157 SIX Translating education: assembling ways of knowing otherwise Dave Bainton Introduction This chapter explores puzzles around ‘translation’, ‘global educational agendas’ and ‘policy transfers’ through a dialogue between theoretical considerations on translation and policy transfer, with ethnographic work carried out in rural communities in Ladakh, India. In an attempt to offer a critical voice to processes of global epistemic reorganisation, ‘translation’ is used as an approach that has the potential to break out of the straitjacket of the
55 CHAPTER FOUR Ways of knowing: everyday and academic knowledge school and home When I was at school in the 1950s, there were hard boundaries between school and home. At the beginning of secondary school (aged 11), I took a geometry set that had belonged to my grandfather into a mathematics class to show the teacher, and I was severely rebuked for showing off. I can still feel the embarrassment today, and I learned the hard lesson that out-of-school life should be kept separate from in-school life. This raises the issue of the difference between everyday
25 Part One: Ways of knowing We are using ‘ways of knowing’ to link the first five chapters of this book. By this, we want to indicate that when heritage is framed as a form of community research, it is produced through plural and interacting modes of understanding and making sense of the past in the present. The phrase ‘ways of knowing’ offers a nod to debates in anthropology and participatory and action research, which have drawn attention to knowing as an expansive and ongoing process that might rely as much on feelings, intuition, social
-evaluation is that it can be risky; it poses a personal and professional risk, in that it may expose a lack of quality in what you do, and, if handled badly, may be confrontational. We consider, however that it is worth the risks for the validation it provides of work in the community, and this is good for our visibility with employers, funders and the general public. Another disadvantage is that successful self-evaluation takes time and commitment, but we would argue that it is well worth the effort and is, indeed, essential, if we are committed to knowing the value of what
of protection, intervention and preventative measures. Te Riele (2006) argues that young people ‘at risk’ are perceived as being disconnected from family and society (a lack of social capital), as not knowing what to do with their lives (a lack of identity capital), and as not valuing or even rejecting the importance of education (lack of cultural capital). Taking a preventative approach to working with young people classified as ‘at risk’ focuses on the negative, on a deficit model, which has become a fascination of policy makers ( MacDonald and Valdivieso, 2001
Part Two Forms of knowing – participatory approaches
411 12 Models of Knowing and Understanding But one obstacle remains. Even after the two domains of the ethical and the epistemological are set apart, some argue that the latter should have priority. It is useless to be overly concerned with truthfulness, they claim, so long as one cannot know whether human beings are capable of knowing and conveying the truth in the first place ... Once again, the exalted and all-absorbing preoccupation with ‘truth’ then comes to nour ish the reluctance to confront falsehood. (Bok 1980: 9) This book began with three aims
This article plumbs the sounds of knowing, and not knowing, what is to be done. I search out these sounds as they percolate through various US political discourses, paying particular attention to the affective charge that attaches to knowing what is to be done, or not, that is, to the affects that are produced in, through and around knowingness and unknowingness. 1 In the shadow of pronouncements by all manner of those who know what is to be done – from conservative, moderate and liberal establishmentarians invested in existing power relations to armchair
curricula in the care sector (for example, Iliffe and Manthorpe, 2004 ; Hengelaar et al, 2018 ; Sunde et al, 2018 ; Caswell et al, 2019 ), in much of the literature, this is based on a standard understanding of what knowing is and how knowledges are produced. This standard understanding is underpinned by a prevailing view of knowing, including knowing in and through experience as a cognitive process of making sense of sense ( Gherardi, 2006 ; Harman, 2018 ). This article proposes alternative ways of understanding and exploring ‘good care’ that take as their
