Abstract
President Rafael Correa (2007–17) was the leader of the Ecuadorian Citizens’ Revolution advanced by his movement Alianza País. Although a former critic of indefinite presidential re-elections, in 2014 Correa asked his bloc of parliamentarians to abolish presidential term limits. His request was approved and the constitution was amended. How can we account for Alianza País’ sudden decision to abolish presidential term limits, considering it had ratified these limits as recently as 2008? This article conducts a discourse analysis of the argument in favour of indefinite presidential re-elections in Ecuador. Courtesy of Lacanian psychoanalysis, in this article I argue that the Citizens’ Revolution’s shift can be fruitfully explained if we consider how the transgressive logic of enjoyment operates in ideology.
Introduction
This article analyses the discourse supporting the abolition of presidential term limits in Ecuador during the second presidency of the charismatic Rafael Correa (2013–17). This controversial reform was enshrined in a constitutional amendment in 2015, a reformation later overruled via referendum in 2018.
Dr Rafael Correa holds a PhD in economics. As one of the founding members of the left-wing movement Alianza País, Correa decided to run for the presidency in 2006 as the leader of the Citizens’ Revolution, Alianza País’ motto. His charismatic rhetoric opposed Ecuador’s traditional party system (partidocracia) and neoliberalism, becoming one of the several Latin American presidents that led the turn to the left in the 21st century: ‘These leaders, charismatic as they were, adopted new narratives opposing a “them” – often called oligarcas [oligarchs], roba-patrias [homeland-stealers], or golpistas [usurpers]’ (Ronderos, 2021: 47).
The triumphant Correa took office in 2007 and convened a constituent assembly to sanction Ecuador’s 20th constitution. Crafted by an official majority of deputies, and following the spirit of the Citizens’ Revolution, the 2008 charter ratified presidential term limits by permitting a maximum of two terms in office (Article 144 of the constitution).
However, the spirit underpinning the Citizens’ Revolution was undermined on 24 May 2014. During the State of the Nation speech, President Correa petitioned the legislative branch to abolish presidential term limits. As we shall see in this article, Correa highlighted that this request emanated from his movement and it entailed a dilemma for him. The official discourse justified the abolitionist reform on account of the ‘gestation’ of the ‘Conservative Restoration’ in Ecuador and Latin America in an interim period that saw the electoral victory of right-wing parties supported by non-elected actors such as the media. Some might argue that Correa’s justification stemmed from paranoid reasoning, a common phenomenon in politics. In fact, it has been suggested that ‘[p]aranoia is a “style” that … can be adopted by people pursuing a wide range of political goals, but it does not mean that they as individuals have paranoid personalities’ (Hofstadter, as cited in Richards, 2018: 21). Paranoid or not, President Correa’s request was approved by the legislature, as a result of which Article 144 of the constitution was amended, sanctioning this reform among others.
How can we account for Alianza País’ sudden decision to abolish presidential term limits, considering it had ratified these limits as early as 2008? In this article I proceed as follows. First, I discuss how the mainstream literature on presidential re-elections and that of charismatic leadership can answer my research question. After contextualising the constitutional amendment under discussion, I suggest we can contribute to our understanding of the Citizens’ Revolution’s unexpected expression of and longing for indefinite presidential re-elections by adopting a Lacanian approach to the grip of ideology. In particular, I speculate that Alianza País’ sudden shift can be explained, in part, in reference to the Lacanian concept of transgressive enjoyment (to be elaborated later in the article). In doing so, and in a manner that converges with McLaughlin’s perspective (2019: 18–19, 20), this article sidesteps the question of political sectarianism in order to focus on the passion underpinning the shift under discussion.
On presidential re-elections and the question of charismatic leadership
This section suggests plausible answers to my research question from the perspectives of rationalist, institutionalist, liberal and non-liberal approaches to presidential re-elections. This segment also reviews a part of the literature on charismatic leadership.
