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639 Policy & Politics vol 38 no 4 • 639-56 (2010) • 10.1332/030557310X539315 © The Policy Press, 2010 • ISSN 0305 5736 Key words: patronage • governance • public appointments • control • reward • state • capacity Final submission August 2010 • Acceptance August 2010 Think again: patronage, governance and the smarter state Matthew Flinders and Felicity Matthews The concept of ‘governance’ denotes a shift in the distribution of power within and beyond modern democracies and state systems. At the heart of this shift lies a normative preference for disaggregating

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qualification] almost completed, I was selected to be a chief officer.’ (Interviewee C61) 74 Leading policing in Europe Another officer noted that the days of succeeding solely through patronage were gone, at least in his country. Joining the race to the top might entail personal investment: ‘There is much competition to secure a place to study, and this requires agreement from your boss and from the Ministry of the Interior, as well as time allowed to do the study, some of your own money to support the learning, arrangements to cover your absence: you have really got

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context of Afghanistan. These components include: the structural causes of corruption; nepotism and patronage; state capture; and ethnic favouritism. Structural causes of corruption Systemic corruption concerns high-level or grand corruption. Like institutional corruption, systemic corruption concerns certain situations in a society or institutions that are entrenched with corruption from the senior to the lower levels due to lack of law enforcement and absent controls. It involves the relationship from top to bottom within an entire governmental structure

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and parliamentarians reaping parts of state resources, jobs and economic benefits. Hence, security and liberal peace ideals have enhanced systemic forms of corruption and patronage. Institutionalised corruption has permeated the major institutions of the state, including the police. The next section discusses institutional legacy, which covers the structural conditions of corruption within the police sector. This subsequently discusses what negative impacts corruption has had in the context of Afghan society and the police sector. Statebuilding, liberal

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125 7 Assessing the drivers of corruption within the Afghan police force Introduction The previous chapters mainly concentrated on aspects of prevention and corruption hindering police forces despite SSR and post-conflict police efforts. An examination of the structural conditions of corruption due to external intervention and the institutional legacy of patronage and conflict in Afghanistan ensued. The book has generated a theoretical framework, consisting of political, economic and cultural drivers (with the debate on the social construction of

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Instability and Insecurity in Post-Conflict Societies
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Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state.

Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police.

Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.

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Global and national economic policies have remained central to the poverty discourse in Uganda, as these policies have had direct impact on the country’s economic production and, at the micro level, on peoples’ livelihoods and psycho-social experiences of shame attached to their situations. Households have experienced poverty transitions with some moving out of poverty and others sliding into it. Poverty rates in Uganda fell from 56% in 1992 to 44% in 1997 and 34% in 1999/2000. This period was followed by one in which poverty rose to 38% in 2002/2003 before falling again to 31% in 2005/2006 (UNDP, 2011). According to the Uganda Household survey (2009/2010), poverty has dropped further, reaching a record low of 24.5% with 7.5 Million Ugandans living in absolute poverty by 2010. The chapter ends with a focus on how these patterns have been reflected in varying debates concerning marginalization, patronage, corruption and unequal “sharing of the national cake” among different ethnic groupings and regions, and on how shaming has been aimed at particular recipients of anti-poverty policies.

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required). They argued that both government policies and NGO activities lack the actual intention of poverty reduction. On the one hand, government policies are not favourable for the poor because of political interest/patronage. On the other hand, NGOs need funds to run their programmes and therefore have to depend on donors. The donors have their targets, agendas and emphases. NGOs have to ‘perform’ according to these targets to get funds rather than having the actual intent to reduce poverty. It was observed that the politicians seemed not to care about poverty

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that favoured anti- Taliban warlords in former President Karzai’s cabinet, due to the Bonn Agreement, which has made it difficult to combat corruption, patronage and state capture within the government and ministries. As a result of these practices of corruption, the consequences of corruption point to embedded corruption in the Afghan police sector that has hindered law enforcement, security, the rule of law and state effectiveness. This chapter begins with a critique of statebuilding efforts, and more narrowly police reconstruction in Afghanistan (and a

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Kabul stated that the MoIA focused on supporting the MCTF as an anti-corruption measure. The lack of awareness of the MCTF to combat serious forms of corruption can be complemented with several other shortcomings. The MCTF still lacks independence and the skills to investigate senior-level crimes (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2018: 11). Cronyism also impacts cases being dropped. CSTC-A has reported that investigators for the MCTF are under-qualified, some personnel are hired on patronage relations, leaders are susceptible to corruption and accountability

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