Our growing, multidisciplinary International Development list – now featuring almost 80 titles – includes leading researchers in the field including Jo Boyden, Pádraig Carmody, Gustavo Esteva, Garth Myers and David Simon and supports decolonial thought, indigenous research and transdisciplinarity.
Building on our reputation for publishing on poverty, inequality and social justice, and our not-for-profit status, the list explores key social challenges including poverty, cities, infrastructure and urban development, migration and health, and covers the impacts of COVID-19 in the Global South.
International Development
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This chapter provides a core definition of the research university based on the concept of four particular duties. It then turns to the question of excellence. Do recent developments in research promote more excellent research or not. This is a pressing question since excellent research will be one of the planet’s only lifelines as climate change bites. Four issues are examined: over-publication, research culture, discovery research and levelling up
This chapter considers some of the main actors that go to make up a university, concentrating on the roles of the built environment, academics, technicians, contract research staff, postgraduates and administrators. There is a substantial digression on the growing role of online teaching.
This chapter continues from in surveying the different constituencies that go to make up a university, concentrating on students, parents, council and alumni. There is a substantial digression on freedom of speech.
New Populism is not so much about content but, rather, the feeling of aggrieved entitlement in search of content. This condition, established in Part II, requires a different understanding of cause than that used in class-forward accounts. This chapter introduces an alternative, non-linear model of cause, which asks how (on what energy) rather than why (for what reason). What animates New Populism, and how does it move—the body, and from one body and place to another, changing as it does so? Put simply, whose feeling is aggrieved entitlement; on whose behalf is it felt? The chapter suggests that this highly infectious feeling prefers the name of ‘The People’ to its own. It outlines the book’s claim that aggrieved masculinity is the beating heart of New Populism. Dominant manhood, wronged and endangered, is its animating figure.
This chapter checks the portrait rendered in the previous chapter for anti-populism, a condescending response to ‘The People’ that basically proves their point. Situated in the January 6 US Capitol insurrection, it takes a closer look at the ‘we’ who critique New Populism. Anti-populism is rejected as oblivious to its own implication in populism; namely, it induces aggrieved entitlement in the act of critiquing it. The chapter calls everyone to reflect on their participation in New Populism. Countering the usual depiction of populist uprising, it introduces the notion of downrising to reveal the fuller scope of contributors and complicities. Even the left plays a role, when casting ‘the base’ (rank-and-file supporters) as the new ‘white trash.’ In step with the mask-ulinity episode in Chapter 4, the chapter rereads the Capitol riot as evidence of the increasing communicability of feeling. Sensations of aggrieved entitlement are more in charge than most care to admit.
The work of Parts I and II bear fruit in Part III, which revisits the cause of New Populism. Most analysts point to socioeconomic and demographic changes as the decisive stimuli for the populist surge. This chapter systematically unravels that analysis of cause in three turns. It challenges economic (class-mainly), socioeconomic (a combination of class and cultural marginalization), and socioeconomic ‘plus’ (racial and religious resentments) explanations. Even when expanded beyond its reasonable limits, the concept of class cannot well explain New Populism. Class-forward analysis, any assessment that leads with socioeconomic unrest, breaks down.
For those who could use an introduction or refresher, this chapter describes what populism is and entails. Drawing on and distilling a large body of scholarship, it offers five “clues,” or vital signs, that populism is afoot: (1) a language of popular sovereignty (‘The People’ versus ‘the elite/establishment’), (2) antagonistic vibe as virtue, (3) a direct and intimate mode of leading and organizing, (4) a performative style that savors “flaunting the low,” and (5) an undeserving third party (an Other) with whom the elite/establishment are in cahoots.
Part IV explores how aggrieved masculinity continues to multiply exponentially and what to do about it. The chapter proposes to treat it as an actual, not merely metaphorical, pandemic of feeling. To start, we must admit what COVID-19 exposed: that manly grievance has become a public health problem. This chapter makes that case, demonstrating how violence motivated by aggrieved masculinity, often targeted toward Others, poses a generalized risk, as evident in US mass shooting patterns. Climate denial and destruction, also linked to aggrieved masculinity, endanger public health as well. The rise of New Populist “anger management” (from Chapter 10) exacerbates the public health threat by turning manly grievance into policy. Any residual hard–soft division—between class and culture wars, for example—is shattered by this chapter, which shows how New Populist culture wars endanger everyone, including the very men they seek to benefit.
This chapter delves into how aggrieved masculinity intensified after it was declared all but extinct. The chapter suggests that the online culture wars of the late 2000s and 2010s better illuminate the rise of New Populism than the socioeconomic and demographic shifts marked in Chapter 11, though all of these are involved. During this period, the “manosphere” (the online phase of anti-feminist men’s movements) became a major political player. The manosphere cultivated the focus on Western Man under siege and perfected the edgy, countercultural vibe that fuels New Populism today. The chapter identifies the manosphere as the ‘super-spreader’ of New Populism. This is neither technological determinism nor a linear account of cause (why, for what reason, or in response to what event). Instead, this is the version of cause introduced in Chapter 12 (how, or on what electricity, does something move). The manosphere propels New Populism’s global surge with a transnational economy of attention and amplification.
Is populism fueled by a feeling of manhood under attack? If gender is the impetus, are there better ways to respond? This book upends prevailing wisdom about contemporary populism. Whereas most attribute its global rise to socioeconomic shifts, this book makes the case for a different cause by taking seriously the prevalence of certain men and manly energies in today’s populist politics. Aggrieved masculinity is the shared feeling at the heart of these movements, and their worldwide outbreak should be reread accordingly—as a sign that a seething sense of “manly right, wronged” has gone viral and global. COVID-19 delivered a stark warning about this pandemic of manly outrage: It endangers public health. This book introduces “viral masculinity” as a novel way to meet that growing threat by tackling the deep connection of our social and physical worlds. Leading with gender without leaving class, race, and other vital factors behind, the book develops a new course of action toward populism today. It compels us to ask not what populism says, but how it spreads, and to realign our efforts accordingly. You need not know or care about gender to get invested in this analysis. You need only be invested in our common future.