In recent years, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela abolished presidential term limits. In 2009, Venezuela adopted this reform through a constitutional amendment ratified via referendum. Without a plebiscite, Nicaragua (2014) and Ecuador (2015) approved this provision by means of a constitutional amendment authorised by the legislatures. Nicaragua (2009) and Bolivia (2017) paved the way for indefinite re-elections as a result of favourable judicial interpretations in contradiction to constitutional restrictions (Grijalva and Castro-Montero, 2019: 240–1).
The indefinite presidential re-election allowance is neither endemic to Latin America nor a new phenomenon. This concession was formally in force in the United States until its constitution was amended in 1951, as a result of which the limit of two presidential mandates was established. Before this reform, Franklin Delano Roosevelt served as president for four mandates. The spirit of the 1951 amendment ‘was to prevent the personalization of the executive branch through its prolonged occupation by any individual’ (Carey, 2003: 121).
Carey’s classic (2003) account systematises the views shared by many Latin American legislators on term limits as well as key ideas drawn from The Federalist Papers and Bolívar’s Selected Writings. Politicians favouring re-elections purport that this provision enhances democratic responsiveness and accountability by matching up voters’ incentives with those of incumbent presidents. But Stokes (2001) suggests that this thesis can be problematic. Her findings in Latin America show that certain presidents have been rewarded with another election (or by their parties) in spite of having failed to deliver their campaign promises, and on the condition that their policy shifts produced a solid macroeconomic administration (as cited in Carey, 2003). Furthermore, supporters of re-election claim that the latter prevents us from having ‘lame ducks’, namely, powerless presidents within their parties and in relation to other politicians due to their limited time in office: ‘Thus, allowing reelection may enhance presidential ability to construct and sustain legislative coalitions and to bargain effectively with politicians’ (Carey, 2003: 126). Other political actors argue that establishing constitutional restrictions on re-elections mutilates the citizens’ will and thus constitutes an antidemocratic practice (Carey, 2003: 126, 131–3).
Within this debate, there are those who fear the leaders’ ambition for power. The most common criticism of re-elections assumes that re-elected presidents will misuse the executive branch’s prerogatives to guarantee their permanence in office. This a potential risk that could lead to tyranny, a worry already addressed by the 1787 convention in the United States. There is also criticism of the non-consecutive re-election allowance. Some fear that this provision could spur incumbent presidents to foster their party’s failure in the following election to remain as the opposition’s leaders, paving the way for their ‘necessary’ return (Carey, 2003: 120, 127–8, 131).
In view of the foregoing discussion, how can we account for the Citizens’ Revolution’s sudden decision to abolish presidential term limits, considering it had ratified these limits as recently as 2008? From a rationalist and institutionalist perspective, it could be argued that Alianza País’ shift aimed to enhance democratic responsiveness and accountability by shortening the gap between electors and the elected president. In addition, it could be purported that this reform sought ways of building and sustaining stronger agreements between the executive and other branches of the Ecuadorian state. From a non-liberal stance, it could be maintained that the indefinite presidential re-election allowance strengthened Ecuador’s democracy, as it abolished a constitutional limitation to the sovereign’s will. By contrast, ‘[t]here are those who warn us that indefinite re-election weakens the electoral competition, undermines the separation of powers … and thus fosters the transition to authoritarianism’ (Serrafero, as cited in Grijalva and Castro-Montero, 2019: 228, own translation).
The subject of presidential re-elections can also be subsumed under the question of leadership. Although a very popular term, we are far from reaching a consensus as to what leadership is. In fact, approximately 66 per cent of the literature on leadership does not define this term, while the remaining literature offers multiple definitions (Rost, as cited in Alvesson and Spicer, 2012: 369). Given this lack of consensus, let us focus on charismatic leadership. Rafael Correa’s stable presidency (2007–17), the longest uninterrupted presidency in Ecuador since independence (El Universo, 2017), can be partly understood as a result of his renowned charisma. This term derives from the Greek charismoi, which means to please and free gift, the latter with a theological meaning (Arlotti, 2003: 64, own translation). Max Weber defines charisma as the ‘extraordinary quality … of a personality in virtue of which he/she is regarded as the possessor of supernatural strength’ (2005 [1922]: 193, own translation). According to Breslauer (2019: 128), Weber regarded charisma as revolutionary in nature and an inexorably momentary event to be supplanted by bureaucracy.
