47 3 Security sector reform, post‑conflict reconstruction and police corruption in post‑conflict states Introduction Now that police corruption and prevention strategies have been covered, the purpose of this chapter is to explain how police reform fits within wider security initiatives based on political ideals. We begin by looking at the dynamics of SSR, and more narrowly police reform, to focus on rebuilding a police sector and reforms that include the justice sector. We then explore post-conflict reconstruction and the liberalist forms that dictate
can create a security vacuum, giving rise to security forces’ loyalty to local militias, forming a culture of warlordism, and increasing support for informal security networks and insurgent groups (Özerdem, 2010: S46). All these features of corruption are plainly evident in war-torn and conflict- stricken countries. Police corruption may persist due to shortcomings in security sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict reconstruction, namely securitisation post-9/11 and patronage. SSR became a later policy goal as part of the broader aims of post
officially more widely recognised as an effective approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction activities as they pertain to building and reforming security institutions after periods of extreme sexual violence in conflict. Security sector reform and transitional justice After conflict the security sector of states involved usually requires reform, particularly in arenas where security forces have been implicated in tactical rape and sexual violence. Security sector reform operations need to cover a range of strategies and actions: demilitarisation and
Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state.
Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police.
Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.
Côte d’Ivoire Ahead of the 2015 general election, the government of President Alassane Ouat- tara made some progress in security sector reform and improving discipline within the security forces. However, there was insufficient progress in strength- ening the judiciary, tackling corruption, or pursuing impartial justice for the seri- ous crimes committed during the 2010-2011 post-election period. The Ivorian government has failed to arrest any member of the pro-Ouattara Republican Forces implicated in the post-election violence, undermining hopes for meaning
progress was made in reaching a negotiated settlement, advancing justice for abuses, or addressing development chal- lenges. The withdrawal in May of Malian civil servants and soldiers from key towns in the north, following a brief resumption of hostilities, resulted in a rise in ethnic ten- sion, left large swaths of territory devoid of state authority, and led to a signifi- cant rise in banditry by unidentified gunmen. Meanwhile, there was little progress on security sector reform or the disarmament of fighters in the north. Malian authorities made little effort to
Kenya Kenya’s efforts to tackle a wide array of security threats have been marred by on- going patterns of serious human rights violations by Kenyan security forces, in- cluding extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Despite evidence of these abuses, the government rarely investigates or prosecutes abusive secu- rity officers. The government has been slow in implementing key reforms that were identified in 2008 as crucial to addressing Kenya’s political crisis , including land and ac- countability, and security sector reforms. There has been
Somalia Somalia’s long-running armed conflict continued to take a heavy toll on civilians in much of south-central Somalia. Warring parties continued to kill, wound, and forcibly displace civilians. Restrictions on humanitarian access exacerbated the human rights and humanitarian crises. Ongoing political infighting and three government reshuffles in three years, along with political maneuvering around implementation of federalism, de- tracted from justice and security sector reform progress. Tensions over creation of a new interim regional administration in
justice and security sector reform. Political efforts to establish fed- eral states fuelled inter-clan fighting in some areas. Abuses by Government Forces Civilians have been caught up in fighting between government forces and Al- Shabaab, skirmishes between government forces over control of checkpoints, and in inter-clan fighting over land and over the haphazard and politicized cre- ation of federal states. They have become casualties of indiscriminate attacks by government forces in their heavy-handed responses to public protests and rebel attacks. On December 13
This chapter analyses the Modi government’s management of national security. It explores the role played by both inherited Hindu nationalist and newer understandings of India’s role as a potential ‘net security provider’ and ‘leading power’. It examines the government’s handling of India’s relations with China and the United States, as well as with Pakistan. And it addresses the vexed issue of security sector reform and military modernisation. It argues that despite considerable ambition and a concerted and largely successful attempt to build a stronger partnership with the US, Modi’s India struggled to come to terms with the sheer scale of the task of extending and leveraging the country’s hard power.
