Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state.
Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police.
Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.
Austerity is not always one-size-fits-all; it can be a flexible, class-based strategy taking several forms depending on the political-economic forces and institutional characteristics present.
This important book identifies continuity and variety in crisis-driven austerity restructuring across Canada, Denmark, Ireland and Spain. In their analysis, the authors focus on several components of austerity, including fiscal and monetary policy, budget narratives, public sector reform, labor market flexibilization, and resistance. In so doing, they uncover how austerity can be categorized into different dynamic types, and expose the economic, social, and political implications of the varieties of austerity.
This volume analyses the impact of globalization on civil service systems across the Middle East and North Africa.
A collaboration between practitioners and academic public policy experts, it presents an analytical model to assess how globalization influences civil servants, illustrated by case studies of countries where there has been an increased engagement with international actors. It demonstrates how this increased interaction has altered the position of civil servants and traces the shifting patterns of power and accountability between civil servants, politicians and other actors.
It is an original and important addition to debate about globalization’s role in transnational public administration and governance.
Why do democracies fall apart, and what can be done about it?
This book introduces students to the concept and causes of democratic decay in the modern world. Illustrating the integral link between public commitment to democratic norms and the maintenance of healthy democracies, it examines the key factors in decaying democracies, including:
• Economic inequality;
• Corruption;
• Populist and authoritarian discourse;
• Declining belief in political institutions and processes.
Drawing on real-world developments, and including international case studies, the book outlines the extent to which there is a ‘democratic recession’ in contemporary politics and shows how transnational networks and technology are impacting on this development.
respondents stressed that the principal practices of corruption persisted due to weak oversight and poorly implemented disciplinary procedures, and few had basic knowledge of the internal MoIA anti-corruption strategy. The majority of the structured interview respondents (44) claimed that weak oversight and implementation of disciplinary procedures were the highest main causes of police corruption, and 26 respondents were not aware of MoIA anti- corruption measures. Robust oversight was prioritised as a major factor to deter police corruption. The perceptions of
This chapter is main analysis data. It specifically presents the empirical data collected in the field which includes interview responses on the problems with security sector reform, police reform, the rule of law and corruption. In addition, low-ranked police officer’s perceptions on corruption, recruitment, training, salaries and the cost of living are examined with responses on the survey and structured interviews conducted. All these reactions are illustrated via the theoretical framework that is based on the political, economic and cultural drivers of corruption. The political drivers reveal that meritocratic recruitment is severely tarnished from patronage, nepotism and favouritism and police officers retain loyalty to local commanders and warlords rather than the state. In addition, criminal entities have captured main parts of the state to entice political elites in illicit drug-trading which has hindered anti-corruption investigations and promoted cronyism to protect political elites from serious forms of corruption. The economic drivers show that low pay intensifies petty forms of corruption, namely bribery and roadside extortion, to supplement income. The cultural drivers infer that pride, motivation and sense of mission are lacking in the current Afghan police force and unprofessionalism is a main meaning of police corruption.
This is another theoretical chapter that generates a framework to thread through the context of Afghan policing. Theories related to a political economy approach to examine the interrelationship between bureaucratic agents and economic elites and the coping strategies of poorly waged public officials and police officers. This theoretical basis informs some aspects of the political and economic drivers of corruption. The political drivers specifically cover systemic corruption which is when corruption becomes institutionally embedded from the top to the lower levels. In addition, patronage, nepotism and ethnic favouritism forms a ‘moral economy’ to deter meritocratic recruitment. Moreover, state capture occurs when main parts of the state are infiltrated by narrow criminal and affiliated political interests for profit making, usually with illicit markets. The economic drivers are focused on corruption as a means of economic necessity, namely low pay, and opportunities to engage in corruption due to weak oversight or limited sanctions if detected for malpractice. The cultural drivers cover culture, motivation and the socialisation of behaviour within police forces and specific anti-corruption training that can help to mitigate police corruption.
Committee on Energy (SCE), to oversee energy transmission ( UK Parliament, 2020 : 164). As with the new Office for Environmental Protection, some have suggested that the SCE may have weaker oversight powers than the EU equivalent ( Moore and Jordan, 2021 ). The UK has also had to create a domestic nuclear regime, expand the Office for Nuclear Regulation to oversee it and must also now maintain a direct relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency ( Etherington, 2020 ). Lastly, on access to funds, the UK lost access to EIB and EU structural funds. It has, in
political, economic and cultural drivers inform corruption in the Afghan police force. Pay reform has the latency to curb petty corruption to supplement low wages for survival, but incentives for honest behaviour and anti-corruption remain futile. Low pay, bribery or roadside extortion and weak oversight were expressed by the police respondents as the main causes and practices of police corruption. In relation to political drivers, patronage and job buying in recruitment occurs, and the police remain loyal to informal figures rather than the state (Singh, 2014
). There is not a consensus in the literature however, that corruption causes democratic breakdown. Here, however, we lay out arguments for how corruption can cause democratic backsliding by exploring several potential issues. Corruption is both a symptom and a cause of democratic decay. It is symptomatic of weak oversight institutions and non-transparent decision-making (Power and Taylor, 2011). Corruption undermines the principles of democratic equality, openness and accountability (Dahl, 2008c). The effect of these weak regulatory institutions is that laws are