President Correa’s charisma can also account for Alianza País’ shift. I come back to this. Of note here is that this natural charm could have coexisted with other types of charisma, such as that obtained via Correa’s achievements, and/or the charisma stemming from the prestige of the presidential office (Peters, 2010).
As we have seen, rationalist, institutional, non-liberal and liberal approaches to presidential re-elections as well as the classic notion of charisma can offer answers to our question in their own right. Nonetheless, these perspectives show a lack of interest in the ideological process whereby leaders and followers transgress their officially affirmed stance. By this I mean the Citizens’ Revolution’s sudden shift from its founding position on presidential re-elections – enshrined in the constitutional limit of one re-election only – to the thesis on the indispensability of a particular leader. The lack of interest in this ideological process echoes a similar lack of expressed interest in followership studies. These have focused on the phylogenetic origin of followership; different types of followers; proposals on how to cultivate desirable followership roles for successful organisations; the followership–leadership virtuous or vicious cycles; and the relationship between personality traits and types of followers (see Kelley, 1988; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Agho, 2009; Popper, 2018; Alegbeleye and Kaufman, 2019; Kudek et al, 2020; Riggio, 2020).
Despite the above-noted distinction, in what follows I draw on psychoanalytic theory to argue that leaders and followers are best not understood as separate entities. Regardless of theoretical differences among post-Freudian schools, psychoanalysis allows us to account for the intertwined dynamic informing the leader–followership dyad (Yates and Weissmann, 2018). However, before I present my proposed Lacanian framework, it is helpful to contextualise the Ecuadorian reform in order to better appreciate the value of this particular psychoanalytic perspective.
The Citizens’ Revolution and the 2015 reform
This section provides an overview of Ecuador’s turn to the left, the 2014–15 quotations analysed, the legislators’ arguments, and the nature of my primary empirical sources.
On the emergence of the left-wing and stable Citizens’ Revolution
Ecuador has sanctioned 20 constitutions. This serves as a rather dramatic illustration of this country’s long-lasting history of political instability since independence (1830). Besides Correa’s stable presidency, his left-wing movement (Alianza País) also constituted the majoritarian force in the legislature from 2009 to 2017. How can we explicate Alianza País’ atypical popularity/stability in this highly unstable presidential system and beyond Dr Correa’s charisma?
Rafael Correa was part of the group of presidents that led Latin America’s turn to the left in the 21st century. The literature on the turn to the left has mainly explained this shift in terms of a disapproval of the economic reform implemented in this region under the guidelines of the Washington Consensus (Arditi, 2009; French, 2009; MacDonald and Ruckert, 2009, as cited in Basabe, 2017: 317). Ecuador’s 1999 financial crisis, which was devastating for the population, was partly influenced by both the 1994 neoliberal reform of the banking system and the 1998 international crisis. It can be argued that the Citizens’ Revolution’s atypical stability derives in part from its anti-neoliberal and thus popular discourse (Espinosa, 2010: 742).
However, as Basabe (2017) has noted, we need to consider that the left has not been a strong force in Ecuador’s parliament in the 1979–2007 period. Moreover, the implementation of the neoliberal reform in this country was weak compared to other Latin American nations. In addition, it is important to observe how the prices of oil skyrocketed (2007–14) during President Correa’s consecutive governments, facilitating the implemention of his popular policies. Ecuador’s turn to the left during Correa’s presidencies thus needs to be understood, at least in part, as a result of the atypical prices of oil on which the Ecuadorian economy depends, explaining to some extent Correa’s decision to run for a third and consecutive re-election, for which reason presidential term limits had to be abolished.
