Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state.
Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police.
Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.
prevention strategy for the New York and New South Wales police forces. A prevention strategy to combat corruption in the police includes enforcing accountability with the aid of commissions of inquiry after a public scandal; police reform that includes institutional reform, community policing and the input of civil society organisations (CSOs); pay reform; a rotation strategy; and training. Commissions of inquiry Detection provides the details of the targets followed by an investigation prior to the final stage of sanctions, but police forces in corrupt countries
particular ethnic groups or individuals from certain regions who desire access to powerful power brokers in senior level commands ‘are not selectively posted’ to tremendously hazardous locations for extensive periods ‘without being rotated out’. Ethnic favouritism favoured Tajiks at the expense of Pashtuns in senior police positions, and police officers were recruited on the grounds of ethnicity and loyalty rather than merit (Ottaway, 2011: 40). A rotation strategy is required to ensure that commands are not controlled by Tajiks or another dominating ethnic group
strategies that are covered in this chapter. Low pay is regularly documented as a main cause of police corruption (Ivković, 2005b: 88). In many developing and war-torn Asian and African countries, the state police are frequently poorly salaried, which makes it difficult to pay for living costs, especially for those with larger and families. This chapter includes a variety of these cases. A rotation strategy involves deterring personal ties that are moulded with corrupt patronage nets and job favouritism to oblige a patron’s interests. Posting a police officer to a
traffickers, but the dismissal of 30,000 traffic police in Georgia also punished officers not involved in corruption. Other prevention strategies, as covered in Chapter 2, include pay reform to raise salaries, a rotation strategy every 3–5 years to mitigate police connections within vice locations, and enhanced training in ethics and integrity. 181 Conclusions Evaluating the drivers of corruption Before considering the three drivers of corruption, it is important to acknowledge that this book is also focused on the surveys, interviews conducted, the academic
