Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state.
Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police.
Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.
perceive corruption as being ‘a low-risk, high-reward activity’ even if detected due to non-severity of penalties (Quah, 2011: 14). Weak law enforcement results in a low chance of being caught and arrested in corrupt practices. A political economy approach also includes coping mechanisms for low-paid civil servants, judges and law enforcement actors (Pugh, 2013: 91). This coping strategy leads to survival-based corruption to supplement low incomes. Narayanan (2000: 57) similarly argues that the roots of corruption derive from low pay within the public sector and
considerably decrease survival-based corruption in the AUP. The structured interviews conducted in 2016 with 50 NCOs and a few lower-ranked police officers also reiterates the importance of pay reform, with many respondents stating that ‘pay reform should be implemented fast’ and to all. On the one hand, it is feasible for pay reform to curb petty corruption in the low AUP ranks. On the other hand, systemic corruption, state capture and clientelism will persistently be unopposed with such a linear strategy. Therefore, raising the wages of Afghan police officers can
positive impact on reducing petty forms of corruption, such as bribery and roadside stops, if it is part of a linear anti-corruption strategy. Pay reform – if complemented with better detection and more robust sanctions – has the potential to reduce survival-based corruption such as bribery and extortion and engagement in organised crime. However, it does not challenge clientelism and corrupt patronage networks that entice police officers to work in vice areas enriched with drugs, prostitution or gambling. Positioning police officers in other jurisdictions can be
, increased pay in the lower ranks of the Afghan police could, to an extent, circumvent survival-based corruption. In criticism of increasing wages, van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001: 324) have verified, with an extensive cross-comparative study, that increasing the pay of public sector staff, principally civil servants, actually has a negative correlation to the low wage hypothesis. A study conducted by Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015: 24–5) suggests that an increase in wages within the Ghanaian police force intensified further corruption because efforts and the
should be cost-free.62 Research conducted in the civil service has exposed that low wages are a focal cause of corruption, because they induce public administrators to complement wages by extorting bribes, whereas increased pay under the ‘fair wage- corruption hypothesis’ can lessen survival-based corruption that may not be costly for governments (van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997: 41). Pay reform has been attempted as a strategy to combat these economic drivers of corruption, which will be discussed in the following chapter on remedies to curb corruption. It can