The 2015 constitutional amendment
On 24 May 2014 President Correa petitioned the legislature to amend the constitution to allow indefinite re-elections. This amendment required the support of two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly (MAs). Alianza País had more than this special majority on voting day, 3 December 2015 (Enmienda S/N (Enmiendas a la Constitución de la República del Ecuador) [ESN], 2015). According to a constitutional provision in force at that time, the eventual reform required a 12-month parliamentary interregnum between the first and second debate. During this pause, the official Specialised Committee had to promote nationwide the acceptance of the proposed reform (Primer debate de la Solicitud de Enmienda Constitucional [PD], 2014).
In this article I analyse Alianza País’ sudden expression of and longing for indefinite presidential re-elections at the representative level, a process in which Rafael Correa played a central role. The following discourse analysis pays special attention to President Correa’s 2014 State of the Nation speech, which incorporates the stance of Alianza País’ grassroots movement. I also analyse the collective opinion of the parliamentary bloc of Alianza País. I focus on those speeches that illustrate the following features of their discourse: the conflicted tone of the reform, on account of the Citizens’ Revolution’s transgression of its original stance on re-elections; Alianza País’ 2014–15 understanding of democracy; and the idealisation of Rafael Correa. The fact that I am leaving out those speeches that do not foreground these features may of course appear self-serving but this is done on account of space limitations. Even so, I contend that my targetted selection is representative of this revolution (Alianza País’ grassroots organisation, its main leader in the executive branch, and his comrades in the national legislature).
Also absent are the speeches made by the opposition, again largely for reasons of space. For this reason, however, a contextualising summary of the arguments for and against the reform is in order. The following were the main assertions implied or called upon by the MAs opposing the abolition of term limits: the liberal maxim of the rotation of democratic power, and the necessity to ask the citizens – via referendum – whether they wanted indefinite re-elections in Ecuador on account of its ‘altering’ the ‘nature’ of the polity. Conversely, the representatives of Alianza País supported the reform on the basis of the citizens’ ‘democratic rights’ to run as candidates and to elect their authorities without institutional restrictions. For the official stance, this meant ‘broadening’ the citizens’ democratic right to participate in politics. It was also argued that, as long as the people so decided, the indefinite re-election of someone guaranteeing the stability of an ‘excellent’ project was a democratic and legitimate practice (Continuación del primer debate de la solicitud de Enmienda Constitucional [CPD], 2014; PD, 2014; Segundo debate de la solicitud de Enmiendas Constitucionales [SD], 2015).
The corpus analysed in this article is in the public domain, all translations of quotations and paraphrasing being my own. While President Correa’s State of the Nation speech of 24 May 2014 is available online, the parliamentary debates are stored in Ecuador’s National Assembly (NA), comprising officially transcribed debates reproducing the arguments for and against the reform in question. The first debate commenced and terminated on 1 and 2 December 2014. The second and last debate began and ended on 3 December 2015. The minutes analysed include other matters also subjected to debate and reformed via constitutional amendments, such as indefinite re-elections for all elected authorities (CPD, 2014; PD, 2014; SD, 2015).
A psychoanalytic understanding of Alianza País’ shift
In this section I establish the theoretical bases to speculate that Alianza País’ shift from its original stance against re-elections to its support for the possible indispensability of a particular leader can be interpreted in part considering how enjoyment operates in ideology.
