencyand controlled much of the country, although mujahedeen forces associated with Northern Alliance forces never fully conceded. Upon coming to power, the Taliban embarked on some land reforms, including returning stolen lands. The Taliban relied heavily on revenue from the poppy trade but imposed harsh taxes on farmers and traders ( Rashid, 2010 ). Economic development declined further under Taliban rule. Externally assisted state building after 2001 The state was profoundly dysfunctional in 2001 as a result of these misguided historical
corruption in the Afghan police force and state, initially focusing on post-2001 external intervention. Conditions in the Afghan state and political bargaining with international assistance have resulted in patronage and, debatably, systemic corruption. After the forced removal of the Taliban, the Bonn Agreement in late 2001 triggered a political bargaining process with Northern Alliance warlords who then entered former President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet in government. The use of prevailing patronage networks empowered local warlords to assist US-backed coalition
-based structures of patronage during the late 1980s to early 1990s remain in relation to the access granted by strongmen of agricultural land for poppy cultivation, roads, and markets for opium trading to clients. A Director of a research organisation argued that the previous resistance of the Soviet invasion resulted in several Mujahidin factions in the north, which later become the Northern Alliance, with the purpose of defeating the Taliban in their southern strongholds, In the north before the war, when the Soviets invaded, this local Mujahidin – general commanders
Balkans, reliance on the Northern Alliance surrogate forces in 2001 had greatly complicated post-war politics by marginalizing majority Pashtun voices, and the newly empowered regional warlords would bedevil US efforts to build a functioning Afghan state. In the hubristic glow of victory, avenues for accommodations with the Taliban went unexplored and an early opportunity to forestall future conflict was missed.55 These factors contributed to the subsequent resurgence of the movement over the coming years.56 The follow-on battle against hardcore militants