On the mythical jouissance and the grip of ideology
All the mystery is in the act. It is designed to hide something, namely, that not only does the murder of the father not open the path to jouissance [incestuous enjoyment] that the presence of the father was supposed to prohibit, but it, in fact, strengthens the prohibition. … That is why the important feature of Totem and Taboo is that it is a myth. … It is important to grasp what is embodied in this fault. (Lacan, 1997: 176, emphasis added)
The idea that the parricide in question ‘strengthen[ed] the prohibition’ of incest links enjoyment to the law and thus to its psychosocial dimension. In Seminar IV, Lacan interprets the ‘tyrannical’ Freudian myth in terms of the Name-of-the-Father. This myth relates to the Oedipus complex, which is intertwined with the castration complex. Thanks to castration, which is executed by the symbolic father, the infant is introduced to the realm of law (2016: 229, 365–9). Of note here is that, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis, ‘castration’ has an aftereffect in adults in general and in the realm of ideology in particular, a point to which I now turn.
As Hook (2017) puts it, libidinal enjoyment (in its various manifestations) influences the realm of the political. Here it is important to emphasise how jouissance does not equate to pleasure; in fact, it is blended with pain and linked to the death drive. More precisely, it is a kind of stimulation that subjects experience once the affective dimension reaches the beyond-the-pleasure-principle threshold. How, then, can we say that enjoyment might be operating in ideology? To discern the grip of a particular ideology, it becomes useful here to map out the prevalent modes of enjoyment contravening its professed goals, that is, the inconsistencies between the presentable symbolic formations of ideology and its disavowed libidinal components. In doing so, it is important to note that the libidinal aspects of ideology should not mislead us into thinking that enjoyment is reducible to an emotion (for example, anger, joy), or an ‘extra-discursive’ element related to the real without symbolic mediation. Instead, jouissance maintains a link to the symbolic order, as this is the field in which social limitations are instituted and disobeyed. ‘Jouissance can be thought of as subliminal in the sense that we are not fully conscious of – or willing to admit to – the thrills … we get in pursuing those activities that trigger libidinal intensity’ (Hook, 2017: 608, emphasis in original), activities that are excessive, transgressive par excellence, such as Freud’s totemic banquet. It is important to note, however, that enjoyment does not work on its own; for it is fantasy that frames the way subjects experience stolen enjoyment at the individual and collective level. ‘[I]nsofar as groups share fantasies about themselves (attributions regarding what is most precious about themselves, about what is their greatest threat of “castration”), then they have shared modes of jouissance’ (Hook, 2017: 606–14).
On Alianza País’ shift and its fantasmatic narrative
I suggest that this enjoyment emerging through the transgression of previously instituted symbolic limits can be discerned in Alianza País’ stance on presidential re-elections, as it transitioned from a liberal position (2007–8) to a non-liberal position (2014–15).
A community remains together because its members identify with one another via ideals such as ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. As noted earlier, however, psychoanalysis points to a complementary but counterveiling logic to this ‘official’ process of community identification. Counterintuitively, the union of a community also relies on its people’s identification with the enjoyment procured by a shared transgression of those ideals (Glynos, 2021: 7–8). Originally, Alianza País argued that other citizens – besides Rafael Correa – were capable of leading the Citizens’ Revolution. But this maxim, which was ratified in the 2008 constitution, was ‘self-transgressed’ through the officially proposed reform that abolished presidential term limits in 2015. Since this reform defied the spirit of the constitution crafted by the Citizens’ Revolution in 2007–8, we can expect to find a thrillingly conflicted (‘enjoyed’) tone accompanying the official discourse (to be shown in what follows).
Earlier, it was mentioned that fantasy structures the imaginary frame whereby subjects experience stolen enjoyment. The ‘us–them’ psychosocial dynamic typical of the ideological phenomenon brings to the fore the utility of the category of enjoyment in accounting for a supposed theft of something never possessed in the first place, but for which ‘they’ are often blamed and on to whom enjoyment is projected. In the case of racism, for example, it has been argued that ‘[w]hat we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack (“castration”) is original; enjoyment constitutes itself as “stolen”’ (Žižek, 1990: 54). In this scenario, fantasy entails the ‘promise to attain the mythical jouissance’, a promise predicated on a longing for fullness (Stavrakakis, 1999: 45).
This yearning for the mythical fullness, which arguably constitutes itself as ‘stolen,’ can appear as such across the ideological spectrum and beyond the phenomenon of racism. As I shall soon argue, President Correa and his bloc of parliamentarians shared a key fantasy, that of an unstoppable Citizens’ Revolution. Within this fantasmatic scenario, the beatific dimension of fantasy manifested itself through a speech promising a full harmony-to-come, that is, the ‘consolidation’ of an indomitable Citizens’ Revolution. But this consolidation could only occur if ‘the elites’ were contained through the abolition of presidential term limits. Here we see how the antagonistic other (in this case the figure adopting the non-revolutionary stance in Ecuador) is regarded as the potential ‘stealer’ of a fantasised fullness of enjoyment in politics. Conversely, the horrific dimension of fantasy became evident via a narrative foretelling an apocalyptic future (that is, ‘the Conservative Restoration’) if the named or suggested obstacle was not eliminated, namely, presidential term limits. We see, then, how this operationalisation of fantasy relies on the Lacanian notion of stolen enjoyment (cf Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 147, 149). And in what follows I chart how these shifts in the dimensions of fantasy and enjoyment appear in the speeches of key actors.
A discourse analysis of the Ecuadorian reform
The Citizens’ Revolution’s initial stance on term limits for all elected authorities
As the parliamentary committee in charge of the reform put it during the first debate, after independence and until 1979 the Members of the Ecuadorian Congress were allowed to run for office indefinitely. The 1979 [1978] constitution established the non-consecutive re-election allowance for parliamentarians, and the 2008 charter authorised only one re-election (consecutive or not) for all elected authorities (PD, 2014: 19, 21). In fact, in November 2007 President Correa shared his movement’s stance on re-elections with La Tercera, a media outlet from Chile. The leader of the Citizens’ Revolution was categorical: ‘Our stance is that only one re-election can be allowed, from the President to the town councillor’ (President Correa, as cited in El Universo, 2007, emphasis added). This ‘only one re-election’ maxim was enshrined in Article 114 of the 2008 charter prompted by the Citizens’ Revolution, whose deputies constituted the majoritarian force in the 2007–8 constituent assembly. When asked in January 2014 whether he was considering altering the constitution to run for a third consecutive presidential term in 2016, President Correa replied: ‘It would be very harmful if one person became so indispensable that the constitution had to be changed in order to affect the rules of the game. There are capable people [to take the lead]’ (as cited in La Nación, 2014). Relatedly, as Patricio Donoso MA reminded the plenary, in May 2013 President Correa had also stated: ‘I reject the re-election. It would be our gravest failure not to have one person to take the baton after having prepared young people for ten years, and it is not that I am going to take it’ (as cited in Donoso, 2014: 20).
On Alianza País’ sudden shift
Ecuador continues its struggle between the Citizens’ Revolution and the Conservative Restoration, which is gestating in the country and in the whole of Latin America. We must keep adjusting our institutions to the new reality, and we must prevent the return of the elites’ control. In its fourth Covention on May 1 … Alianza PAIS resolved to ask our bloc of parliamentarians to amend the constitution regarding the presidential re-election provision. … My stance – sincere, authentic, as people know me – was always contrary to it, or at the most informed by analysis and respite. After careful consideration and realising that sometimes only the lesser evil can be chosen, since, I insist, I believe in the stability of institutions, I have decided to support these initiatives. Thus, I request our bloc of parliamentarians … to amend the Constitution of the Republic to allow indefinite re-elections for all elected authorities. … With all liberty the Ecuadorian people will elect the continuity or rotation of their leaders. … I hope that some day this type of institutional change will no longer be necessary. (Correa, 2014: 11–13, emphasis added)
Alianza País’ sudden shift in favour of indefinite presidential re-elections was justified at its grass roots national convention, as articulated by President Correa, and later by his bloc of parliamentarians (discussed later in this article). For the Citizens’ Revolution, the adjustment of the Ecuadorian democracy to a context characterised by the ‘Conservative Restoration’ was necessary to prevent the return of the ‘elites’ control’, the latter a real possibility due to presidential term limits. This institution appears to be the indirect obstacle around which the official discourse elaborated the beatific dimension of fantasy. This type of fantasmatic narrative promises a full harmony-to-come, provided that the stealer of ‘our’ enjoyment is removed, a removal – through the abolition of presidential term limits – that would keep alive the Citizens’ Revolution. This narrative as well as Alianza País’ democratic decision on 1 May (that of Correa’s followers) prompted President Correa to request indefinite re-elections not only for presidents, but for all elected authorities.
The making of laws produces the very conditions of possibility for enjoyment. … When it comes to grasping the hold of an ideology upon subjects, look not simply to the meanings they produce but to how they enjoy. We should expect, furthermore, that their predominant modes of enjoyment often contradict many of their avowed moral or political beliefs. It is crucial then to prioritize points of contradiction between ideology in its presentable symbolic formations and its disavowed libidinal components. (Hook, 2017: 609–10, emphasis in original)
[W]e, the 100 parliamentarians of PAIS, hope that President [Correa] makes this decision [of running for president for a third consecutive term] … in the year 2016. … [T]here are personal motives that he needs to analyse. But let us hope that the President continues to be in command of the country because that will be beneficial for the homeland. (Issa, 2014: 213)
It is safe to argue that that the person ‘capable of representing values, expectations, wishes, and collective aspirations’ was Rafael Correa, at least for the parliamentarians of Alianza País in 2014. From the point of view of a classic approach to charisma, the Citizens’ Revolution’s sudden shift in favour of a non-liberal democracy speaks to the extraordinary attributes of those leaders regarded as essential for the continuation of a given political process. Therefore, according to this rationale, these personae deserve to be re-elected indefinitely. From a psychoanalytically informed perspective (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), these extracts – which complement Correa’s State of the Nation speech – allow us to grasp the shared fantasy of an irreplaceable leader for the consolidation of the Ecuadorian Citizens’ Revolution, a deliverable promise insofar as the obstacle of presidential term limits is abolished. Alianza País’ transgression of its ideal (that is, that no leader is indispensable within the Ecuadorian Citizens’ Revolution) bolstered the identification among its partisans inside the National Assembly. Alianza País’ transgression of its original ideal on presidential re-elections strengthened its unity, a non-rational phenomenon highlighted by Glynos (2021).
In the theoretical section I foregrounded that libidinal enjoyment needs to be understood in relation to other concepts, such as the death drive and the law. I would like to add another element to this analysis, that of the superego. This sheds light on a controversial punishment that followed the abolitionist reform under discussion. Within the realm of ideology, the superego can produce a twofold process. Once the subject identifies with the symbolic law, the superego commands her to enjoy the punishment of those law-breakers. And here we appreciate the obscene gratification underpinning in part the grip of ideology (Hook, 2017: 17–18). Maybe the latter psychosocial mechanism played its part in the punishment received by Fernando Bustamante MA, a former member of Alianza País. Unlike the block of parliamentarians cited earlier, Bustamante abstained from voting in favour of the constitutional amendment that abolished presidential term limits. The response was immediate. The Ethics Committee of Alianza País sanctioned Bustamante MA for his abstention, after which he was asked to resign the presidency of the parliamentary committee on International Relations (El Universo, 2016). Here we can appreciate how the official superego became the ambassador of the new law on indefinite presidential re-elections and thus punished the law-breaker. Whether or not the official superego and enjoyment played their part in this punishment, I cannot help but suggest a link between Hook’s (2017) theoretical contribution and this empirical speculation.
The abolitionist reform supported by the parliamentarians of Alianza País, which entailed the transgression of its original stance on re-elections, was seen as a blunt quest for unlimited power by the opposition. This created social unrest. By November 2015, amidst social protests for and against indefinite re-elections, the official stance had affirmed that the eventual constitutional amendment would include a clause preventing Rafael Correa from running for the presidency in 2016, while allowing him to do so from 2020 onwards (Agencia EFE, as cited in elDiario.es, 2015). The clause in question, the Second and Temporary Provision of the constitutional amendment, was actually sanctioned by the legislature in December 2015 (ESN, 2015).
This provision can be understood as the government’s means to alleviate the political tension caused by this rather controversial reform. In fact, this provision allowed the official stance in parliament to claim a lack of interest in President Correa’s third and consecutive re-election. However, and this is important, his eventual and indefinite participation as a presidential candidate could resume from 2020. In other words, according to the official discourse President Correa was not the reform’s raison d’être, although his return in 2021 (‘God willing’) was desired. In the 2015 debate it was purported that this reformation did not alter the principle of the rotation of democratic power, for the ultimate decision relied on the sovereign’s will (SD, 2015: 136–7, 245).
With 109 parliamentarians (out of 137) present during the voting, the constitutional amendment allowing indefinite presidential re-elections was approved with 100 favourable votes, eight negatives and one abstention (SD, 2015: 294).
Conclusion
Arguments favouring and opposing presidential re-elections in the Americas are as old as the 1787 US Constitution. In this article I have analysed a particular stance on re-elections, that is, the official discourse that authorised indefinite presidential re-elections in Ecuador from 2015 to 2018. In doing so I have moved beyond the traditional focus on rationalist, institutional, economic and leadership factors in addressing the article’s research question. In particular, I have endeavoured to show how a Lacanian approach to the grip of ideology – predicataed on the transgressive nature of enjoyment – contributes to our understanding of Alianza País’ sudden expression of and yearning for indefinite presidential re-elections. In a nutshell, the fantasy of an unstoppable revolution led by a charismatic leader outweighed the adequate symbolic formation of the Ecuadorian Citizens’ Revolution. In this process both the followers (that is, Alianza País’ grassroots movement and its parliamentarians) and their leader transgressed the spirit with which the Citizens’ Revolution emerged in 2007.
Notwithstanding that I have sought to highlight the psychoanalytic factor in explaining the shift in position exhibited by Alianza País, this should not be taken to mean that other explanatory factors do not also play important roles. For this reason, as Glynos argues (2021: 12–13), we must guard against psychoanalytic imperialism, that is an academic endeavour that tends to exaggerate the explanatory power of psychoanalysis. For instance, the concept of enjoyment could become as imperialistic as that of ‘class’ has in certain economistic approaches to political and ideological analysis. Thus, we should welcome other supplementary interpretations of Alianza País’ shift in position not only to prevent an ‘expert-centred approach’ sometimes found in psychoanalytically informed enterprises (Frosh, 2019: 105–6), but also to explore how these different explanatory factors interrelate.
But the surprising and sudden reversal of political and constitutional direction in Ecuador raises additional interesting questions for future research because of the way the discourse of a democratic revolution relied on a charismatic left-wing leader. For instance, how does the yearning for unlimited presidential re-elections appear across the ideological spectrum, and/or in presidential democracies in which leaders are not charismatic? More importantly, what are the limits to utilising the concept of enjoyment in discourse analyses beyond the clinical setting? Should psychoanalytically informed enterprises in the social sciences remain at a theoretical level? For example, despite the fact that the corpus analysed here is in the public domain, are there ethical implications stemming from this article that need to be further addressed? Is speculation a productive and pertinent research strategy in the realm of psychosocial studies? These and related questions, which will help to better probe and test the limits to my argument, beg further investigation.
Acknowledgements
A special thanks to Jason Glynos. His insightful and generous comments on earlier versions of this article have proven crucial. I would also like to thank Laura Montanaro, Federica Genovese, Aziz Alghashian, Reid Kleinberg, Pete Gentry and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.
Conflict of interest
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
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